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Abstract 
Why has regime change, defined as military intervention aimed at forcibly transforming a 
target state’s domestic political authority structure, been a long-standing practice in US 
foreign policy, used roughly two dozen times since 1900 despite its limited success in 
producing peace, stability and/or democracy? Extant theories fail to provide sound answers. 
Realist approaches, for example, under-predict the recurrence of regime change if great 
powers should have no reason to intervene in weaker states, or over-predict it if anything 
goes under anarchy. Similarly, democracy promotion arguments overstate the causal 
importance of the US desire to expand liberty globally. 
This dissertation presents a novel explanation for the recurrence of regime change in US 
foreign policy, arguing that the practice of regime change is predicated upon what I call 
'emotional frustration', an anger-arousing emotional state that is brought about by a foreign 
leader's obstructive behavior perceived to be rooted in implacable hatred. While obstruction 
is ubiquitous in interstate interactions, I claim that the combination of hegemonic 
expectations towards a target state and the perception of hatred shape the extent to which a 
foreign leader's conduct evokes an emotional response on the part of foreign policy elites. 
Once emotionally frustrated, regime change becomes an attractive foreign policy instrument 
to decision-makers who seek a way to confront and put a stop to the obstruction of a 
menacing target state. It enables frustrated leaders both to permanently get rid of a 
perceivedly hostile foreign leader and to discharge their frustration through the use of force. 
Illustrating the importance of emotional frustration, I conduct four historical case studies 
based on primary sources, spanning almost one hundred years of US history. Regime changes 
in Cuba (1906), Nicaragua (1909–12), the Dominican Republic (1965), and Iraq (2003) 
reveal overlooked patterns of emotional frustration that have time and again animated regime 
change decisions. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In a much-televised manifestation of the strikingly quick disintegration and defeat of Saddam 
Hussein's Ba'athist regime in Iraq, US military forces ripped down a statue of the Iraqi 
dictator from its base in Baghdad's Firdos Square on April 9, 2003.1 Only three weeks earlier, 
on March 19, US President George W. Bush had ordered the invasion of Iraq with 183,000 
coalition troops.2 The toppling of the statue not only symbolized the abrupt end of the 
dictator's rule over Iraq, it also came as a potent image for the foreign policy of regime 
change, prompting some to call the invasion the "Mother of All Regime Changes".3 But as 
defining as the overthrow of Saddam Hussein was for the practice of regime change – the 
very term regime change first emerged in connection with US policy towards Iraq in the 
1990s –4 Iraq is merely a recent case added to a long list of similar cases. Indeed, regime 
change, which is defined here as military intervention aimed at forcibly transforming a target 
state's domestic political authority structure, figures prominently in the history of both US 
foreign policy and international politics. Contrary to the view that the 2003 US-led invasion 
of Iraq was a radical aberration stemming from overwhelming neoconservative influence on 
the Bush administration's foreign policy,5 regime change is a time-honored tool of statecraft 
with a long-standing tradition: a brief glance at the historical record shows that the United 
States alone accounts for twenty-five cases of regime change that span more than a hundred 
years of modern American history from 1899 until today.6 At the same time, however, regime 
change is a proscribed tool of foreign policy with no standing in international law, which 
stands as a formidable hurdle to its use, making regime change anything but a routinized 
foreign policy practice. Therefore, the much-discussed 2003 invasion of Iraq begs a broader 
and more fundamental question: if not habitual, why has regime change been a recurrently 
                                                 
1
 "The Fall of Baghdad", New York Times, April 10, 2003. 
2
 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 379, 401. 
3
 W. Michael Reisman, "The Manley O. Hudson Lecture: Why Regime Change Is (Almost Always) a Bad 
Idea," American Journal of International Law 98, no. 3 (2004): 519. 
4
 According to Robert Litwak, "'[r]egime change' entered the U.S. foreign policy lexicon in connection with Iraq 
in the late 1990s and was popularized by the Bush administration in the months preceding the 2003 war to oust 
Saddam Hussein". See Robert S. Litwak, Regime Change: U.S. Strategy Through the Prism of 9/11 
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2007), xiii. 
5
 See for example Stefan A. Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the 
Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 139. For a dissenting, yet affirmative view, see 
Robert Kagan, "Neocon Nation - Neoconservatism, c. 1776," World Affairs 170, no. 4 (2008). 
6
 John M. Owen, The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change, 
1510-2010 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 22. By another count, the United States has engaged 
in twenty-two regime change operations since 1900. See David A. Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 115-116. In total, Owen counts 209 cases of regime change in 
international history from 1510 to 2010, Owen, The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, 
States, and Regime Change, 1510-2010, 2. 
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used practice in US foreign policy over more than the past one hundred years? Taking up this 
question head-on, this project is an inquiry into the recurrence of regime change in US 
foreign policy. 
The question of why regime has repeatedly been used in US foreign policy is relevant 
both in terms of theory and policy: first, regime change is a highly consequential and 
disruptive foreign policy practice. In Iraq, more than a decade has passed since the 2003 
invasion. Saddam Hussein was executed and relegated to the dustbin of history in December 
2006; the United States withdrew all its troops from Iraq in December 2011. Post-invasion 
Iraq, however, rarely fails to remind us of the repercussions of regime change. Stability and 
democracy, whether actually sought after by the invaders or not, have remained remote ideals 
rather than becoming tangible results.7 Iraq is not exceptional. Akin to revolutions, i.e. 
moments when "one state structure dissolves and a new one arises in its place",8 regime 
change generally causes a massive disruption in the most fundamental authority structures of 
target states and is, through the effects on a state's infrastructural power and institutions, "the 
most shattering domestic political event a country can experience".9 This is, as Alexander 
Downes correctly notes, why "it is important to understand the origins of FIRC [foreign-
imposed regime change] because it sometimes entails disastrous consequences".10 
Second, the practice of regime change deserves attention because, as an instrument of 
foreign policy, it is far from being obsolete. Influential US policymakers regularly invoke 
ideas about regime change when it comes to dealing with perceived enemies. While former 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates pointedly urged avoiding Iraqi-style invasions in a speech 
addressing the future of the US Army in February 2011,11 at least two candidates running in 
the 2012 Republican presidential primaries, Mitt Romney and Newt Gingrich, demanded a 
reinvigorated foreign policy, pushing for regime change in countries like North Korea and 
                                                 
7
 With a score of six for civil liberties and five for political rights, Iraq is still rated as 'not free' by Freedom 
House's 2012 Freedom in the World report. In terms of political stability, "ongoing sectarian, terrorist, and 
political violence targeted government forces" still in 2011, and "terrorist attacks continue to be directed toward 
sectarian targets". See Freedom House, Freedom in the World: Iraq (2012 [cited November 20, 2012]); 
available from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/iraq#.U1SHBleKJBk. 
8
 Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), vii. 
9
 Goran Peic and Dan Reiter, "Foreign-Imposed Regime Change, State Power and Civil War Onset, 1920-2004," 
British Journal of Political Science 41, no. 3 (2011): 453. From the regime changer's perspective, "[f]ew 
national undertakings are as complex, costly, and time consuming as reconstructing the governing institutions of 
foreign societies" after regime change. See Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, "Lessons from the Past: The American 
Record on Nation Building,"  (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), 1. 
10
 Alexander B. Downes, "The Causes of Foreign-Imposed Regime Change in Interstate Wars," in Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association (2008), 4. 
11
 Speech delivered by Robert M. Gates at the United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, February 25, 
2011 (http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1539, accessed on November 20, 2012).  
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Iran.12 More generally, Robert Kagan, contrasting the contemporary era of US foreign policy 
with the isolationist inter-war years,13 reminds us that current intervention fatigue among US 
foreign policymakers and the US public might not be a lasting sentiment, making regime 
change anything but outdated as a foreign policy instrument.  
Third, regime change is a practice worth investigating because it has broad 
implications for a number of fundamental debates within the discipline of international 
relations. First, it raises important questions with respect to the reasons why states resort to 
the use of force, perhaps the most essential research agenda in international relations, and 
state behavior more generally speaking. While distinctly different from other types of used 
force,14 studying regime change can provide insights into the causes of interstate violence. 
Second, the practice of regime change, being notorious for its violation of state sovereignty, 
tells us something about the mutual recognition of sovereignty and the extent to which states 
are willing to respect this basic principle in international society. Indeed, repeated and 
consistent violations of what Hedley Bull calls "basic rules of coexistence in international 
society" might have implications for how we perceive the constitutive structure of 
international politics.15 It is these implications that make regime change a relevant subject 
worth studying. 
The Enigma of Regime Change 
A brief look at the history of US foreign policy in the past one hundred years shows that 
regime change has been a recurrent, yet non-habitual tool of statecraft. On the one hand, no 
other country has engaged in regime change operations more frequently during the twentieth 
century than the United States, the single most prolific regime changer in the world. Having 
conducted twenty-five regime changes in various target states between 1899 and 2003,16 US 
regime change occurs roughly once every four years on average. What is more, the pattern of 
                                                 
12
 "The Race to the Right", New York Times, December 24, 2011. "Gingrich's Foreign Policy Words Summon 
the Cold War, but Enemy Is Iran", New York Times, December 15, 2011.  
13
 Robert Kagan, "Superpowers Don't Get to Retire," New Republic, May 26 2014. 
14
 As Bruce Jentleson and Ariel Levite show, regime change, or what they call "foreign military intervention", 
differs from the concept of war along the dimensions of domain, objective, and strategy. See Bruce W. Jentleson 
and Ariel E. Levite, "The Analysis of Protracted Foreign Military Intervention," in Foreign Military 
Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict, ed. Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson, and Larry Berman 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 5-8. 
15
 As Hedley Bull argues, "[a]t the heart of [the rules of coexistence] is the principle that each state accepts the 
duty to respect the sovereignty or supreme jurisdiction of every other state over its own citizens and domain, in 
return for the right to expect similar respect for its own sovereignty from other states". See Hedley Bull, The 
Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002 [1977]), 
67. 
16
 Owen, The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change, 1510-
2010, 18-22. 
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US regime change covers times of multipolarity, bipolarity, and unipolarity in the 
international system – the pre-World War I era, the Cold War, and the post-Cold War era – 
and extends to many different regions of the world – the Western hemisphere,17 Europe, the 
Middle East, East Asia, and Southeast Asia.18 Put differently, US regime change has a long 
tradition, constituting to a recurrent pattern in US foreign policy. On the other hand, however, 
regime change remains an extraordinary foreign policy practice. As much as it occupies a 
prominent place in the toolbox of US foreign policy, its use is far from habitual. Unlike other 
practices like diplomacy or even war, regime change is not routinized or what John Owen 
calls "a normal tool of statecraft",19 as it has no established place in the normative structure of 
international life. Thus, regime change is not a routinized tool of foreign policy. The 
simultaneity of its recurrence and non-habitual nature make it a puzzling phenomenon in 
international relations.  
The pattern of recurrent US regime change activity over more than the past hundred 
years is equally puzzling from a consequentialist perspective: while being highly 
consequential, regime change has ramifications rarely congruent with what the literature 
generally assumes are the regime changer's intentions. That stability, peace, and democracy 
have been out of reach in post-invasion Iraq, as described above, is no isolated incident. 
According to the literature on the effects of foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC), FIRCs 
are generally detrimental to the internal stability of target states and rarely successful in 
advancing democracy. Goran Peic and Dan Reiter, for example, find that "FIRCs make civil 
wars more likely because they wreck state infrastructural power or change political 
institutions".20 With respect to the likelihood of successful democratization through FIRC, 
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George Downs show that "intervention does little to promote 
democracy and often leads to its erosion".21 Notwithstanding the finding that countries that 
have experienced intervention are more likely to democratize, James Meernik similarly 
maintains that "regardless of the manner in which democratic change is measured, the 
majority of US military interventions do not appear to lead to increased levels of 
                                                 
17
 Mindful of the fact that, in strictly geographical terms, the Western hemisphere refers to the half of the earth 
that lies west of the prime meridian, thereby including parts of Western Europe and Western Africa, I use the 
term interchangeably with the Americas or the New World, essentially referring to Latin American states. 
18
 Owen, The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change, 1510-
2010. 
19
 Ibid., 3. 
20
 Peic and Reiter, "Foreign-Imposed Regime Change, State Power and Civil War Onset, 1920-2004," 474. 
"Virtually necessary conditions" for FIRC to cause civil war are interstate war and the imposition of changes in 
political institutions, ibid., 470. 
21
 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George. W. Downs, "Intervention and Democracy," International Organization 
60, no. 3 (2006): 647. 
 5 
democracy".22 Finally, Alexander Downes and Jonathan Monten find that "democratizing 
efforts of the intervener are largely for naught" unless the target states is economically 
developed, ethnically homogenous, and has prior experience with representative 
government.23 If these studies are right, engagement in regime change is hardly explicable. 
Why do states in general and the US in particular engage in regime change if its effects are 
unintended, undesired, and dangerous? 
The central purpose of this study is to explain the US practice of regime change and to 
account for its recurrent, yet non-habitual pattern from the beginning of the twentieth century 
until today. Inquiring into the long-standing tradition of regime change in US foreign policy, 
the study asks why and for what purpose the United States has repeatedly used this foreign 
policy instrument in its dealings with the world? Admittedly, answering such question is no 
easy task. Referring to George W. Bush's decision to invade Iraq in 2003, Richard Haass, the 
State Department's Director of Policy Planning from 2001 to 2003 during Bush's first 
presidential term, openly admits that despite his "good if not complete understanding of how 
this second Iraq war came about", he "will go to [his] grave not fully understanding why".24 
A brief look at the extant literature on regime change, intervention, and US foreign policy 
shows that convincing answers are lacking not only with respect to Iraq, but with respect to 
the sources of US regime change more generally. There is a striking gap between the 
relevance of the question and what we know about how and why regime change comes about. 
Stephen Krasner calls this gap between relevance and accumulated knowledge about regime 
change, or what he calls state practices "designed to alter the domestic authority structures of 
other states", a lacuna that for international relations scholarship is "particularly troubling or 
perhaps, just weird".25 By providing an answer based on qualitative historical research, this 
study will try to fill this gap, making an explanatory contribution to our understanding of 
regime change as a recurrent, yet non-habitual feature of US foreign policy. 
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The Shortcomings of Conventional Explanations 
Existing literature has either paid surprisingly little systematic attention to the reasons and 
sources of regime change, or is limited in its contribution to accounting for its use.26 
Canvassing and critically reviewing a broad range of extant explanations, Chapter One of this 
study will show in more detail that the single most important limitation shared by most 
accounts is an inhibiting over-reliance on the notion that regime change is the product of a 
cold and careful cost-benefit calculus. Adopting a perspective that is focused on the 
consequences of regime change, most explanations assume either implicitly or explicitly that 
regime change yields predefined benefits like democratization or the elimination of threat 
coveted by the regime changer. The following two sections extract arguments about the 
sources of regime change from broader research on democracy promotion and the 
consequences of unipolarity, two of the most relevant alternative accounts.  
Democracy Promotion 
There is a vast literature on democracy promotion, especially democracy promotion and US 
foreign policy.27 While not necessarily speaking directly to the research question dealt with 
here, arguments about the sources of regime change can be extracted from this literature. 
Focusing on democracy promotion through force as a specific type of intervention, one 
potential explanation for regime change is the argument that US liberalism and democracy 
are root causes of American interventionism. Such an argument ascribes a central role to 
identity for the country's foreign policy, with American national identity defined as a type of 
national identity that assumes the universality of the "American national experiment".28 The 
consequence of this national identity is a foreign policy that, according to Marc Peceny, 
exhibits a "cultural bias in favor of democracy".29 This does not mean that the American 
impulse to spread democracy globally cannot be in line with national security imperatives. 
According to Tony Smith, democracy promotion is an expression of the United States' 
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conception of national security which assumes that "a peaceful world order in which America 
could fully participate needed to be one constituted by democratic states".30 Concerns with 
the domestic order of other countries thus stems from a security concern: the impulse to 
spread democracy around the world is based on the belief that "the character of the domestic 
regimes of other states [is] hugely important for the attainment of American security and 
material interests".31 Understood in this way, strategic behavior aimed at enhancing US 
influence in the world is not antithetical, but rather congruent with a foreign policy based on 
values in favor of spreading democracy around the world. 
The historical record of US regime change contradicts the purported relationship 
between the practice of regime change and its democratizing purpose. While democracy 
promotion is perhaps the most intuitive US foreign policy preference, the US has, even after 
Woodrow Wilson's presidency and the alleged birth of "American liberal democratic 
internationalism",32 deliberately and forcefully reversed attempts at domestic democratization 
in a number of countries. Tony Smith acknowledges that US governments have supported 
"authoritarian governments in places as different as Greece, Turkey, China/Taiwan and 
throughout Latin America", but treats these cases as a Cold War anomaly.33 Democracy 
prevention rather than promotion, however, is more than just an anomaly: preoccupied with 
the containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the United States was forced to 
"sup with the Devil in ways that made a policy of liberal ends and means impossible to 
pursue".34 Hence, the correlation between regime change and democracy promotion is not as 
consistent as this argument expects. 
Unipolarity and the Structural Roots of Regime Change 
According to some, the phenomenon of regime change and intervention more broadly is a 
consequence of causal factors sitting at the structural level of the state system.35 Among the 
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factors at the level of the international system, the international distribution of power, often 
understood in terms of material capabilities, is a prominent factor. Stephen Brooks and 
William Wohlforth, for example, argue that unipolarity, i.e. an international system with "one 
extremely capable state" vis-à-vis other states,36 has implications for the likelihood of 
intervention. As part of their general argument about how systemic constraints inhibiting the 
freedom of action of the most powerful state in the system are inoperative in a condition of 
unipolarity, the two authors argue that intervention is more likely in unipolarity than 
bipolarity. As the unipole does not need to "factor in the prospect of military intervention by 
another great power", the lack of a counterbalancing constraint provides the unipole with 
opportunities for intervention that a great power confronted with another great power would 
not have under bipolarity. Comparing the 1991 Gulf War with the 1973 oil embargo, the 
authors argue that the United States did not militarily intervene in the Middle East following 
the 1973 oil embargo because of "the potential for direct or indirect Soviet intervention" as a 
"significant constraint on the use of American force".37 More broadly speaking, the absence 
of strong constraints under unipolarity makes intervention and regime change more likely. 
While Brooks and Wohlforth provide an inherently consistent explanation for why the 
absence of constraints on US foreign policy is important for our understanding of the 
occurrence of intervention, the consequences of unipolarity are indeterminate to the extent to 
which alternative international distributions of power as material capabilities can have the 
same implications for intervention and regime change. Bipolarity, for instance, can be a 
power distribution that is just as prone to the occurrence of intervention as unipolarity, 
especially in the nuclear age. According to Hans Morgenthau, "the recognition on the part of 
the two superpowers, armed with a large arsenal of nuclear weapons, that a direct 
confrontation between them would entail unacceptable risks" makes them choose "to oppose 
and compete with each other surreptitiously through the intermediary of third parties", 
leading to proxy wars and intervention in weaker states.38 Testifying to the indeterminacy of 
structural effects on the prevalence of regime change, the historical record of US regime 
change shows that the recurrent pattern of its employment is hardly related to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Steven E.  Lobell, Norrin M.  Ripsman, and Jeffrey W.  Taliaferro 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 140-141. 
36
 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the 
Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 12. For a similar argument 
stressing the impact of power disparities on the propensity to intervene, see Oran R.  Young, "Intervention and 
International Systems," Journal of International Affairs 22, no. 2 (1968): 182. 
37
 Brooks and Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American 
Primacy, 58. 
38
 Hans J.  Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene," Foreign Affairs 45 (1966): 428. 
 9 
international power distribution, given that the United States has engaged in this practice 
under multipolarity, for example in Cuba in 1906 and in Nicaragua between 1909 and 1912, 
bipolarity, for example in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and unipolarity, for example in 
Iraq in 2003. 
The Argument – Hegemonic Expectations, Perceptions of Hatred, and Emotional 
Frustration  
I argue that the assumption of rationality found in many extant explanations is misleading, 
blinding us to the actual nature of the decision-making process that results in regime change. 
Rather than taking a cost-benefit calculus for granted, we cannot understand engagement in 
regime change unless we analyze the decision-making process in the run-up to regime change 
operations head-on. According to the argument presented here, regime change is a foreign 
policy that displays aggression. More often than not, the ambitions pursued with it are 
offensive, not defensive. Regime change is a "war of choice", i.e. a war that does "not involve 
obvious self-defense",39 not a "war of necessity" marked by the "requirement to respond to 
the use of military force by an aggressor and the fact that no option other than military force 
exists to reverse what has been done".40 But what is the choice of aggression in regime 
change based on? As mentioned above, international relations scholarship typically treats 
aggressive behavior as the product of a careful cost-benefit calculus. "Calculated aggression", 
a type of aggression that involves weighing "costs and risks of offense against the likely 
benefits" rather than charging "headlong into losing wars or Pyrrhic victories",41 is most 
commonly assumed to be at play in foreign policy decision-making. Yet, I claim that this 
type of aggression must be contrasted with aggression triggered by emotions. In order to 
account for US regime change behavior, the central claim of this study is that regime change 
is a type of 'affective' aggression triggered by what I call 'emotional frustration'. 
The argument about how emotional frustration can lead to the aggressive foreign 
policy of regime change centers on foreign policy decision makers, i.e. state leaders, their 
foreign policy aides, and other statesmen involved in the articulation and execution of a 
country's foreign policy, and their experience of frustration. Taken as a starting point, 
frustration is ubiquitous in international politics. In their dealings with other states, state 
leaders' plans and desires are rarely fully realized, which means that their expectations are 
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oftentimes obstructed. But not every frustration triggers an emotional response. To 
distinguish between different types of reactions to frustration, constituted by expectations and 
the obstruction thereof, I define emotional frustration, a sub-type of frustration, as an anger-
arousing emotional state provoked by an obstruction of prior expectations that is perceived to 
be rooted in intolerable hatred. Thus, in order to understand what evokes an aggressive 
response to frustration on the part of foreign policymakers, we need to turn to expectations 
and perceptions of obstruction. Prior expectations towards the behavior of a target state are 
important, because behavior becomes obstructive only in light of expectations. I argue that 
especially hegemonic expectations, which I define as anticipations that a target state will 
comply with the wishes of foreign policymakers even if these wishes undermine the 
autonomous decision-making capabilities of the target state, enhance the frustration potential 
of foreign policymakers by raising the probability that target state actions will be regarded as 
obstructive.  
Hegemonic expectations by themselves, however, are not enough to bring about 
emotional frustration. I argue that to understand emotional frustration, we must additionally 
assess how foreign policymakers perceive a given obstruction by a target state. If obstruction 
is perceived to be a routine matter, a fact of life in international politics, or attributable to 
external constraints and requirements, there is a low likelihood that frustration will arouse an 
emotional response.42 If, however, obstruction is perceived to be emanating from deep and 
intolerable hatred for the frustrated, it constitutes emotional frustration and is more likely to 
lead to aggression.43 Attributions with regard to the causes of an obstruction and perceptions 
of intentionality are thus critical to how frustration becomes emotional. In combination with 
hegemonic expectations, the perception of foreign policymakers that an obstruction is rooted 
in hatred and irredeemable hostility, plays an important role in evoking an emotional 
response to frustration.  
While regime change can certainly not be reduced to emotions, I argue that it would 
be difficult to explain regime change without reference to the emotional frustration of foreign 
policymakers. Once emotionally frustrated with a target state, foreign policymakers have a 
high chance of considering regime change an attractive option to put a stop to the obstruction 
of a menacing target state. Regime change helps leaders not only to get rid of a foreign leader 
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perceived to be full of intolerable hatred, but also to discharge frustration through the use of 
force. Understood this way, the practice of regime change need not be a product of a rational 
weighing of costs and benefits, nor a tool whose essential purpose is to confront national 
security threats or to spread democracy. Instead, it is best understood as a foreign policy 
practice predicated upon emotional frustration. 
Method and Case Selection 
To illustrate how central hegemonic expectations, perceptions of obstruction as a sign of deep 
hatred, and emotional frustration are for regime change decisions, I conduct a qualitative 
historical analysis of four US regime change cases. While I use cross-case comparisons to 
evaluate alternative explanations, my principle source of analytical leverage comes from the 
within-case analysis of historical cases, a methodological tradition with different names, yet 
most commonly referred to as "process tracing".44 With respect to the selection of cases, I 
examine four US intervention decisions: the 1906 intervention in Cuba, the 1909 intervention 
in Nicaragua, the 1965 Dominican intervention, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Why these 
cases? Evidently, unless one studies "all cases in the population [...], one faces the pertinent 
challenge of case selection".45 Since random selection, an otherwise powerful approach to 
case selection, is not an appropriate selection procedure for qualitative research,46 intentional, 
non-random case selection, with all its pitfalls and vulnerability to inherent selection bias,47 is 
the norm and only alternative that qualitative researchers have. On the basis of established 
case selection criteria in the literature on case study methodology,48 my rationale for selecting 
the above-mentioned four regime change decisions is as follows: first, I solely focus on US 
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instances of regime change. As already mentioned above, the United States is the most 
prolific regime changer in recent international history and hence, in empirical terms, the most 
important and intriguing state to study. True, one could argue that the narrative presented 
here might be a product of unique American circumstances, less relevant to illuminating other 
states' patterns of engagement in regime change, and therefore not generalizable or applicable 
to an international set of regime changers. Mindful of the relevance of these potential 
charges, I argue that on the basis of my argument that emotional frustration must be taken 
into account to understand regime change decisions, US engagement in regime change is a 
least-likely case,49 at least from the perspective of the commonly held assumption that 
especially Western decision-makers are particularly unlikely to be prone to emotional 
decision-making.50 This assumption, however questionable, has been implicitly held both in a 
wide range of scholarly work and the realm of policymaking, predominantly historically, but 
also up to more recent times, and is best expressed in Henry Kissinger's description of the 
developing world where foreign policy is not defined "according to clear, objective rational 
interests but rather by opaque, internal, and irrational cultural desires and emotions."51 
Showing that emotional frustration indeed plays an important role in US regime change 
decisions should do away with such assumptions and thereby bolster our confidence in the 
general relevance of emotions in regime change decisions.52 
Second, among US cases of regime change, I choose four historical cases that span 
the entire period of US regime change activity from the beginning of the twentieth century 
until today, covering different periods in the history of US foreign policy and thus allowing 
for variation in the structure of the international system, regime types promoted, and the 
international normative context, i.e. factors that might be considered playing a role in the 
occurrence of regime change. This case selection rationale, choosing four positive cases and 
allowing for variation in a number of potentially important factors, brings leverage to the 
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analysis by facilitating the elimination of those varying factors at the cross-case level.53 In 
addition to the broad temporal variation, the chosen targets of regime change provide some 
level of spatial variation. To be sure, one could argue that my case selection is somehow 
biased because three out of four target states under study are in the Western hemisphere, the 
"backyard" of the United States, potentially confounding the analysis, as Latin American 
peculiarities might have an underappreciated bearing on the US decision to engage in regime 
change. I try to counter such claims by showing that those factors facilitating US regime 
change in Latin America, expectations of compliance towards chosen targets and other 
potentially influential factors such as power disparities in bilateral relations, are in fact 
similar across different regions in which the US has engaged in regime change. 
A potential criticism of my case selection could be the often-invoked mantra that a 
no-variance design on the outcome of interest, commonly referred to as 'selecting on the 
dependent variable', leads to devastating bias and hampers inferential leverage. Especially 
Barbara Geddes' admonition that studying positive cases without paying attention to their 
negative counterparts might lead to faulty inference if one concludes from such a study that 
"any characteristic that the selected cases share is a cause",54 should be taken seriously. To 
avoid such faulty inference, my individual case studies involve a careful assessment of US 
foreign policy towards the target state in question prior to the intervention decision, 
guaranteeing variation in the US approach towards the target, the outcome of interest.55 This 
strategy is most explicit in the fourth case study, the 2003 Iraq War, in which I analyze the 
shift in US foreign policy towards Iraq from containment (negative outcome) to regime 
change (positive outcome) in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.56 
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Moreover, this study is not exposed to the type of selection bias mentioned by Barbara 
Geddes and others for a second reason: qualitative methodologists show convincingly that 
while exclusively focusing on positive cases indeed leaves one vulnerable to selection bias at 
the cross-case level, within-case analysis is much less subject to this kind of bias. Following a 
different logic of inference by seeking out what has been called "internal evidence about 
causation" instead of relying on cross-case comparisons, within-case analysis, the major 
source of analytical leverage in this dissertation, is relatively immune from the dangers of 
selection bias caused by 'selection on the dependent variable'.57 
Source Material  
Following established guidelines to help minimize unwarranted selectivity and bias,58 I gather 
evidence from disparate sources: archival sources and other primary documents, 
historiographies of the cases studied, memoirs written by policymakers, a number of 
interviews with administration officials from the George W. Bush administration for the 2003 
Iraq case, and newspaper reports mainly from US dailies. With the help of triangulation, I try 
to contextualize consulted sources by comparing pieces of evidence across different types of 
sources and by drawing on a wide range of different historiographies in order to grasp the 
historical and political context of decisions.59 Especially the use of contemporary news 
reports helps contextualize secondary sources and, more importantly, archival government 
documents, providing valuable information on the political context in which foreign policy is 
elaborated and articulated.60  
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In terms of primary sources, I make extensive use of declassified government 
documents. My starting point for the first three cases, Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Dominican 
Republic, is the Foreign Relations of the United States series (FRUS), a vast, officially edited 
collection of hitherto classified documents on major US foreign policy decisions.61 For 
additional depth in primary records, I have also consulted the personal papers of two 
presidents and two secretaries of state stored in the Manuscript Division of the Library of 
Congress for my first two cases: the Theodore Roosevelt Papers and the Elihu Root Papers 
for the 1906 Cuban intervention and the William H. Taft Papers and Philander C. Knox 
Papers for the 1909 intervention in Nicaragua. These collections provide valuable insight 
into the personal correspondence and governmental documents of the top US foreign policy 
elite. Regarding the 1965 Dominican intervention, I heavily rely on archival materials from 
the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas, especially the National 
Security Country File on the Dominican Republic and recordings of telephone conversations 
between President Johnson and his aides. With respect to my last case, the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq, almost all relevant US government documents remain classified. The National Security 
Archive, a private organization based in Washington, D.C., however, has made a significant 
number of Freedom of Information Act requests (FOIA) and presents compilations of 
obtained documents pertinent to Iraq in several Electronic Briefing Books.62 A small number 
of other primary sources have been provided by Donald Rumsfeld and Douglas Feith, George 
W. Bush's Secretary of Defense and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy during the 2003 
invasion of Iraq.63 This breadth and depth of different source across and within my four cases 
should help make my analysis more reliable. 
While the central argument of this study about the role of emotional frustration in US 
regime change decisions hinges upon the quality of the source material used, tracing the 
emotional state of US foreign policy elites is no easy task. Emotions are usually guarded from 
the public and even with regard to the decision-making process within US administrations, 
evidence for emotional frustration is hard to come by, as "top-level policymakers are 
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motivated to conduct the decision process in ways that will enable them to assure the public 
later that the decision was made after careful multisided deliberation".64 Stephen Pelz makes 
a similar argument, showing that "many international leaders take pains to disguise their 
reasoning and purposes".65 To deal with these problems, I pay particular attention to informal 
primary sources like personal letters or telephone conversations with friends, i.e. documents 
that provide a more probable window into the emotional state of US leaders.66 Relying on 
these types of documents therefore helps me trace the emotional state of presidents and 
influential foreign policymakers within US governments. 
Plan of the Study 
The plan of the dissertation is as follows. Part I has two chapters. The following chapter 
(Chapter One) presents the subject of inquiry, i.e. the recurrence of regime change in US 
foreign policy. It shows that with more than two dozen regime change operations, it is a 
relevant instrument of US foreign policy that deserves to be inquired into. In terms of theory, 
its relevance stems from the discipline's broad mission to deal with the foreign policy 
behavior of states, with intervention decisions, and the use of force in the international arena. 
For the policy debate, this inquiry is relevant because it helps us understand what 
policymakers strive for when they engage in regime change and what implications this has 
for the effectiveness of regime change. After having laid out the general research question of 
this dissertation and having conceptualized regime change as the subject of inquiry, the 
chapter turns to conventional explanations briefly sketched in this introduction. It argues that 
particularly literature on democracy promotion and systemic constraints on state behavior 
provide good starting points for the generation of alternative explanations. It will show, 
however, that arguments discernable from the literature on foreign-imposed regime change 
and bargaining theory are insufficient, be it theoretically or empirically, to account for the 
pattern of regime change in US foreign policy. Chapter Two presents the dissertation's main 
argument, postulating a relationship between the level of emotional frustration of leading 
foreign policymakers and their propensity to engage in regime change in foreign countries. It 
starts with a discussion of emotion and its place in IR theory, before turning to the 
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conceptualization of the theory's main explanatory phenomenon, i.e. emotional frustration. It 
then discusses the relevance of foreign policy expectations, perceptions of obstruction, and 
specifies their relationship with the experience of emotional frustration, arguing that 
emotional reactions to obstruction caused by foreign states is more likely when foreign 
policymakers have an expansive set of expectations towards the target state and perceive 
obstruction to be rooted in intolerable hatred.  
Part II constitutes the empirical part of the dissertation, consisting of four historical 
case studies of US regime change operations. Chapter Three deals with Theodore Roosevelt's 
decision to intervene in Cuba in 1906 and to re-occupy the island for the duration of three 
years through to 1909. It analyzes Roosevelt's prior vision for and hegemonic expectations 
towards the young Cuban republic before intervening and his general frustration with Cuban 
state conduct, both international and domestic. Chapter Four turns to another pre-World War 
I case of US regime change, i.e. William H. Taft's series of interventions in Nicaragua from 
1909 to 1912. In this era of so-called dollar diplomacy, the Taft administration grew 
increasingly more frustrated with long-time Nicaraguan President Jose Santos Zelaya and 
decided to interject itself in the domestic struggle for power between Zelaya supporters and 
opponents. Chapter Five turns to Lyndon B. Johnson's Dominican intervention in 1965, 
detailing how in the context of the Cold War, the US government expended considerable 
efforts to prevent the return of the ousted Dominican President Juan Bosch whose supporters 
were involved in a violent standoff with Dominican junta forces in April 1965. The chapter 
discusses Johnson's rationale to send more than 20,000 troops to the island in what was the 
biggest US intervention in the Western hemisphere since the 1930s. Chapter Six turns to the 
arguably most prominent case of US regime change: the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This chapter 
illustrates how, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, Saddam Hussein's obstructive 
behavior was perceived to be an expression of his deep anti-Americanism and how this 
perception combined with hegemonic expectations contributed to the Bush administration 
vehement desire to overthrow the Iraqi dictator after 9/11.  
The study closes with a concluding chapter that not only summarizes the main 
problematic of the study, the theoretical argument, and the empirical findings, but also 
presents a set of implications for international relations scholarship. First, the study makes a 
contribution to the debate on the significance of public justifications for foreign policy 
actions. Showing that while especially realist theories have rightly cautioned us against 
taking public rhetoric at face value and assuming that they accurately reflect the actual 
driving forces for foreign policy, realists themselves give too much credit to justifications 
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based on supposed threats to national security. To the extent that regime change is predicated 
upon emotional frustration rather than security concerns, realists thus commit the same 
mistakes they accuse others of making. Second, turning to the debate on US grand strategy, 
the study contributes to the discussion between proponents of primacy ("deep engagement") 
and proponents of restraint (retrenchment). On the basis of one of the main arguments of the 
study, namely that hegemonic expectations enhance the potential for frustration, potentially 
leading to emotional frustration if obstruction is perceived in a certain way, i.e. as rooted in 
hatred and hostility, I show that both advocates and critics of the grand strategy of primacy 
have paid little attention to the unintended consequences of such expectations. While 
proponents of primacy assure that their preferred grand strategy does not necessarily result in 
a more aggressive foreign policy, they underestimate that hegemonic expectations, which can 
be said to be more akin to such a grand strategy, in fact do make a turn to aggression much 
more likely than expected. Third, this study makes a contribution to the debate on the 
effectiveness of regime change. It shows that it makes little sense to analyze the prospects of 
"foreign-imposed regime change" for democratization in the target state if we know little 
about the regime changer's motivations. By demonstrating that emotional frustration plays a 
more consistent role in regime change decisions, the study implies that to judge effectiveness, 
we need to assess the purpose of regime change. Ironically, if the purpose of regime change is 
understood as a means to get rid of a menacing foreign leader and at the same time to 
discharge frustration, one could argue that it is a highly effective tool of foreign policy. 
Finally, I show how the empirical findings of this study contribute to the debate about how 
policymakers assess state intentions, focusing on the effects of imputing hatred to the 
behavior of target states.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Recurrence of Regime Change and the State of the Art 
This chapter has two tasks. It first conceptualizes the practice of regime change as the 
principle phenomenon of interest by defining the concept and specifying its attributes, 
followed by a discussion of the comparability of regime change cases, also called the 
homogeneity of the population, and a description of the recurrent, yet non-habitual pattern of 
regime change in US foreign policy. Second, the chapter critically evaluates existing 
explanations or intellectual resources from which potential explanations can be generated. It 
canvasses a range of different literatures, discussing studies on 'foreign-imposed regime 
change' (FIRC), structural explanations for intervention, democracy promotion, and 
bargaining theory, showing that no approach has been able to provide a convincing account 
of regime change in US foreign policy.  
The Recurrence of Regime Change 
What is Regime Change? 
The conceptualization of regime change is an essential task, not least because the term regime 
has carried meanings different from how it shall be defined in this study. I do not refer to 
regimes as international arrangements defined as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures."67 Instead, here the term regime denotes a 
state's domestic political authority structure governing the "relation of rulers to ruled within a 
given state's borders" and "the administration of the state's domestic coercive power".68 James 
Rosenau defines the authority structure of a given society as the "identity of those who make 
the decisions that are binding for the entire society and/or [...] the processes through which 
such decisions are made",69 taking into account both actors and the institutional framework 
constituted by a given regime. 
To further clarify the concept of regime, two differentiations from related concepts 
are in order: first, to the extent that a state is defined as an "ensemble formed by combining 
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government, population and territory",70 a state comprises more than a regime. While states 
and regimes should not be equated with each other, regimes form a constitutive part of states, 
translating the state's claim to the monopoly of force into concrete and binding rules for 
society and thereby constituting an integral element of the state-society nexus. Second, the 
concept of regime is to be distinguished from the concept of government. Regimes define the 
fundamental rules of authority. Governments in turn are specific bodies of authority. Being 
conceptually more narrow than regimes, they are formed and replaced by the fundamental 
rules established by the pertinent regime. Regimes can be categorized into different regime 
types, with the most basic distinction being one made between democratic and non-
democratic regimes.71 Governments, at least within democratic regimes, can be categorized 
into different systems of governments, for instance presidential and parliamentary systems. 
Based on this definition of regime, regime change refers in its widest sense to the 
transformation of a state's political authority structure. To the extent that the sources of 
change can be determined, the manipulation that is brought about by purposeful actors can 
generally have two sources: domestic or foreign. As clear as the conceptual distinction 
between domestic and foreign-imposed regime change might seem, the lines between the two 
are blurry in practice. In many cases of revolution, for example, change is driven by domestic 
actors who are decisively supported by outside powers, often clandestinely. Only cases in 
which outside powers use their own military to stage an intervention can we confidently 
identify outside influence that is decisive rather than subsidiary. Domestic regime change, the 
first type of regime change, is internally generated change, stemming from domestic forces 
such as a country’s class structure, elite behavior, or economic performance, and has been 
subject to much of the democratization and regime transition literature in the subfield of 
comparative politics.72 This study does not deal with this type of regime change. Instead, I 
exclusively focus on foreign regime change, a type of regime change that involves 
transformation through "the coercion of outside powers".73 For this purpose, regime change, 
also called foreign-imposed regime change, shall in this study exclusively refer to forcible 
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intervention by an outside power aimed at transforming a target state’s domestic political 
authority structure.  
The Conceptual Attributes of Regime Change 
The concept of regime change defined here features a number of characteristics worth 
specifying: first, in regime change, change is always irregular in light of the rules of the 
regime that is changed, barring the improbable existence of rules set out by a regime that 
allow for its abolishment. Whether domestic or foreign-induced, regime change can therefore 
not be brought about through regular means such as elections in a democratic regime. The 
irregular nature of regime change is concomitant with a violation of what Stephen Krasner 
calls "Westphalian sovereignty", i.e. the target state's "political organization based on the 
exclusion of external actors from authority structures".74 Second, the magnitude of change 
sets regime change apart from other types of change. In contrast to annexation or territorial 
conquest, regime change does not entirely demolish the integrity of the target state inasmuch 
as it does not affect its territorial boundaries. Defined this way, cases of intervention that do 
not retain the juridical sovereignty of the target state do not lie within the conceptual purview 
of regime change. True, the target state might suffer a "formal loss of foreign policymaking 
power"75 in the course or aftermath of regime change, such as in a temporary occupation by 
the regime changer, but regime change does neither eliminate nor absorb the target state. Put 
differently, regime change carries with it the withdrawal of recognition from the targeted 
regime, but it does not amount to a permanent withdrawal of state recognition. Two empirical 
examples illustrate this distinction. The 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq is a case of regime 
change, because the intervention dismantled the rule of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath party, 
but did not constitute any territorial changes. The 1845 annexation of the Republic of Texas 
by the US, in contrast, cannot be considered a case of regime change, because it not only 
dismantled the Texan regime, but led to the death of the Republic of Texas altogether.  
On the other side of the spectrum, the depth of change brought about by regime 
change is higher than what might be called government change if the latter is carried out in 
accordance with the rules established by its regime. Barack Obama's 2008 presidential 
election victory, for instance, brought about a change in government from a Republican to a 
Democratic administration, but did not constitute a change in regime. While such regular 
                                                 
74
 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 4. See 
also Owen, The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change, 1510-
2010, 3. 
75
 Tanisha Fazal calls this condition "state death", see Tanisha M. Fazal, "State Death in the International 
System," International Organization 58, no. 2 (2004): 312. 
 22 
government changes are clearly to be distinguished from regime change, the categorization of 
irregular changes of state leaders that leave governing institutions intact, have been subject to 
debate in the literature. Differentiating foreign-imposed regime changes (FIRCs) that "change 
only leaders from those that also change institutions",76 one study considers what it calls 
"leadership FIRC" as one of two basic variants of regime change. Another study agrees by 
arguing that regime change can "mean an externally imposed change in either leaders or 
political institutions", proposing a distinction between "foreign-imposed leadership change 
and foreign-imposed institutional change".77 Others exclude from their analysis foreign 
interventions that "replace one ruler or government with another under the same 
institutions".78 Having defined regimes as elites plus institutions, this study opts for a more 
exclusive conceptualization of regime change. Changes at the elite level that "are fought over 
the occupancy of existing roles in the structure of political authority"79 without transforming 
the authority structure itself are thus excluded from the purview of the concept.  
Third, regime change is a purposeful practice. For a case to qualify as regime change, 
the intent to transform the target state's political authority structure must precede the actual 
use of force. This definition excludes cases in which the promotion of a given regime comes 
as an afterthought to war, i.e. cases that John Owen calls "ex post promotions".80 Such 
interventions are undertaken for reasons different than effecting a change in the target state's 
regime, whereas in the case of regime change, called "ex ante promotions" in Owen's 
terminology, targeting the authority structure is the very reason force is directed at the target 
state. This definition excludes cases like the post-World War II occupation of Germany 
because, as Michael Walzer correctly shows, "[i]n the case of Nazism, regime change was the 
consequence, not the cause, of the war fought by the allies". It was neither "the aim of the 
wars declared in 1939 by Poland, France, and Britain to transform the German state",81 nor 
that of the United States, as the US Congress declared war on Germany in December 1941, 
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but designs for post-war Germany were contemplated only years later, for example during the 
Yalta Conference in February 1945, when the defeat of Nazi Germany became more likely.82 
Fourth, regime change is a military intervention involving the use of force and the 
deployment of the regime changer's military across borders. Defining regime change as what 
R.J. Vincent has called "coercive interference",83 I exclude non-coercive means of 
intervention like propaganda or foreign aid from the purview of the concept. Covert 
operations are equally excluded, though their case is less clear: while they feature means 
potentially just as coercive as those employed by overt military intervention, the secret nature 
of their use of force sets covert operations apart from regime change proper, suggesting that 
their underlying rationale is qualitatively different from overt operations. Fifth, I do not 
specify the change brought about by regime change operations in terms of regime type 
promoted. Cases of both democracy promotion and what we might call democracy prevention 
are within the conceptual scope of regime change as defined here. 
Sixth, for a case to qualify as regime change, the transformation of the political 
authority structure effected by an outside power need not be directed at the incumbent 
regime. If, for example, a state intervenes in a civil war, supporting the incumbent regime in a 
standoff with rebels who are on the brink of taking power, it would make little sense to 
disregard such a case solely on the grounds that the intervener sided with those in power 
rather than with the rebels. In such a case, the intervention is just as much an act of 
transformation as in cases in which the intervener supports rebel groups against the regime of 
the target state, provided that the change effected by the intervener is decisive rather than 
subsidiary, an issue discussed above. While a more narrow definition of regime change that 
exclusively focuses on opposition towards the incumbent might be, in a semantic sense, more 
in line with what we commonly would label regime change, it would be misleading insofar as 
it would disregard cases exhibiting the same logic of intervention without targeting the 
incumbent regime, running the risk of arbitrarily truncating the universe of cases. This is why 
this study considers both support for (in the face of domestic opposition) and opposition to 
the incumbent regime as two variants of intervention belonging to the same concept of 
regime change as long as the nature of engagement is transformative and meant to affect the 
course of struggles over the target state's domestic authority structure. 
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Finally, regime change shares a number of similarities with other state practices, but it 
is clearly distinguishable from such cognate concepts like war or intervention more broadly 
speaking. There are two important differences between regime change and war defined by 
Hedley Bull as "organized violence carried on by political units against each other".84 First, 
wars are fought between states, whereas the principal domain of regime change operations 
lies within one state, the target state.85 To be sure, both regime changers and states initiating 
war engage in an "act with belligerent intent",86 with the means chosen being so similar that 
many regime change operations, for example the 2003 invasion of Iraq, are referred to as war 
(e.g. the 2003 Iraq War). Yet, what makes regime change different from war in the 
conventional sense is its one-sided nature of organized violence, carried out by the regime 
changer, but not by the target state. Second, while wars can be fought for a variety of reasons, 
their purposes having changed over time,87 the goal of regime change, by definition, is 
always the transformation of a target state's authority structure, a very specific purpose that 
has remained unchanged across time.  
Turning to intervention as another cognate concept, regime change constitutes one 
specific variant of intervention. What regime change has in common with other types of 
intervention is its one-sided nature of organized violence, setting intervention apart from 
war.88 In terms of purposes, earlier definitions of intervention come surprisingly close to what 
this study calls regime change. Introducing what he called a "scientific approach to 
intervention", a reaction to what he perceived as the tendency to equate intervention with 
foreign policy influence,89 James Rosenau defined intervention narrowly as being of a 
convention-breaking and authority-oriented nature. Especially the second attribute, which 
restricted the concept to cases in which a foreign policy was "directed at changing or 
preserving the structure of political authority in the target society", seems to be in line with 
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core characteristics of regime change.90 But inasmuch as the concept of intervention 
comprises a range of different purposes like peacekeeping, or humanitarian aid, it is broader 
than the concept of regime change. Historically, intervention purposes have been even more 
varied, for example "to punish violations of natural law, suppress slavery, prevent revolution, 
defend property rights or the rights of international creditors, change the nature of domestic 
political systems [regime change], protect religious minorities, prevent gross human rights 
violations".91 Defined this way, the purpose of intervention can be significantly broader than 
the purpose of regime change. 
The Comparability of Regime Change Cases 
After having conceptualized regime change for the purpose of this study, this section turns to 
the universe of cases, also called the extension of the concept.92 As previously mentioned, 
this study has a broad empirical scope, comprising US regime change cases from the 
beginning of the twentieth century until today. I claim that these cases of US regime change 
from different periods spanning the entire twentieth century are sufficiently similar to be part 
of the same population denoted by my concept of regime change.93 Discussing the conceptual 
extension of regime change is central, particularly because two criticisms might be leveled at 
the claimed comparability (or homogeneity) of cases belonging to the population of regime 
change. First, the homogeneity of the population might be questioned on the basis of changes 
in the international normative context concerning the norm of sovereignty and non-
intervention. More precisely, a critic could argue that pre-1945 cases are in fact not 
comparable to post-1945 cases, because norms of sovereignty and against conquest were 
codified and became part of the international normative structure only after World War II. 
Tanisha Fazal, for example, shows that state death and "coercive territorial change" have 
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"decreased markedly" in the post-World World II world because of such changes.94 While 
acknowledging that a norm "protecting states' territorial sovereignty" was in existence even 
before 1945, Fazal argues that "strong Allied support might account for its power after the 
war",95 when such a norm could finally take hold and become influential in international 
politics. 
As a foreign policy practice that "entails violations of sovereignty",96 the standing of 
norms on sovereignty and non-intervention has important implications for the homogeneity 
of the universe of cases under investigation. After all, one would have a hard time treating 
interventions as regime change in times in which sovereignty meant little in international 
politics. It is correct to argue that the Charter of the United Nations played an undoubtedly 
central role in the codification of norms of sovereignty and non-intervention and that the 
post-1945 world has been indeed marked by this enshrining of such norms. This should not 
mean, however, that sovereignty and non-intervention was an insignificant factor in pre-1945 
international politics, potentially threatening the homogeneity of empirical phenomena I call 
regime change across 1945. In fact, considerations about sovereignty figured prominently in 
the decision-making process leading to pre-1945 cases of what I call regime change, giving 
credence to the comparability of pre- and post-1945 cases. As the example of the Theodore 
Roosevelt administration shows, precisely because US statesmen were aware of the 
sovereignty of target states and a potential anti-American backlash in case of intervention did 
they go to great lengths to reassure their neighbors that, in the words of Theodore Roosevelt's 
Secretary of State Elihu Root, the United States wished for "no territory except our own; for 
no sovereignty except the sovereignty over ourselves [i.e. people of the United States]".97 
Even when intervention was deemed unavoidable, Roosevelt argued that it "should be veiled 
as to avoid hurting the feelings of those in whose behalf we are interfering [i.e. Latin 
American target states]".98 To be sure, these considerations did not prevent Roosevelt to 
engage in regime change. Yet, they show that sovereignty figured in the administration's 
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calculations, making such pre-World War II and even pre-World War I cases comparable to 
their post-1945 counterparts.  
A second line of criticism might suggest that applying the term regime change to 
historical cases is anachronistic and therefore problematic. Discussing the applicability of the 
concept of intervention to the seventeenth and eighteenth century, Martha Finnemore for 
example cautions against the use of "deductively imposed definitions" that do no take into 
account the historical context of cases under investigation.99 Instead, she advocates looking at 
how participants themselves view their action and what discourse they use to refer to it. The 
question of "whether it is appropriate to use our current vocabulary to make intelligible the 
practices of people living in the past [emphasis in original]",100 is indeed important. It is 
certainly true that the terminology of regime change is an invention of the 1990s.101 The 
practice that is denoted by the term, however, is older than the term itself, given that "actors 
can use different words to refer to the same thing".102 Without referring to their actions as 
regime change before the emergence of the terminology, US foreign policy elites were well 
aware that what they were engaged in was the overthrow of foreign governments. In the case 
of the 1906 Cuban intervention, senator Joseph B. Foraker referred to the administration's 
action as intervention "with force of arms to overthrow established government".103 Similarly, 
in the case of the 1909 – 1912 intervention in Nicaragua, there was a general understanding 
among US decision-makers that their actions in Nicaragua constituted an intervention 
directed at the Nicaraguan regime, something we would call regime change today. During the 
Cold War, an alternative term became popular for the same practice: rollback. Defined as a 
grand strategy that "seeks to eliminate communist influence worldwide", prescribing "active 
U.S. support for anti-communist forces"104 and seeking "not merely to contain the target state 
within its borders, but to overthrow its ruling regime",105 rollback comprised means such as 
overt military intervention to replace communist regimes.106 As these examples show, the 
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lack of the term regime change should not be a marker of the existence of the practice under 
investigation. Regime changes that occurred before the pertinent terminology emerged, 
belong to the same universe of cases as those that occurred in the 1990s and later. 
Recurrent, But Not Routinized 
Due to the paucity of intellectual thought on its place, status, and role as a state practice, there 
is a common tendency to misrepresent the prevalence of regime change by describing it in 
terms that either underpredict or overpredict its occurrence in international relations. On the 
one hand, we tend to underpredict its prevalence if we constrain regime change to what is one 
of its most recent and perhaps most commonly known empirical manifestations, the US-led 
invasion of Iraq in 2003. Focusing solely on Iraq has undesirable ramifications for how 
prevalent we think regime change is in international politics, for reducing regime change as a 
general concept to one of its admittedly most prominent cases carries with it the danger of 
downplaying the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and regime change more broadly, to something 
unusual or unique. Indeed, some scholars regard the 2003 Iraq War as an anomaly in 
American foreign policy. Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, for instance, argue that US 
foreign policy under George W. Bush, including the invasion of Iraq, was heavily influenced 
by the neoconservative movement which, according to them, managed to hijack the Bush 
administration after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, but was a far cry from "balanced 
conservatism" and thus "little more than an aberration" in the history of US foreign 
relations.107 Many others similarly subscribe to what has been termed "neoconism", i.e. "the 
strong belief that something distinct about the Bush administration constituted a necessary 
condition for war [in Iraq] [emphasis in original]".108 Put differently, "neoconism" denotes 
the claim that regime change in Iraq would not have occurred, had the Bush administration 
been spared from neoconservative influence. Importantly, insofar as attaching explanatory 
weight to neoconservatism has the consequence of elevating the presence of an assumingly 
anomalous ideological group of influential foreign policy elites to the status of a necessary 
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condition for a state’s engagement in regime change, these "neoconist" views, wittingly or 
unwittingly, underpredict the prevalence of regime change in international politics. For if 
regime change grows out of the hijacking of foreign policy by a group or ideology whose 
sway is said to be short-lived but necessary, regime change must logically be quite an unusual 
outcome.  
On the other hand, some describe regime change in terms that unavoidably 
overpredict the prevalence of regime change, giving the impression that regime change is a 
ubiquitous fact of international politics. John Owen, for example, provides a convincing 
critique of the first view outlined above, showing that regime change is in fact far from 
unusual or unique, but rather a long-standing practice in international politics. His extensive 
historical dataset counts 209 cases of forcible overthrows between 1510 and 2010.109 Yet, by 
presenting regime change as a phenomenon in international relations "common enough that 
we can call it a normal tool of statecraft",110 Owen runs the risk of exaggerating the extent to 
which regime change is routinized as a means of foreign policy. Surely, his 209 cases are an 
impressively large number, convincingly cautioning us against considering the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq an anomalous practice and simultaneously raising questions about why regime change 
has been so understudied in the field of IR. Regime change, however, is not a routinized state 
practice, because the regime change tally must be judged against the backdrop of the time 
period Owen considers, and because regime change is not an accepted practice in 
international relations. The sheer number of cases tells us little about how "normal" a tool of 
statecraft regime change actually is if not put into perspective. In relative terms, regime 
change occurs roughly four times in ten years on average worldwide (one case every 2.39 
years on average). Importantly, state engagement in regime change is not evenly distributed 
over time, but instead clustered in waves.111 The United States, "the most prolific intervener 
in the international system since the end of World War II",112 has engaged in twenty-five 
regime change interventions between 1899 and 2003 or, put differently, in roughly one 
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regime change intervention every four years on average.113 Relative to the extensive time 
period Owen considers and to the use of other tools of foreign policy, like diplomacy, war, or 
economic sanctions, these numbers do not seem to qualify regime change as a routinized tool 
on a state’s menu of foreign policy options. Second, irrespective of absolute or relative 
numbers of regime change interventions, the alleged normalcy of regime change is put into 
question by the fact that, as a state practice, regime change is not sanctioned by international 
law, making it extraordinarily difficult for states to publicly justify engagement in regime 
change and to use it as a habitual instrument of foreign policy. Especially the triangle of 
codified norms on sovereignty and non-intervention, the use of force, and the right to self-
determination presents a formidable obstacle to regime change. Article 2.4 and 2.7 of the 
Charter of the United Nations proscribe the "threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state" (Art. 2.4) and establish a right to non-
intervention by stipulating that "[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of any state" (Art. 2.7).114 Article 42 and Article 51 of the UN Charter specify the conditions 
of legitimate use of force, i.e. maintaining and restoring "international peace and security" 
(Art. 42), and the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack 
occurs" (Art. 51).115 These basic principles governing interstate relations, however often 
violated in practice, preclude states from engaging in regime change habitually, at least since 
the end of World War II. In contrast to routinized foreign policy practices like diplomacy, 
regime change can therefore not be considered a "normal" tool of statecraft. 
The existence of regime change in international politics, which is at once recurrent 
and non-habitual, presents an interesting puzzle. If regime change is a phenomenon larger 
than its arguably single most prominent manifestation, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, yet far from 
being a habitually used instrument of foreign policy, its recurrent pattern begs an explanation 
that neither underpredicts, nor overpredicts its prevalence. More specifically, how can we 
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explain the recurrent and century-long pattern of regime change activity of the "most prolific 
intervener", the United States, without arguing that regime change is either an anomalous or 
routinized feature of US foreign policy? The next section turns to the literature in search of 
answers to this study's research question.  
Existing Explanations for the Recurrence of Regime Change 
Literature on Foreign-Imposed Regime Change 
Research that explicitly deals with regime change as the central phenomenon of interest 
belongs to a nascent strand of intervention research. While the term foreign-imposed regime 
change (FIRC) was used first by Suzanne Werner in her 1996 article on the probability of 
FIRC in the aftermath of war involvement,116 regime change has gained growing attention as 
a subject of inquiry particularly since 9/11 and the subsequent US interventions in 
Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). Most FIRC studies, however, assess the consequences of 
regime change rather than its roots or purpose. By taking the practice of regime change as an 
analytic starting point, theses studies typically examine the effects of FIRC on a range of 
different phenomena, focusing on international consequences such as the probability of 
interstate conflict,117 regional peace,118 or domestic consequences such as internal stability,119 
civil war,120 and democratization.121 Due to their interest in the consequences of FIRC, 
studies like these formulate assumptions about the recurrence of regime change rather than 
tackle the question head-on. Peic and Reiter, for instance, list several potential motives for 
the practice of FIRC: "[r]egime change is often imposed to remove an interstate threat, 
especially when an adversary is seen as implacably hostile and untrustworthy", a means of 
"safeguarding American national security", or a means to "advance foreign economic 
interests or spread ideology",122 but offer no analysis of these potential explanations. 
FIRC studies that focus on the underlying logic and sources of regime change are 
rare, but they exist. Suzanne Werner, for instance, examines the likelihood of regime change 
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during wartime, arguing that the likelihood of a war participant suffering the loss of power 
through regime change depends on the opportunity and willingness of the war opponent to 
inflict this ultimate cost on the war participant. More precisely, opportunities for the war 
opponent negatively affecting the fate of the war participant are the participant's loss in war, 
high war costs, and relative military weakness compared to the war opponent. The opponent's 
willingness to impose a new regime increases with differences in authority structures of the 
belligerents, high war costs for the opponent, and the lack of domestic regime change during 
the war.123 According to Werner, differences in authority structures are the key determinant 
of the opponent's willingness to impose regime change because "[e]xamples of different 
institutions and expectations in other states can undermine the strength and legitimacy of the 
very institutions and expectations which secure a leader's claim to power".124 Alternative 
authority arrangements pose such a threat that leaders extend their political objectives in 
warfare, striving for the complete elimination of the war opponent's regime. Another study 
that examines the causes of regime change during wartime tests a variety of hypotheses and 
concludes that particularly three factors increase the likelihood of FIRC in wars: ideological 
tensions and differences in authority structures between the regime changer and the target 
state, unreliable personalist dictatorships causing commitment problems between the two 
states, and buffer states.125 
The study of the causes of FIRC during wartime provides important insights, but has 
two fundamental limitations. First, it frames FIRC as a potential consequence of war and thus 
restricts its research findings to what John Owen calls "ex post promotions", i.e. cases of 
FIRC "in which the initial attack was for other reasons" than regime change itself and in 
which the "decision to use force to impose a regime may not have been made until after the 
attack [emphasis in original]".126 By regarding FIRC as a potential byproduct of warfare or, in 
the words of Suzanne Werner, a consequence of "absolute war", these studies obscure the 
function and role of regime change. If regime change is by design seen as a potential 
consequence of interstate war, it cannot have a separate underlying logic other than the 
achievement of war aims broadly defined. Thus, cases of "ex ante promotions" in which force 
is used specifically to topple the regime of a target state, remain unexplored and unexplained. 
Second, the use of large-N datasets and statistical analyses in these studies produces results 
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that convincingly show the probabilities of the occurrence of regime change during wartime, 
but cannot provide insights into FIRC's root causes or its role in the foreign policy of the 
regime changer. For instance, Alexander Downes plausibly shows that commitment problems 
between two states, such as when one state is ruled by an unreliable personalist dictatorship, 
makes the occurrence of FIRC more likely.127 Why a state would seek to replace the regime 
of another state in the first place, however, is left unexplored. Thus, studying the enabling 
conditions of regime change is worthwhile in itself, but cannot provide satisfying insights 
into FIRC's role.  
John Owen's work on the sources of regime change is to date perhaps the most 
elaborate and sophisticated. In his article on the foreign imposition of domestic institutions, 
Owen identifies temporal clusters of what he calls institutional promotion between 1555 and 
1999 in which regime change was a particularly prevalent means of foreign policy. In doing 
so, he argues that regime promotion typically occurs in cases in which the target state suffers 
a civil war or has undergone some other form of domestic instability. Two other factors 
increasing the probability of regime change are the lack of international security and 
international tensions between competing ideologies.128 Building on his survey of cases and 
clusters, Owen provides an elaborate explanation for regime change, explicitly covering both 
ex post and ex ante promotions. In his 2010 monograph on the topic, he identifies 
transnational ideological polarization defined as "the progressive segregation of elites and 
mass publics across states along an ideological axis"129 as the main driving force behind 
regime change. In times of high ideological polarization, regime leaders strongly identify 
with a particular regime type or ideology and are thus more willing to engage in regime 
promotion or regime counter-promotion in order to roll back the influence of competing 
regime types and their pertinent state ideologies. Owen argues that high ideological 
polarization is a likely consequence of either a regime crisis in a target state or a great power 
war, both of which present opportunities to potential regime changers and what Owen calls 
"transnational ideological networks (TINs)" that are "organized around a common deep 
commitment to a particular political regime".130 
As plausible as Owen's account centering on the important role of transnational 
ideological contest is, its explanatory power in explaining the foreign policy of regime 
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change is limited. To the extent that Owen treats regime change as an international outcome, 
analyzing macro-historical clusters of intensified regime promotion over long periods of time, 
his account falls short of offering a more fine-grained explanation for the foreign policy 
choices of particular countries. As he readily admits, his account cannot explain US 
interventions in the Western hemisphere in the beginning of the twentieth century and during 
the Cold War, because those interventions had little to do with the central hypothesized cause 
of his work during the twentieth century, i.e. a "long transnational contest among advocates 
of liberal democracy, communism, and fascism".131 With Owen conceding that cases of US 
regime change in the early twentieth century, i.e. cases of one of the most prolific regime 
changer, are "not explained by the transnational ideological struggle among communism, 
fascism, and liberalism"132, i.e. by his favored account, we must turn to other strands of IR 
literature to learn more about the recurrence of regime change in the foreign policy of the 
United States. 
Structural Explanations 
Structural theories have a long pedigree in international relations theory. Convinced that the 
structure of the international system "provides a set of constraints and opportunities within 
which individual groups and states seek to advance their interests"133 and that the system 
"exhibits properties and behaviors that are different from those of the parts",134 structural 
theories typically explain what Kenneth Waltz calls "international-political outcomes" with 
recourse to the nature and character of the structure of the international system.135 Not all, but 
some of these theories try to account for state behavior, too. Focusing on the nature of the 
international system as the main driving force for intervention, Stanley Hoffmann for 
example argues that the proliferation of intervention depends on the homogeneity of the 
international system and the prevalence of mechanisms of international order. An 
international system is homogeneous as long as "all the units have the same principle of 
domestic legitimacy",136 i.e. the same domestic political authority structure regulating state-
society relations. Heterogeneous international systems facilitate the occurrence of 
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intervention, as conflicting principles of domestic legitimacy lead to a violent clash, inviting 
mutual aggression and a struggle for ideological domination.137 The second factor next to the 
homogeneity of the international system that facilitates intervention is, according to 
Hoffmann, the absence of a "mechanism of moderation" such as the balance of power, 
maintaining that the balance-of-power mechanism lowers the likelihood of intervention, but 
does not prevent it from occurring. Interestingly, Hoffmann characterizes the Cold War as an 
era without such a mechanism helping maintain international order, arguing that "in the 
periods of acute cold war [...], forms of intervention caused by the rivalry between the United 
States and the Soviet Union become countless".138 Indeed, Hoffmann considers the post-
World War II period as the most intervention-prone era among the historical eras in which 
interventions have proliferated, observing a "maelstrom of interventions around the mists of 
self-determination", fierce competition between democracy and totalitarianism, a number of 
belatedly colonial interventions, the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism, and finally splits 
in the communist world due to "rival versions of the totalitarian orthodoxy".139 
According to Hans Morgenthau, there are additional factors pertaining to the 
international level that favor intervention. Discussing the first decades after the Second 
World War, he notes that the process of decolonization has given birth to new sovereign 
nations whose existence depends on foreign economic and financial aid. To the extent that 
this dependency on foreign aid is a "condition for their survival",140 it represents a lever for 
intervention. Put more broadly, one could argue that power imbalances between great powers 
and lesser powers are an enabling condition for intervention. Second, the frequency of 
intervention is, according to Morgenthau, linked to domestic revolutions in that they portend 
a new orientation in a country's foreign policy, making great power interventions more likely. 
Another factor influencing the willingness of great powers to intervene in the domestic 
conflicts of weaker states is nuclear deterrence. Referring to the Cold War, Morgenthau 
argues that "the recognition on the part of the two superpowers, armed with a large arsenal of 
nuclear weapons, that a direct confrontation between them would entail unacceptable risks" 
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makes them choose "to oppose and compete with each other surreptitiously through the 
intermediary of third parties", leading to proxy wars and intervention in weaker states.141 
Arguments emphasizing the importance of the Cold War and, more generally, 
bipolarity for the prevalence of intervention are not uncontested. According to Stephen 
Brooks and William Wohlforth, there is indeed a link between the number of great powers in 
the international system and intervention, albeit a different one than Hoffmann and 
Morgenthau's. As part of their general argument about how systemic constraints inhibiting 
the freedom of action of the most powerful state in the system are inoperative in a condition 
of systemic unipolarity, Brooks and Wohlforth argue that intervention is more likely in 
unipolarity than bipolarity. As the unipole does not need to "factor in the prospect of military 
intervention by another great power", the lack of a counterbalancing constraint provides the 
unipole with opportunities for intervention that a great power confronted with another great 
power would not have under bipolarity. Comparing the 1991 Gulf War with the 1973 oil 
embargo, the authors argue that the United States did not militarily intervene in the Middle 
East following the 1973 oil embargo because of "the potential for direct or indirect Soviet 
intervention" as a "significant constraint on the use of American force".142 
Arguments about the importance of structural factors for interventionist inclinations 
of particular states come in different shapes, focusing on alternative aspects of the 
international system like polarity or the homogeneity of the international system. What all of 
them have in common, however, is their inherent indeterminacy and empirical inadequacy. 
With regard to polarity, there are plausible arguments both for why bipolarity – combined 
with nuclear deterrence – and unipolarity should lead to more interventions, weakening the 
link between structural configurations and state behavior. Brooks and Wohlforth's argument 
about how unipolarity frees the unipole from systemic constraints, allowing it to intervene in 
foreign countries more freely, is an argument that is equally applicable to bipolarity: as 
Robert Jervis shows, one could argue that because bipolarity during the Cold War made the 
two superpowers more self-reliant and more independent from their allies, it gave them a 
"measure of independence and extra power that they could use as they saw fit", allowing 
them to pursue conflicts and engage in interventions where their own security was not at 
stake.143 Following this argument, one could assume that bipolarity is equally prone to 
interventionist behavior on the part of two superpowers, but there are plausible arguments for 
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why, under bipolarity, superpowers should have no interest in intervention, making the link 
between the international distribution of material power and intervention behavior 
indeterminate. As Kenneth Waltz maintains, we should not expect excessive interventionism 
under bipolarity precisely because superpowers are self-reliant and should therefore have 
little reason to worry about realignments of their weaker allies, "for third parties are not able 
to tilt the balance of power by withdrawing from one alliance or by joining the other".144 
While being theoretically indeterminate, arguments centering on the polarity of the 
international system fare no better in empirical terms: a brief look at the historical record of 
US regime change reveals a recurrent pattern of regime change that does not correlate with 
any particular distribution of power at the international level, as there are cases of US regime 
change during multipolarity, bipolarity, and unipolarity.  
The heterogeneity of the international system as the second factor claimed to be 
important for the prevalence of interventions is more plausible inherently,145 but finds no 
empirical support. Invoking the pre-1914 system as an example for the irrelevance of 
heterogeneity at the international level, Jervis shows that "the two countries whose sources of 
legitimacy were most different from each other – republican France and imperial Russia – 
allied because of external pressures".146 The heterogeneity argument fares no better with 
respect to US regime change. One would expect, following the logic of the argument, that 
states engaged in regime change would promote regimes that are similar to their own 
authority structures, eliminating heterogeneity as the source of potential conflicts in the 
future. The empirical record, however, shows that the United States has engaged in regime 
changes "on behalf of authoritarianism" and that such support "provides numerous examples 
of state leaders promoting a regime type other than their own".147 Thus, the heterogeneity 
argument accounts for little in the variation of regime types promoted and therefore cannot be 
empirically substantiated. 
Democracy Promotion 
Turning to second-image factors, regime type and state identity are said to have an impact on 
intervention, specifically in the context of American foreign policy. Focusing on democracy 
promotion through force as a particular form of intervention, some argue that US liberalism 
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and democracy are root causes of American interventionism. At its core, this type of national 
identity has the conviction that the "American national experiment" and its historical 
experience are universally significant and applicable.148 When it comes to foreign policy, this 
conviction generates what Mark Peceny calls a "cultural bias in favor of democracy".149 
Democracy promotion as the attempt at making other regimes more similar to the United 
States is thus seen as a significant outgrowth of the nature of American liberalism. A variant 
of why the United States promotes democracy in the world is offered by Tony Smith who 
agrees that democracy promotion has played a central role in American foreign policy, albeit 
for a different reason. Rather than being a consequence of the belief in the universality of the 
American experience, democracy promotion is, according to Smith, an expression of 
America's conception of national security which assumes that "a peaceful world order in 
which America could fully participate needed to be one constituted by democratic states".150 
The concern with the domestic order in other countries is thus a security concern: the impulse 
to spread democracy around the world stems from the belief that the nature of the regimes of 
other states is "hugely important for the attainment of American security and material 
interests".151  
Arguments centering on the desire of the United States have the same problem as 
explanations invoking the heterogeneity of the international system as the main driving force 
for intervention: they cannot account for the variation in regime types that the US has 
promoted when engaged in regime change. For us to treat contradictory evidence as mere 
exceptions to the rule, there are too many cases in which the US has been either indifferent 
towards the complexion of the target state's new regime, or even decidedly opposed to 
democratic reforms. What is more, cases that do not feature any desire to promote desire are 
not clustered and do not belong to particular periods: there is no indication of a desire to 
promote democracy in pre-1945 cases such as Nicaragua and in post-1945 like the 
Dominican Republic. Moreover, one could argue that cases that are typically treated as 
instances of democracy promotion are in reality driven by other considerations: in the 2003 
Iraq War, for example, democracy promotion was a post-hoc justification for an invasion 
whose primary justification, i.e. weapons of mass destruction, became quickly obsolete due to 
the lack of confirmatory evidence. In sum, democracy promotion arguments vastly 
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exaggerates the causal importance of a potential desire to turn targeted states into 
democracies. 
Rationalist Theories of War 
Another theoretical approach from which one can extract arguments about the recurrent 
pattern of regime change in US foreign policy is the rationalist theory of conflict, also called 
bargaining theory. Under the assumption that one can treat the question of regime change as a 
"subset of the broader question of the causes of war",152 bargaining theory, which has been 
called the "dominant approach in conflict studies",153 provides interesting insights into the use 
of regime change as a foreign policy. To explain the occurrence of war between two states, 
bargaining theory makes a number of assumptions: first, wars are always inefficient solutions 
to interstate disputes. Framed as a "failure of bargaining",154 bargaining theory considers wars 
"costly because both sides must pay the costs of fighting, regardless of who wins, so there are 
fewer goods to distribute between the two sides after war than before".155 Even if a state 
anticipates victory in war and deems the benefits of fighting higher than its costs, fighting 
still involves costs, making war a suboptimal solution to a dispute. In the words of James 
Fearon, the inherent inefficiency creates a puzzle: "what prevents states in a dispute from 
reaching an ex ante agreement that avoids the costs they know will be paid ex post if they go 
to war"?156 The main intuition of bargaining theory is that "if the outcome of a war were 
obvious from the start, then the war itself could be avoided and this outcome could be 
instituted by peaceful means, avoiding the suffering and destruction of war".157 Second, 
bargaining theory assumes not only that states are unitary actors, discounting causal factors 
pertinent to the domestic context,158 but also that states are strictly rational. Going beyond the 
notion that states are intentionalist actors, strict rationality assumes that states "seek out and 
use all available information",159 constantly updating prior beliefs and estimates about an 
                                                 
152
 Dueck, "Neoclassical Realism and the National Interest: Presidents, Domestic Politics, and Major Military 
Interventions," 140. 
153
 David A. Lake, "Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War," 
International Security 35, no. 3 (2011): 7-8. 
154
 Ibid., 10. 
155
 Dan Reiter, "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War," Perspective on Politics 1, no. 1 (2003): 29. 
156
 James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 383-384. 
157
 Lilach Gilady and Bruce Russett, "Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution," in Handbook of International 
Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: SAGE, 2002), 396. Put 
differently, Lake maintains that war "is an inefficient outcome that all parties would avoid in the absence of 
bargaining imperfections", see Lake, "Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of 
the Iraq War," 10. 
158
 Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," 379. 
159
 Lake, "Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War," 9. 
 40 
opponent's military strength and intentions. Assuming that two actors have the same 
information about an issue, they should arrive at the same beliefs.160 
Based on these two central assumptions – wars as inefficient outcomes and states as 
rational actors – bargaining theory suggests three possible reasons why states might go to war 
despite its costliness. First, wars become possible due to the incentive of state to willingly 
misrepresent their resolve and military capabilities, deciding not to reveal private information 
about these factors in negotiations.161 Even rational actors might thus decide to wage war if 
they cannot correctly assess the likelihood of military victory and the degree to which the 
other state is willing to make concessions. Second, wars become possible because of 
commitment problems. Despite the notion that a negotiated settlement to a dispute is 
inherently more efficient than fighting, states might choose to wage war if the opponent 
cannot credibly commit not to attack in the future. The higher skepticism towards the 
enforcement of a potentially more efficient negotiated settlement is, the higher is the 
incentive to resort to war.162 In theory, there is a third possible cause of war. If the issue in 
dispute is "indivisible or cannot be the object of an intermediate settlement",163 rational actors 
might arrive at the conclusion that fighting a war might be the optimal choice. While 
"logically tenable", this third rationalist explanation for war is usually discounted because, as 
Fearon argues, most international disputes can be made divisible through "side-payments or 
linkages with other issues".164  
While bargaining theory presents rigorous and inherently consistent arguments about 
the causes of war, its assumptions frame the puzzle of war in ways that inevitably lead to an 
debilitating inability to find empirical support for the arguments postulated. First, by 
considering war a bargaining failure and an inefficient outcome inherently inferior to a 
negotiated settlement, bargaining theory dramatically underestimates the attractiveness of the 
use of force. While James Fearon claims that war is always inefficient ex post unless "states 
enjoy the activity of fighting for its own sake, as a consumption good",165 the use of force can 
in fact be a highly attractive option and a perfectly rational strategy if its costs are not borne 
by those who decide to wage war. That foreign policy elites can to a high degree insulate 
themselves from the costs of war is conveniently overlooked, with bargaining theory 
pretending, especially in its unitary-actor variant, that the public does not have to bear the 
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brunt of the costs in blood and treasure. As the 2003 invasion of Iraq shows, even the 
exorbitant costs of fighting, 50 billion dollars according to the Bush administration's own 
estimate and three trillion dollars actually incurred,166 did little to deter the President from 
engaging in a large-scale military invasion. Second, while bargaining theory assumes that 
most disputes can be made divisible, it is hardly conceivable how bargaining and a peaceful 
settlement could replace the use of force when the ultimate goal of one state is the overthrow 
of the other state's regime. David Lake argues that even when one state seeks regime change, 
the set of bargaining solutions to the dispute need not be empty because the leader of the 
targeted state could simply concede everything to the potential regime changer. In the case of 
regime change in Iraq, Saddam Hussein "could have fled Iraq and sought exile in some safe 
haven" to prevent war.167 Yet, Lake's argument is hardly convincing: apart from the fact that 
complete surrender can hardly be called bargaining, conceding everything to the opponent is 
not reconcilable with the assumption of rationality, which leads us to the third and most 
important weakness of bargaining theory: actors do not act in accordance with the assumption 
of strict rationality. Assessing the viability of bargaining theory in the case of US regime 
change in Iraq, David Lake readily admits that "the most severe challenge to bargaining 
theory arises from the cognitive and decision-making biases that were so evident in the Bush 
administration and Saddam and his regime".168 Rather than updating prior beliefs with new 
information, leaders oftentimes stick to their initial beliefs and even disregard conflicting 
evidence. Provided with the same information, different leaders assess the behavior of foreign 
leaders differently. Commitment problems, a major cause of war in bargaining theory, remain 
constant across many disputes, yet leaders opt for war in some, but try to strive for negotiated 
settlement in others.169 In sum, bargaining theory provides little in the way of accounting for 
the use of regime change.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has conceptualized regime change for the purpose of this study, and argued that 
existing explanations do not fully account for the recurrent, yet non-habitual pattern of 
regime change in US foreign policy. Large-N studies on foreign-imposed regime change deal 
only with ex post promotions rather than ex ante promotions, solely focusing on FIRC during 
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wartime. Structural explanations focusing on the international distribution of material power 
and the heterogeneity of the system are indeterminate at a theoretical level, failing to specify 
links between structural factors and interventionist behavior, and find little support at the 
empirical level, being unable to account for the persistence of regime change across different 
systemic constellations in terms of polarity and heterogeneity. Arguments centering on a 
desire to promote democracy fare no better empirically, being defied by the variation in the 
regime types promoted by the United States, ranging from democracy promotion to 
democracy prevention. Finally, rationalist theories of war take actors' rationality and the 
inefficiency of war for granted, blinding us towards empirical evidence that is in clear 
conflict with such assumptions. Other arguments like defensive and offensive realism as well 
economic-interest arguments cannot be refuted at the cross-case level and will therefore be 
examined separately as alternative explanations in the empirical part of this study. To 
overcome the limitations of existing explanations, the following chapter will present a novel 
argument about the pattern of US regime change, one that is focused on the emotional 
frustration experienced by leading US foreign policymakers. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Role of Emotional Frustration in Regime Change 
How can we explain the pattern of regime change in US foreign policy? In trying to account 
for the practice of regime change, this chapter lays out the core claims of this study, focusing 
on the emotional state of leading US foreign policymakers. It argues that the practice of 
regime change is predicated upon what I call 'emotional frustration', an anger-arousing 
emotional state that is brought about by a foreign leader's obstructive behavior perceived to 
be rooted in hatred and irredeemable hostility. While obstruction is ubiquitous in interstate 
interactions, I claim that the combination of prior hegemonic expectations towards a given 
target state and the perception of hatred play an important role in influencing the extent to 
which a foreign leader's conduct evokes an emotional response on the part of foreign policy 
elites. Once emotionally frustrated, regime change becomes an attractive foreign policy 
instrument to decision-makers who seek a way to confront and put a stop to the obstruction of 
a menacing foreign leader. Rather than a strategic response to threats to wealth or security, 
factors commonly assumed to be decisive in intervention decisions,170 regime change has 
thus frequently been spurred by hegemonic expectations and obstructions perceived to be 
rooted in deep hatred. 
The focus on emotional frustration as a driver of regime change must look odd to 
most of IR literature. After all, decision makers are typically portrayed as strategic calculators 
of costs and benefits. Aggressive behavior, while possible, can seemingly only be the result 
of a cold and careful weighing of costs and potential benefits.171 If emotions play any role in 
explaining behavior, they are widely assumed to be found in regions that are far from an 
asserted Western heartland of rationality, regions that, hardly coincidentally, are the site of 
contested and sometimes violent political interactions with the United States and its Western 
allies. Prevalent at the beginning of the twentieth century when leading US policymakers 
viewed "tropical peoples as suffering from a 'female' inability to make rational decisions 
about government or the economy",172 the notion that such regions are inhabited by people 
                                                 
170
 Peic and Reiter, "Foreign-Imposed Regime Change, State Power and Civil War Onset, 1920-2004," 453. 
171
 This is what Mearsheimer calls "calculated aggression", arguing that "great powers are not mindless 
aggressors so bent on gaining power that they charge headlong into losing wars or pursue Pyrrhic victories", see 
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 37. 
172
 Cyrus Veeser, "The Platt Amendment and U.S. Occupation Policies in Latin America," in The Routledge 
Handbook of American and Diplomatic History, ed. Christos Frentzos and Antonio S. Thompson (New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 55. 
 44 
whose decisions are emotional and based on passionate impulses, is still popular. Henry 
Kissinger, for example, regarded most of non-Western foreign policy as influenced not by 
"clear, objective rational interests but rather by opaque, internal, and irrational cultural 
desires and emotions".173 More recently, the Middle East has been characterized as a region 
in which "widespread disaffection, disillusionment, anger, resentment, frustration, 
humiliation, and a range of other powerful emotions that infect the population as a collective" 
reign supreme, making "the people of the Muslim Middle East […] a very angry lot".174 If 
emotions are an "infection", a depiction running counter to how emotions are dealt with here, 
I will show that their domain extends from the Middle East and other non-Western regions 
straight to the heart of the United States' foreign policymaking community.  
The argument presented here attributes a central role to the extent to which US leaders 
feel emotionally frustrated with target states' leaders, an emotional state that has repeatedly 
characterized their turn to regime change. It should be noted that the relationship between 
emotional frustration and regime change is not deterministic enough to be considered what 
Carl Hempel famously called a "general law" or "universal hypothesis".175 While regime 
change as a specific foreign policy tool has a higher likelihood to be used in response to 
emotional frustration, I do not argue that emotionally frustrated state leaders will always 
choose forcible regime change from the vast menu of their foreign policy options – because 
other courses of action such as covert CIA operations or economic sanctions rather than 
regime change might equally be the result of frustration – nor that every instance of regime 
change can be reduced to the behavioral implications of frustration. In this sense, I agree with 
others who have noted that "the world is too fraught with contingency" for us to be able to 
"provide a complete list of necessary and sufficient conditions for forcible regime 
promotion".176 This notwithstanding, I do claim that the close study of the history of US 
regime change decisions reveals some hitherto overlooked patterns of emotional frustration 
that have again and again animated regime change interventions. 
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The outline of the chapter is as follows: the next section presents the core claims of 
this study by first discussing the role of emotion in international relations scholarship. It 
shows that emotions, particularly fear, play an important, yet implicit role in the theoretical 
apparatus of a number of prominent IR theories and in the conceptualization of the security 
dilemma. The chapter then turns to the definition of emotion by canvassing a range of 
debates. It argues that emotion and rationality need not be irreconcilable, that experiencing 
emotion requires cognitive appraisal, and that emotions have important behavioral 
implications, also called action tendencies, that make them worthy subjects of inquiry. The 
following section conceptualizes the main explanatory factor of this study, i.e. emotional 
frustration. It argues that emotional frustration is sub-type of frustration, with frustration 
broadly defined as exhibiting two central attributes: preexisting expectations and an 
obstruction. What sets emotional frustration apart from other types of frustration, so the 
section argues, is its anger-arousing quality. Next, I turn to expectations and make a 
distinction between hegemonic and non-hegemonic expectations, arguing that hegemonic 
expectations enhance the frustration potential of foreign policymakers, as relatively more 
target state actions might constitute obstruction. The following section shows that the 
difference between emotional and non-emotional frustration is predicated upon the perception 
of obstruction, arguing that perceived hatred, surprise, and deliberateness have a high chance 
of triggering an angry response on the part of the frustrated individual. Next, I present two 
arguments – one instrumental and one non-instrumental – for why regime change as a type of 
aggression is an attractive option for emotionally frustrated policymakers. The chapter closes 
with a discussion of the operationalization of frustration. After pointing to the pitfalls of the 
quantitative analysis of operational codes, i.e. its problematic equating of beliefs with 
emotions and its lack of attention to context, I argue that a qualitative analysis of private 
discourse and reliance on the self-reporting of emotion is a viable strategy to identify 
emotional frustration.  
Explaining US-Imposed Regime Change – The Role of Emotional Frustration 
How can we solve the enigma of regime change as a recurrently used instrument of long-
standing tradition in US foreign policy? Stressing the behavioral implications of emotions, 
this study looks at the emotional state of leading foreign policymakers. Through case studies 
across the twentieth century, it uncovers the repeated way in which emotional frustration has 
framed and animated decisions to engage in regime change. Before subsequent sections of the 
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chapter explicate the main argument, the following section presents how emotions have been 
dealt with in IR and what they are. 
Emotions in IR 
Emotions have an odd existence in IR scholarship. On the one hand, they have received little 
systematic research despite being an empirically ubiquitous phenomenon in world politics.177 
Only recently have scholars started to turn to emotion-based factors in their theoretical 
explanations, reacting to the growing recognition that the realm of international politics and 
its fundamental issues like war, nationalism, and identity are strongly infused with 
emotions.178 On the other hand, emotions have always featured in the conceptual apparatus of 
many influential IR theories, even if only implicitly. Critics might suspect this to be the case 
for rather marginal phenomena, but it in fact holds true for fundamental concepts such the 
security dilemma, "a vicious circle of security and power accumulation" triggered by the 
cumulative effects of the desire for more security,179 or simply put "the tendency for efforts to 
increase a state's security to decrease the security of others".180 With regard to the sources of 
the security dilemma, Arnold Wolfers points to the implications of fear, a prominent 
emotion,181 as a potential reason why statesmen pursue "the will-o'-the-wisp of absolute 
security".182 Discussing potential, unintended consequences of foreign policy strategies based 
on fear, Hans Morgenthau similarly shows that being fearful of the potentially malign and 
revisionist intentions of other states can prompt states to resort to defensive measures like 
military build-ups and higher military spending, which in turn can be interpreted as offensive 
in nature by other states, setting off a security dilemma in which all sides become "enmeshed 
in mutual fear and engage in an arms race which seeks to still those fears". Thus, it is fear, 
perhaps the most common emotion-based background assumption to realist IR theories, that 
according to Morgenthau "creates imperialism where there is none".183 Neta Crawford 
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therefore correctly observes that "the concept of a security dilemma pivots on [pessimistic] 
perceptions of intention, not reality".184 
Among the many examples of IR theories that rely on the logic of the security 
dilemma and on implicit emotion-based background assumptions, two deserve special 
mentioning. Despite the predominance of the rational-actor paradigm, viewed by Neta 
Crawford an important reason for why IR theory has "lately tended to ignore explicit 
considerations of 'the passions'",185 even theories which explicitly subscribe to the assumption 
of rationality cannot entirely do away with emotions. John Mearsheimer's version of realism 
is a prominent case in point. The main argument of offensive realism that great powers 
maximize power and behave offensively in order to ensure survival, rests entirely on the 
assumption that international anarchy, offensive military capabilities, and uncertainty about 
other states' intentions – three of Mearsheimer's five "bedrock assumptions"186 – inevitably 
create fear among great powers. This fear, which Mearsheimer calls a "motivating force in 
world politics",187 is an emotional state without which his main theoretical claims, i.e. 
offensive foreign policy behavior and power maximization, would not logically follow. 
Though Mearsheimer's model would be seriously compromised if one were to take the 
emotion of fear out of the equation, he does not deal with the concept of fear, its nature, 
causes and consequences in a theoretically informed and conscious manner. This is all the 
more surprising given that the notion that states are fundamentally driven by an emotion as 
extreme as fear, seems in need of an explanation for why it can be deemed reconcilable with 
the kind of rationality as strategic decision-making that Mearsheimer assumes great powers 
adopt in their dealings with each other.188 
A second example of a theory implicitly relying on emotions is Tanisha Fazal's theory 
of state death. Her argument that the unfavorable position of buffer states, i.e. states that "are 
geographically located between two other states engaged in a rivalry",189 makes them more 
vulnerable to the loss of their foreign policy making power than non-buffer states, hinges 
entirely upon the premise that the two rivals fear each other. What Fazal calls the "strategic 
imperative to take over" the buffer state is a consequence of her taking for granted the notion 
that each of the two rivals fears that the other would take over the buffer at their expense if 
they did not do so first: "[e]ven if each rival knows that its opponent would prefer to avoid 
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war, neither can be certain that this preference will dominate the strategic imperatives facing 
the rivals".190 Again, despite lacking detailed theorizing, it is the prominent emotion of fear 
that drives the strategic calculus of states according to Fazal's theory. In trying to do justice to 
the important role of emotions in world politics by bringing it to the fore, the argument 
presented in the following sections deals with the behavioral implications of one particular 
emotion – emotional frustration – in a more systematic and theoretically informed way.  
What is Emotion? 
An important reason for the confusion surrounding the role of emotion in international 
politics is the lack of consensus regarding how emotion should be defined. Depending on 
theoretical orientations, disciplinary commitments, and research purposes, scholars have 
conceptualized emotion in manifold ways. At a very general level that is agnostic to the 
specificities of the causes and consequence of emotion, Neta Crawford defines emotions as 
"inner states that individuals describe to others as feelings" which may (or may not) be 
"associated with biological, cognitive, and behavioral states and changes".191 Crawford's 
inclusive definition of emotion zooms in on what she considers its most important 
characteristic, i.e. its subjective nature. Yet, even this highly abstract conceptualization 
reveals a potentially biased commitment to the notion that only inner states which individuals 
are able to represent and communicate to others, qualify as emotion, leaving out instances in 
which such inner states remain unconscious and hence non-representable. In view of 
contested conceptual demarcations between emotion and related phenomena, one could argue 
that Crawford's definition captures feelings rather than emotions, if feelings are defined as 
mental representations or "the perception of an emotional state".192 This example shows, if 
nothing else, that defining emotion requires a careful discussion of a number of questions, 
such as how emotion relates to rationality and appraisal, as well as a discussion about the 
behavioral implications of emotion. Before turning to emotional frustration, the specific type 
of emotion subjected to inquiry in this study, the following will canvass each of the foregoing 
issues. 
First, the relationship between emotion and rationality needs to be specified. The 
extent to which these two concepts are considered to be intertwined or distinct has a heavy 
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bearing upon how we come to understand the nature of emotion. A prominent way of dealing 
with the relationship is to define them in strict opposition to each other, stipulating that 
behavior can only be rational if it is not emotional. Defined this way, "the emotions 
encompass all those internalized impulses that may lead a person to override his or her 
material self-interest".193 If rationality is the pursuit of self-interest, as is commonly 
assumed194 and exemplified by Russell Hardin's definition of rational action as doing "what 
you believe serves your interest",195 emotion and rationality are at odds with each other. 
Indeed, the purported opposition and irreconcilability of emotion and rationality has, often 
with normative overtones against the influence of emotion on behavior, a long tradition going 
back to Plato who believed that emotions undermined "the sovereign dignity of reason".196 
Aristotle, Descartes and Kant, among other thinkers, "viewed emotion as inimical to 
reason".197 Echoing the belief in the distorting effects of emotion on rationality, scholars of 
political psychology similarly argue that emotions lead to deviations from a rational baseline. 
Robert Jervis, for example, argues that actors are not free of misjudgment because of the 
existence of cognitive misperceptions and emotions.198  
In a move against the strict divide of emotion and rationality, scholars have more 
recently begun to conceptualize the relationship in more complex ways. Rose McDermott 
argues that emotions are integral to rationality in that they inform preference formation. 
Building on recent neuroscientific evidence, she maintains that "rationality, as we understand 
it, often requires emotional processing first".199 Jonathan Mercer supports the view that 
emotion and rationality are not dichotomous, but rather causally linked, arguing that emotion 
is essential and necessary to rational decision-making.200 Arguing that "emotions help form 
and strengthen beliefs" and that "emotion and cognition are not contrasting modes of thought 
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but rather intertwined processes", Frank Costigliola maintains that the "assumption of a clear-
cut opposition between the rational and the emotional says more [...] about traditional 
Western concepts about the division of mind and body than it does about the actual nature of 
thought".201 This reconceptualization of the relationship between rationality and emotion 
finds support and is informed by recent developments in neuroscience where pioneers like 
Antonio Damasio argue that the neural mechanisms for emotion and rational thoughts are not 
separate, but rather intertwined.202 Drawing on this insight, one author argues that the "brain 
does not distinguish between cognitive and emotional thought, between concluding that 
Wednesday follows Tuesday or that rape is repugnant",203 another that there is no 
physiological difference "between believing that 2 + 2 = 4 or that torture is evil".204 
This study agrees with the more recent view that emotion is, in a fundamental sense, 
necessary for rationality in that it constitutes interests and desires. Critiquing the conventional 
view that emotion compromises rationality, Jonathan Mercer shows perhaps most 
compellingly that people "who are 'free' of emotion are irrational".205 Yet, to the extent to 
which specific emotions affect the cost-benefit calculus of decision-makers, emotions have 
behavioral implications that, depending on how narrowly one defines rationality, might very 
well be considered irrational. Focusing on the role of emotions in forming beliefs rather than 
on the effects of specific emotions like fear or anger, Mercer concedes that though 
"incomplete", "[a] focus on the distorting power of emotion is not wrong", admitting that the 
action tendencies of specific emotions can upset the cost-benefit calculus of actors.206 When 
Mercer argues that "[e]motion can contribute to irrational beliefs and self-destructive 
behavior",207 he leaves the possibility open that emotions do not only affect behavior through 
constituting fundamental beliefs like trust, nationalism, justice or credibility, which is his 
central argument, but that they can also have a more immediate impact on behavior through 
upsetting a strategic cost-benefit calculus. This immediate impact can cause an action to be 
irrational if rationality is defined as the strict pursuit of self-interest. If, on the other hand, an 
actor's motivations are conceptually broadened, rendering rationality agnostic towards the 
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specifics of pursued goals, rationality and emotion need not be in conflict with each other. 
Such a definition is offered by Jon Elster who regards an action as rational as long as it is the 
result of three optimal decisions in terms of means to achieve an actor's goals and beliefs 
based on available and optimally collected evidence. Not only does Elster leave the 
substantive content of goals and desires conceptually unspecified, he explicitly points out that 
they are the likely consequence of the passions.208 Thus defined, action based on the pursuit 
of an emotion-triggered desire is rational as long as that desire is pursued in an instrumentally 
rational way, i.e. with optimal means, optimally grounded beliefs, and optimally collected 
evidence.  
Second, mindful of the debate about the relationship between the appraisal view of 
emotion, which assumes that cognition precedes the experience of emotion, and the 
counterview, which assumes physiological sources of emotion, treating cognition as 
following rather than preceding emotion, this paper assumes that the experience of emotion 
involves appraisal. Rather than being a straightforward physiological response to an outside 
stimulus, emotions arise after some cognitive appraisal of the latter. In the words of one of 
the leading proponents of the appraisal view of emotion, the role of cognitive appraisal is "to 
mediate the relationship between the person and the environment", which means that "the 
way one interprets one's plight at any given moment is crucial to the emotional response".209 
This view critiques the James-Lange theory about the origin of emotions, which posits that 
physiological arousal instigates emotions without the mediation of cognition, and goes back 
to its earliest formulation by William Cannon who critiqued the unmediated relationship 
between an outside stimulus and the emotional response postulated by William James.210 The 
reason why the appraisal view emphasizes the role of cognition in experiencing emotion is 
the human nature assumption that "humans are meaning-oriented, meaning-creating creatures 
who constantly evaluate events from the perspective of their well-being".211 As such, a 
person's "appraisals, beliefs, and coping styles"212 play a central role in the experience of 
emotion in that they determine whether or not an outside stimulus will lead to an emotional 
response. Since a "creature that is oblivious to the significance of what is happening for its 
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well-being does not react with an emotion", for an emotional response to occur "people must 
comprehend […] that their well-being is implicated in a transaction, for better or worse".213  
To be sure, arguing that cognition is a constitutive element of emotion does not mean 
that the experience of emotion is "purely cognitive in form, pale, colorless, destitute of 
emotional warmth", as William James, one of the earlier critics of the appraisal view, 
suggested.214 While James convincingly argued that bodily expressions are part and parcel of 
emotion, a view succinctly represented by his statement that a "purely disembodied human 
emotion is a nonentity"215 and generally not opposed by appraisal theorists,216 his assertion 
that the inclusion of cognition would confine emotion "entirely to the intellectual realm" 
stems from a narrow conceptualization of cognition that practically equates the concept with 
rationality. This equation, however, is hard to support, given that appraisal is neither a 
necessarily deliberate process, nor rational in the sense of adequately reflecting reality.217 
Cognition is thus better defined as "nothing more than 'concerned with receiving and 
processing information'" rather than implying "the presence of elaborate calculation, of 
computation, or even of reflexive self-awareness".218 
Third, emotions are important for understanding decision-making because they have 
behavioral implications. To the extent that the experience of emotion is typically linked to 
action tendencies, understanding emotions helps us understand human behavior. Defined as 
"states of readiness to execute a given kind of action", action tendencies are so closely linked 
to emotion that some even consider them constitutive of emotion in that "[e]motions are 
tendencies to establish, maintain, or disrupt a relationship with the environment, or simply 
that "[e]motions are action tendencies".219 Specific emotions excite individuals to specific 
actions. Fear, envy, shame, guilt, anger, hatred all have action tendencies, but these vary from 
emotion to emotion.220 What these emotions have in common is that their action tendencies 
are not merely dispositions, but rather "actual, embodied states, or states on the verge of 
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embodiment in action, to be released when circumstances permit".221 To be sure, that emotion 
"constitutes interests and causes behavior" does not mean that "emotion drives all behavior", 
which Jonathan Mercer calls the "'black hole' approach to emotion".222 Taking the behavioral 
implications of the experience of emotion seriously is important to understand a range of 
phenomena in international relations, but one should not assume that emotion in and of itself 
provides a complete explanation for every type of action. On the basis of this discussion, the 
next section will turn to a particular emotion: emotional frustration.  
Conceptualizing Emotional Frustration 
Emotional frustration is the central explanatory factor of the theoretical argument presented 
here. As with many other emotions, however, there is generally little agreement regarding 
what frustration means or how it should be conceptualized, leaving the term "often 
enshrouded in ambiguity".223 Predominantly used in and stemming from the disciplines of 
sociology and psychology, the literature in these two fields offers a number of varying 
definitions. At the most basic level, frustration can be understood either as an external 
obstruction or as an individual's response to an obstruction.224 Reflected in everyday 
language, we say something frustrated somebody's plans when we refer to the former 
definition of frustration, but that someone feels frustrated when referring to the latter. While 
an early and widely influential conceptualization in psychology adopts the former view, 
considering frustration an obstruction and defining it as "an interference with the occurrence 
of an instigated goal-response",225 frustration can be conceptualized in a way that 
accommodates both elements of stimulus and response, as shown by Steuart Britt and Sidney 
Janus who consider frustration a process constituting a "frustrating situation", a "frustrated 
organism", and a "frustrated reactional system".226 This comprehensive definition does not 
reduce frustration to obstruction, but instead brings together its three constitutive elements, 
i.e. the occurrence of obstruction as stimulus, its effect on the individual feeling frustrated, 
and the individual's response, providing the basic framework for this study's 
conceptualization.  
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For the purpose of this study, I define emotional frustration as an anger-arousing 
emotional state brought about by an obstruction of preexisting expectations that is perceived 
to be based on irredeemable hatred and hostility. As such, emotional frustration is a sub-type 
of frustration writ large, defined as the impact on an individual, both anger-arousing and 
otherwise, of an obstruction of that individual's preexisting expectations. Frustration in its 
wider sense encompasses all cases in which an individual's expectations are obstructed, 
regardless of whether or not the obstruction provokes an emotional response, whereas 
emotional frustration captures the subset of cases that feature emotional arousal. The 
structure of the concept of frustration follows the necessary and sufficient condition 
approach, meaning that an empirical phenomenon qualifies as frustration if and only if it 
features all attributes of the concept.227 Frustration exhibits two defining attributes, namely 
the existence of expectations prior to the occurrence of frustration, and an obstruction thereof. 
With regard to the first attribute, an event or action can cause frustration by constituting an 
obstruction only if there are preexisting expectations concerning that event or action. This is 
because obstruction, and by implication frustration, is a function of the extent to which an 
event relates to a person's expectations in the shape of desires, aspirations, goals, or 
ambitions. Frustration is not a uniform response to an external stimulus, but rather contingent 
upon prior expectations one holds. Depending on these expectations, a given action might or 
might not constitute an obstruction. An individual's or a group of individuals' potential for 
frustration therefore critically hinges upon preexisting expectations, setting frustration apart 
from a related, but distinct concept, i.e. deprivation where, in contrast to frustration, 
preexisting expectations play no role, for one need not have any goals or expectations to be 
deprived of something. Without prior expectations, an event or action might therefore 
constitute deprivation under certain conditions,228 but not frustration.229 
The second defining attribute frustration is the presence of an obstruction, by which I 
mean an obstacle that prevents the fulfillment of prior expectations. For frustration to occur, 
an event or action which an individual has expectations about must block the achievement of 
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expectations or fulfillment of goals. If expectations are not obstructed by events, frustration 
will not follow. Generally speaking, obstruction has one of two sources: internal or external. 
Internal thwarting is self-caused and cannot be attributed to the actions of others or structural 
factors. Goal impediment comes therefore from within:230 an example for considering the 
source of frustration to be internal is when one considers one's own shortcomings to be the 
reason for a failure to reach one's goals, holding oneself rather than external factors worthy of 
blame. If the source of obstruction, on the other hand, lies outside oneself, we speak of 
externally generated frustration. This type of frustration can be further distinguished 
according to the culpability of the external source of frustration. The frustrated either sees the 
obstruction she experiences as an intentional act directed at her or as accidental and 
unintended. Her judgment as to whether an outside actor can be blamed for her experience of 
frustration depends on the attributional interpretations she makes about the nature of 
obstruction in terms of its hostility.231 
The concept of frustration presented heretofore encompasses different sources and 
types of obstruction and different types of impact that obstruction has on an individual. 
Broadly defined, the presence of preexisting goals obstructed by an event or action 
constitutes frustration, leaving what Britt and Janus call the "frustrated reactional system" 
largely undetermined.232 Since frustration and emotional frustration as one of its subtypes 
share both attributes so far discussed, a specification of the emotional aspect of emotional 
frustration is needed to distinguish it from frustration more broadly speaking. I argue that 
emotional frustration is a specific type of frustration because it puts the individual in an 
emotional state of displeasure, arouses anger in him, and instigates an aggressive response. 
Individuals in this emotional state "are seen as less rational, more prone to aggressive 
behavior, and likely to lash out at the source of the obstruction or violation".233 Working at 
the level of the individual's response to obstruction, i.e. "the frustrated reactional system", the 
distinction between emotional and non-emotional frustration helps us understand why not all 
frustrations have the same behavioral implications. Individuals deal with some frustrations in 
a non-emotional way; other frustrations lead to emotional outbursts. Steuart Britt and Sidney 
Janus show that "[r]eactions to frustration may be aggression, withdrawal, regression, 
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resistance, anger, guilt and remorse, shame and embarrassment".234 Saul Rosenzweig 
specifies three alternative conscious reactions to frustration: extrapunitive, intropunitive, and 
impunitive.235 
Since frustration is a ubiquitous feature of human interaction,236 anger and ensuing 
aggression would be overpredicted if we assumed these reactions to unconditionally follow 
from every type of frustration. Deviating from the original formulation of the frustration-
aggression hypothesis of John Dollard and his coauthors, whose stimulus-centric conception 
of frustration assumes that "aggression is always a consequence of frustration",237 Leonard 
Berkowitz provides an illustrative example of the possibility of non-emotional frustration 
from the game of American football. In the example, a football player on the way to score a 
touchdown is hurled down by a player from the opposing team, an obstruction of the former 
player's goal of scoring a touchdown. Given that the player had expectations of scoring and 
the presence of an obstruction denying his efforts, we can confidently argue that this 
regularly occurring scene in a football game is an instance of frustration. The player's 
reaction to this frustration, however, is likely to be non-emotional, as Berkowitz argues: 
"there is a very good chance that he will only give his opponent a friendly pat on the behind 
and run back to his team in apparent good humor".238 As this example shows, frustration can 
lead to a range of different reactions. Marked by its quality to arouse anger and aggression, 
emotional frustration is therefore but one specific type of frustration. 
Hegemonic Expectations 
As defined in the previous section, frustration is predicated upon prior expectations, one of 
two defining attributes of frustration (with obstruction being the second). This section defines 
prior expectations for the purpose of this study and argues that especially hegemonic 
expectations towards a target state enhance the frustration potential of foreign policymakers 
by raising the probability that a foreign leader's actions are seen as obstructive. 
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The starting point of the argument advanced here about the role of emotional 
frustration in regime change decisions is the assumption that the articulation and 
implementation of foreign policy requires states and their leaders to think about how they 
relate to other states. As parts of one international system, states are by definition exposed to 
contact with one another and "interact in such a way as to be necessary factors in each other's 
calculations".239 Regardless of what specific goals and aims states might pursue and how they 
prioritize them, the presence of other states in the system forces state leaders to develop 
strategies to deal with one another. This notion is commonly recognized across a wide 
spectrum of different systemic theories of international relations. Kenneth Waltz, for 
example, accords theoretical precedence to units in his discussion of the structure of 
international politics,240 but argues that once the structure as the arrangement of states is 
formed "by the coaction of self-regarding units",241 it will have a bearing on state action by 
defining "the game one has to win".242 Alexander Wendt takes issue with much of Waltz' 
theory, such as his materialist ontology and his classification of unit interactions as 
"reductionist" theorizing,243 but agrees with the basic notion that states "interact when they 
'take each other into account'".244  
Based on the consequences of being parts of one whole for state behavior and foreign 
policy, state leaders adopt expectations in their interactions with each other. These 
expectations are consequential with regard to the experience of frustration. The more 
extensive expectations are, the higher is the likelihood that, based on such expectations, the 
behavior of another state is regarded as obstructive. In theory, at one extreme end of the 
continuum, states simply do not have specific expectations towards a target state. Whatever 
the target state does will not constitute obstruction, as there are no goals to be thwarted in the 
first place. Barring this unrealistic case of a complete lack of expectations, I advance an 
argument about the consequences of expectations by distinguishing between hegemonic and 
non-hegemonic expectations. State leaders with non-hegemonic expectations are likely to 
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treat other states as formal equals, accepting a relationship that is "unranked, flat, [and] 
egalitarian, without formal or informal super- and subordination".245 Without hegemonic 
expectations, states respect the principle of sovereign equality, which refers to what Gerry 
Simpson calls "existential equality", recognizing the political independence of states inherent 
in the principle of sovereign equality: "[e]xistential equality […] includes a state's sphere of 
domestic jurisdiction (Article 2(7) of the UN Charter), its right to territorial integrity, [and] its 
right to political independence […]".246 To be sure, sovereign equality does not refer to other, 
more expansive notions of equality, such as the abolishment of "unjustified privileges based 
on power, religion, wealth, or historical accident".247 Yet, states with non-hegemonic 
expectations tend to ascribe the same sovereign rights to other states that they claim for 
themselves in their dealings with others. As a consequence, this type of expectations reduces 
the frustration potential of policymakers, as fewer actions of other states are likely to be seen 
as obstructive.  
On the other hand, endorsing a stratified vision of world politics, state leaders can 
have hegemonic expectations towards other states, thereby considering themselves to be 
standing above others. I define hegemonic expectations as foreign policymakers' anticipation 
that a target state will comply with their wishes even if those wishes are concomitant with a 
violation of sovereign equality. Despite the conventional characterization of international 
politics as a realm of anarchy, notions of unequal interstate relations are not alien to the field 
of IR. Research on hierarchy, empire, and special responsibilities employs distinctions similar 
to the one used here, albeit for different analytical purposes. Ian Clark, for example, shows 
that since 1815 international order has been hierarchical in that disparities in material 
capabilities have been accompanied by a more or less formal stratification of international 
politics, with great powers having the prerogative to structure and ensure the stability of 
international order and smaller powers having to follow their collective decisions.248 
Literature on empire similarly portrays international politics as a realm in which sovereign 
rights are unequally distributed. Arguing that the Westphalian model of sovereign statehood 
obscures imperial relations in world politics, critical empire scholars maintain that 
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international relations are governed by hierarchy, a thick set of social relations from the 
imperial center to the periphery, rather than being a thin anarchical space of strategic 
interaction between fully sovereign states.249 Others concur that international politics is 
pervaded by international authority, arguing that the United States is an informal empire that 
"exercises indirect rule over other political communities through heterogeneous bargains".250 
Finally, research on special responsibilities in world politics supports the view that the realm 
of international politics must deal with and reconcile "two principles of equality and 
differentiation",251 acknowledging that sovereign equality is not the only game in town in 
international politics. These perspectives make important contributions to how we understand 
the nature of international politics, facilitating thought on expectations state leaders can have. 
The foreign policymakers of a state with hegemonic expectations might not have 
entered into a hierarchical social relationship with a given target state, but what they expect is 
compliance with wishes that compromise the target state's sovereign right to autonomous 
decision-making. Hegemonic expectations typically concern specific actions in the realm of 
foreign policy, such as alliance behavior or the ratification of bilateral treaties, but they can 
equally be targeted at a state's domestic policies.252 The empirical part of this study provides a 
number of illustrative examples: during the presidency of John F. Kennedy, the United States 
expected Juan Bosch, the President of the Dominican Republic, to outlaw the political 
activities of a number of Dominican Communist parties. During William H. Taft's 
presidency, the US government expected Jose Santos Zelaya, the Nicaraguan President, to 
adjust his domestic economic policies to grant free access to US companies. In terms of 
foreign policy, both the Theodore Roosevelt and Taft administrations expected Zelaya to 
recognize the United States' role as the pacifier of Central America. If foreign leaders resist 
such expectations that disregard their sovereign rights to make decisions that are autonomous 
from US demands, their conduct becomes obstructive. This is why hegemonic expectations 
enhance the frustration potential of foreign policy elites. Expecting certain types of actions 
from target states inevitably makes the conduct of foreign states a prime concern for 
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otherwise unconcerned state leaders, raising the possibility that foreign actions constitute 
obstruction. 
Perceptions of Obstruction 
If not all types of frustration are emotional, we need to understand under which conditions 
frustration might instigate an emotional reaction. I argue that the type of reaction to an 
obstruction depends on how the frustrated individual perceives the obstruction in question. 
More specifically, if the obstruction is perceived to be emanating from deep and intolerable 
hatred for the frustrated, it constitutes emotional frustration and is likely to lead to an angry 
response. More benign perceptions of obstruction that do not associate the obstructive 
behavior with assumed hatred, but regard it rather as a routine matter of international politics 
or attribute it to external constraints and requirements of a given situation, are less likely to 
ignite an emotional response in the frustrated individual. 
The importance and place of perception in international relations has been much 
discussed. According to some views, especially rationalists and realists, perceptions are 
thought to be a rather negligible factor in international politics. This is because state actors 
are assumed to seek out as much information as possible about their adversaries, because they 
are able to gauge their adversaries' intentions quite accurately or at least uniformly, or 
because perceptions of state leaders are said to take a backseat to factors pertaining to the 
structural environment of international relations.253 In short, these views assume that 
rationality and the constraints of the international system make perception irrelevant. Others 
argue that state leaders' perceptions of the world are in fact consequential and therefore 
critical factors worthy of close investigation. Holding the basic premise that, despite potential 
environmental constraints, actors have a choice,254 perception becomes a salient factor, 
having a bearing upon actors' decision-making. Recent scholarship has examined both the 
sources and consequences of perceptions and, adopting the assumption that there must be a 
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correct way to perceive the world, misperceptions.255 With regard to the consequences of 
perception, scholars have analyzed the relationship between what they refer to as 
misperception and war,256 policy choices more generally,257 or to what extent attributional 
interpretations – i.e. whether someone's behavior can be traced back to the actor's disposition 
or to the behavior's context – has an impact on the formation of reputation.258 With regard to 
the sources of perception and misperception, scholars have pointed to cognitive biases 
inherent in human decision-making,259 the impact of belief systems and operational codes,260 
and the social dynamics pertinent to decision-making in groups.261 Most recently, scholars 
have assessed the influence of emotions on perception, arguing that "the prior emotional 
relationship between groups may influence the assignment of reasons and intentions 
(attributions) to others' behavior".262 
Despite the many perspectives on perception in international relations scholarship, 
little has been said on the consequences of perception for an actor's emotional state. I claim 
that the perception of behavior, especially of foreign leaders' obstructive behavior, is central 
for understanding when frustration evokes an emotional response in foreign policymakers. 
The difference between emotional frustration and its non-emotional variants is predicated 
upon the perception of obstruction. More specifically, I argue that an aggressive response to 
obstruction is likely when foreign policymakers perceive a foreign leader's obstruction to be 
rooted in deep hatred and hostility. Such interpretations of obstruction are key to the 
experience of emotion. As physiological arousal alone is not sufficient to induce an emotion, 
it is such appraisal of a situation that makes the experience of emotion possible.263 
Psychological studies have shown that attributions regarding the cause of obstruction can 
                                                 
255
 Misperception is commonly defined as "the gap between the world as it actually exists and the world as it 
exists in the mind of the perceiver". See Charles A. Duelfer and Stephen Benedict Dyson, "Chronic 
Misperception and International Conflict: The U.S.-Iraq Experience," International Security 36, no. 1 (2011): 
75. 
256
 Jack S. Levy, "Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems," World 
Politics 36, no. 1 (1983). 
257
 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics. 
258
 Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). 
259
 See Stephen P. Rosen, War and Human Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), Yaacov 
Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy 
Decisionmaking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990). 
260
 See Alexander L. George, "The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders 
and Decision-Making," International Studies Quarterly 13, no. 2 (1969), George, "The Causal Nexus Between 
Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behavior: The 'Operational Code' Belief System.", Deborah Welch 
Larson, "The Role of Belief Systems and Schemas in Foreign Policy Decision-Making," Political Psychology 
15, no. 1 (1994). 
261
 Irving L. Janis, Groupthink (Boston: Wadsworth, 1982). 
262
 Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships," 134.  
263
 Stanley Schachter, "The Interaction of Cognitive and Physiological Determinants of Emotional State," in 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, ed. Leonard Berkowitz (New York: Academic Press, 1964). 
 62 
have an effect on the propensity for aggression.264 Especially the perception that obstruction 
is a consequence of hostility arouses anger: "people become angry and aggressive on being 
kept from reaching a desired goal to the extent that they think that someone had intentionally 
and unfairly produced this interference or had deliberately and wrongly tried to hurt them".265 
Other studies concur by arguing that frustration is especially likely to create an aggressive 
response when obstruction is perceived to be arbitrary, i.e. unwarranted.266 Interestingly, 
without having received much theoretical attention, these results from psychological studies 
have in fact found their way into international relations scholarship. Robert Jervis, for 
example, maintains that the assessment of an adversary's intentions can have emotional 
consequences. An actor is likely to respond with anger if she perceives in the intentions of the 
adversary a desire to inflict harm on her, regardless of the actual extent of harm.267  
Apart from the perception of hatred, the likelihood of foreign policymakers to react 
with anger to an obstruction depends on two additional factors. First, obstruction must be 
unexpected for emotional frustration to occur. If an obstruction is considered to be part of 
regular interactions between individuals, the frustrated individual is unlikely to react 
emotionally. Berkowitz' football example is a case in point: because players are familiar with 
the rules of the game, they are likely to abstain from an emotional reaction as long as the 
behavior of opponents is seen as part of the game and in compliance with its rules. In 
contrast, obstruction will more likely arouse anger if the frustrated individual is surprised by 
an obstruction. Because of the "contrast effect" between expectations and the "unpleasant, 
unexpected thwarting", greater surprise can lead to greater aggression.268 To be sure, this does 
not mean that individuals do not hope to reach their preexisting goals in the case of non-
emotional frustration. As Berkowitz rightly argues, every type of frustration, emotional or 
otherwise, presupposes the existence of hopes that are then dashed. Therefore, "frustration 
can only be surprising (to a greater or lesser extent)".269 
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Second, for emotional frustration to occur, obstruction must be viewed as deliberate. 
Accidental obstruction, i.e. obstructions that are viewed as non-intentional, are less likely to 
cause an emotional response. If obstruction is attributed to a "freely acting agent"270 held 
responsible for the interference with the frustrated individual's goal attainment, the frustrated 
is more likely to react emotionally. This means that the emotional response to an obstruction 
is predicated upon whether or not the frustrated individual attributes the obstruction to 
someone else.271 Anger is more likely aroused by an obstruction if an external agent is seen 
as having caused the obstruction.272 The perception of intentionality, not intentionality itself, 
has thus important ramifications for the type of reaction a frustrated individual is likely to 
show. Together, the perception of an obstruction as rooted in hatred, as unexpected, and as 
deliberate triggers emotional frustration with a high probability. 
Emotional Frustration and Regime Change 
Why is regime change an attractive foreign policy option for emotionally frustrated decision-
makers? As a foreign policy that involves a considerable use of force, regime change is an 
instrument whose application displays aggression. Its ambitions are offensive, not defensive. 
Regime change can legitimately be treated as what has famously been coined "war of 
choice". Unlike "wars of necessity" in which there is a "requirement to respond to the use of 
military force by an aggressor and the fact that no option other than military force exists to 
reverse what has been done",273 or in the words of Charles Krauthammer, "a life-or-death 
struggle in which safety and security of the homeland are at stake",274 regime change 
operations belong to the category of "wars of choice", i.e. wars that "do not involve obvious 
self-defense".275 To be sure, Haass correctly notes that "[t]he distinction between wars of 
necessity and wars of choice is heavily subjective.276 Foreign policy debates endlessly turn 
around the question of how to conceive of the national interest and what security priorities to 
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set. But as much as threat perceptions are elastic and "often bitterly contested",277 regime 
change operations are unlikely to be a response to a existential national security threat.278 
In positing a relationship between emotional frustration and the choice for regime 
change, I borrow from the frustration-aggression hypothesis developed in the field of social 
psychology. In its most basic formulation, the hypothesis establishes a relationship between 
the experience of frustration and the inclination to engage in aggression, defined as an "act 
whose goal-response is injury to an organism".279 John Dollard and his co-authors (called the 
Yale group) argued in 1939 that "aggression is always a consequence of frustration" and that 
the "existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression".280 In other words, in 
its original formulation, frustration was said to be both necessary and sufficient for 
aggression, a rather rigid and deterministic formulation of the relationship. Subsequent 
studies in the field of psychology have revealed that "contrary to the Yale group's assertion, 
we cannot say that aggression is always a consequence of frustration",281 given that 
aggression can have a range of different sources.282 Similarly, the sufficiency argument needs 
further qualification, as "frustration produces instigations to a number of different types of 
response, one of which is an instigation to some form of aggression".283 In order to determine 
types of frustration that indeed trigger an aggressive response, psychology scholars have 
turned to the attribution of blame and how obstruction is appraised.284 These important 
modifications notwithstanding, "[s]urveys of the pertinent research have generally supported 
the basic idea" of the frustration-aggression hypothesis.285 
Despite its intuitive relevance, the frustration-aggression hypothesis has gone largely 
unnoticed in international relations scholarship.286 Following its basic logic, I argue that there 
are two reasons why regime change is an attractive option for emotionally frustrated 
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decision-makers. First, perceiving obstruction as deliberate, unexpected, and most 
importantly rooted in hatred, foreign leaders quickly turn into an intolerable menace in the 
eyes of frustrated policymakers. If obstruction is interpreted as a sign of implacable and 
irredeemable hostility, there is little policymakers think they can do to deal with the foreign 
leader's obstruction. Therefore, regime change becomes an attractive option to eliminate a 
foreign menace perceived to be bent on inflicting harm. Studies in psychology that have 
tested these tendencies at the individual level have found that "frustrations viewed as having 
been intentionally produced are more likely to create anger and affective aggression"; 
similarly, experiments have shown that "participants were much less hostile after a 
mistreatment when they were assured that the misbehavior was not intended to be a personal 
attack".287 Second, as emotional frustration arouses anger, which is defined "as a syndrome of 
relatively specific feelings, cognitions, and physiological reactions linked associatively with 
an urge to injure some target",288 aggression in the form of regime change is not only 
instrumental, i.e. a means to the goal of overthrowing a foreign leader, but also a form of 
what has been called affectively-spurred "hostility catharsis".289 As such, regime change 
becomes an attractive option to emotionally frustrated policymakers because it allows them to 
discharge their emotional arousal through aggression targeted at the source of obstruction.290 
The 2003 invasion of Iraq provides an illustrative example of the difference between the 
instrumental and non-instrumental value of regime change: a day after President George W. 
Bush had given Saddam Hussein an ultimatum of 48 hours to leave Iraq, the Bush 
administration received an offer to send the Iraqi dictator to Belarus.291 The offer fell through, 
but had it been accepted, the US President would have achieved his goal, i.e. Saddam's 
removal, without using force, i.e. without discharging his emotional frustration. 
Operationalizing Frustration 
Like other emotions, emotional frustration is difficult to identify. The literature on emotions 
in international relations reveals that even scholars who actively advocate a more systematic 
inquiry into its role in international relations, recognize the difficulties of adequately 
capturing emotions. In her discussion of the significance of emotions in world politics, Neta 
Crawford argues that one methodological reason why emotions are an understudied subject in 
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international relations scholarship is their ephemeral and internal nature, which makes them 
unobservable.292 Even more pessimistic are Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchison who argue 
that "emotions cannot be quantified, nor can they easily be measured, even in qualitative 
terms".293 If at all, methods from other disciplines that go beyond orthodox social science are 
needed, they argue, to make use of emotions in empirical research. Paul Saurette concurs by 
arguing that "attempts to study and explore the influence of emotions and other psychological 
factors of interpersonal dynamics and interactions do face significant difficulties", as the 
"emotional realm is [...] fuzzy".294 The pessimism regarding the measurability of emotions 
notwithstanding, this study disagrees with the "fallacious, but often employed logic that 
implicitly assumes that if a phenomenon is difficult to study [...], there can be no value in 
exploring its influence on politics".295 In trying to identify emotional frustration, I rely on the 
analysis of textual discourse produced by US foreign policymakers, most notably presidents 
and close foreign policy aides. With the help of archival data and primary sources, I try to 
distinguish "'genuine' emotions from their instrumental display".296 In the following, I 
critically review an alternative quantitative method used in the literature to grasp emotion. I 
then justify my choice for qualitatively analyzing textual discourse.  
The first way to operationalize frustration is through the quantitative analysis of 
operational codes.297 Mark Schafer and his co-authors focus on state leaders' perception of the 
outside world's hostility towards them and their feeling of lacking control over international 
events, two attributes that represent the two main conceptual components of frustration as 
defined by the authors. They relate these two components to three items from the set of ten 
fundamental beliefs forming the operational code of state leaders. Thus, hostility is said to be 
captured by Alexander George's first philosophical belief about the "nature of political life 
and the character of political 'others'" and the second belief about the prospects for the 
realization of political values, while the lack of control is represented by George's fourth 
philosophical belief capturing the extent to which a subject "sees control of events as residing 
more with the 'self' or more with others".298 To measure these two beliefs, Schafer and his co-
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authors use what they call 'Verbs in Context System', i.e. a quantitative tool that codes verbal 
statements by the actors in question and creates index scores reflecting these statements. For 
instance, the hostility component of frustration is represented by an index score of a subject's 
statements concerning the outside world. Computing a ratio between negative and positive 
attributions the actor makes to others, the score shows how hostile the actor regards his 
environment: "[t]he more negatively s/he refers to others, the lower the score; the more 
positively s/he refers to others, the higher the score".299 
While Schafer et al's operationalization of frustration is rigorous, systematized, and 
replicable, I consider it inadequate due to two fundamental shortcomings. First, beliefs taken 
from George's operational code for the quantitative analysis of actors' verbal statements do 
not correspond to the concept of frustration. The operational code is a collection of political 
actors' beliefs, not emotions, referring in Alexander George's definition, to a "political 
leader's beliefs about the nature of politics and political conflict, his views regarding the 
extent to which historical developments can be shaped, and his notions of correct strategy and 
tactics".300 As such, the beliefs taken from George's list of the operational code reflect an 
actor's broad outlook towards the world rather than their emotions in specific situations. It is 
therefore doubtful whether the quantitative analysis of verbal statements related to political 
beliefs is a valid way to measure frustration. Second, even if the operational code adequately 
corresponded to the emotion of frustration, the usefulness of verbal statements is contingent 
on whether these statements reflect the feelings of the actors in question, a strong and 
potentially distortive assumption that presupposes that statements and feelings are generally 
in line with each other. The reliance on documented speeches and writings, especially in a 
quantitative analysis, pays little attention to the contextual settings of the data, neglecting the 
potentially strategic character of these statements typically directed at a particular audience. 
By assuming the meaning of words out of context, the method is likely to lead to unintended 
distortions. 
To avoid the common pitfalls associated with quantitative methods, this study turns to 
the analysis of discourse. In trying to identify emotional frustration and perceptions of 
obstruction, I rely on foreign policymakers' self-reporting and articulation of their emotional 
states and responses to obstruction in private documents. By paying close attention to the 
sequence of events and the referents of emotional phrases and words, by situating used 
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phrases and words into the historical context of the decision-making process, by 
contextualizing memos, conversations, policy briefs, intelligence reports, cables, and 
memoirs with the help of newspaper articles and historiographies, I hope to be able to capture 
the proper meaning of the words used and emotions described by policymakers. By 
extensively relying on primary documents, I hope to be able to distinguish between genuinely 
experienced frustration and emotions that are strategically used to persuade a chosen 
audience. By using declassified governments documents, which were kept away from the 
public eye, I hope to have found a valuable strategy to avoid running the risk of mistaking 
public statements for reliable indicators of emotion, given that "political actors constantly 
evoke and manipulate emotions" in order to receive support for their policies.301 To 
complement self-reporting and avoid an unwarranted over-reliance on one single method, I 
additionally pay close attention to the nature of the decision-making process, particularly 
with respect to whether alternative policy options were seriously considered and the time 
required to make decisions. We can reasonably expect that emotionally frustrated 
policymakers will not carefully weigh their options in accordance with standard rationalist 
models of decision-making.302 We can equally expect the anger-arousing quality of emotional 
frustration to reduce "the demand for information" and shorten "decision times".303 Therefore, 
we should be able to observe these implications of emotional frustration to have more 
confidence in the empirical veracity of emotional frustration based on self-reporting. 
The use of policymakers' self-reporting of emotional states is certainly not 
uncontested. According to Paul Saurette, "[p]eople are rarely self-conscious of the full slate 
of factors that are driving their thinking, their decision-making and their actions". Also, 
"individuals rarely explicitly monitor the precise emotions they feel and are perhaps even less 
able to accurately analyze their impact".304 A potential lack of self-awareness and the failure 
to accurately verbalize emotions are thus said to be challenges to the identification of 
emotions and, more specifically, emotional frustration. My response to this cautionary note is 
two-fold: first, I argue that while the potential lack of self-awareness on the part of 
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policymakers is a serious issue for the study of affect or other non-cognitive feelings,305 it is 
less of a challenge to this study. Because emotional frustration by definition involves 
cognitive appraisal, it is impossible for policymakers not to be aware of this emotional state. 
Second, if it is true that actors cannot fully account for their emotional states, failing to 
accurately verbalize them, the resulting gap between statements captured by the method of 
this study and the actual depth and breadth of experienced emotions will not bias my findings 
in my favor, given that I will be less likely to identify emotional frustration where it actually 
exists rather than identifying emotional frustration where there is none. The use of self-
reporting therefore remains a viable strategy to identify emotional frustration. 
Conclusion 
Emotional frustration, I have argued, plays an important role in decisions about regime 
change. The combination of hegemonic expectations and perceptions of intolerable hatred as 
the source of a foreign leader's obstructive conduct can lead to emotional frustration on the 
part of foreign policymakers, arousing anger and an inclination to aggression. In such 
situations, regime change is an attractive foreign policy option. It carries the promise of not 
only putting a stop to obstruction, but to effectively eliminate a foreign menace perceived to 
be implacable, and at the same time, allows frustrated leaders to discharge their emotions 
through the use of considerable force. The following four chapters illustrate the logic of the 
argument in four different case studies of US regime change: Cuba in 1906, Nicaragua 
between 1909 and 1912, the Dominican Republic in 1965, and Iraq in 2003. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The 1906 Intervention in Cuba 
In the first two decades of the twentieth century, the United States engaged in a number of 
military interventions. Emerging victorious from the Spanish-American War of 1898,306 a 
new global conception of power propelled the country into what George Kennan called 
"foreign adventure and authority".307 Apart from the Spanish-American War itself, in which 
American troops were sent to Cuba, Guam, the Philippines and Puerto Rico, the following 
years saw more US military interventions in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, 
Mexico and Nicaragua.308 US interventionist behavior in these years was so pronounced that 
the year 1898 has been called a "watershed year",309 representing a turning point in American 
history that marked the onset of recurrent US power projection by force beyond its own 
continental borders. 
Out of the plethora of interventions in the first two decades of the twentieth century, 
this chapter will focus on one of that era's first cases: the 1906 intervention in Cuba, simply 
called the second intervention,310 which saw the US dismantle the constitutional order of a 
young, nominally independent Cuban republic, and install American direct rule for almost 
three years. More than being a case of intervention, the second intervention was the very first 
case of US regime change.311 In other US military interventions of that time, the degree of 
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interference was significantly more limited. In the 1904 intervention in the Dominican 
Republic, for example, the US assumed control of Dominican custom houses, but refrained 
from changing the country's governance structure.312 To the extent to which the second 
intervention in Cuba dismantled the Cuban authority structure followed by three-year-long 
US occupation, the 1906 intervention exhibits key regime change characteristics. First, the 
change that the US imposed on Cuba was coercive. Although no fighting was done by the US 
military in Cuba,313 troops were deployed and remained on the island as occupying force. 
Secondly, the intervention restructured the Cuban political system by imposing US direct 
rule, meeting the criterion of change at the polity level and being more than mere leadership 
change. Finally, it was an instance of what John Owen calls "ex ante promotion". Regime 
change in Cuba was not preceded by the use of force for other reasons such as by a war 
fought for strategic assets.314 The original purpose of the deployment was indeed regime 
change from the very onset. 
This chapter shows how Roosevelt's decision to order marines to Cuba was predicated 
upon his growing frustration with, first, the 1906 August revolt headed by disgruntled 
members of the Liberal party who in view of persecution and expected vote rigging had 
boycotted the 1905 Cuban presidential election, and second, the unsuccessful response of 
Tomas Estrada Palma, the incumbent Cuban President, who failed to quell the rebellion and 
instead decided to resign from the presidency, exposing the country to complete anarchy. The 
insurrection and Palma's response to it were obstructive to Roosevelt's hegemonic expectation 
of order, peace and stability in Cuba, publicly articulated in the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary to 
the Monroe Doctrine. What is more, Roosevelt perceived these Cuban obstructions as 
unexpected and hostile towards the United States, leading to emotional frustration with both 
Palma and the Liberal, which eventually prompted him to intervene against both the Cuban 
government and its armed opposition. 
The outline of the chapter is as follows: the first section starts out with an account of 
how the intervention came about, focusing both on domestic Cuban politics and the US 
decision to intervene. The second section puts the intervention into its historical context by 
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shedding light on US relations with Latin America at large and US-Cuba relations in 
particular prior to the intervention. Special attention will be paid to the Monroe Doctrine, the 
Spanish-American War of 1898, the Teller and Platt Amendments, and the Roosevelt 
Corollary of 1904. After these two introductory sections, the third section shows what role 
Roosevelt's frustration with the uprising and the Cuban government's response to it played in 
his decision to engage in regime change. More specifically, the section presents Roosevelt's 
hegemonic expectations towards Cuba, how events in Cuba obstructed these expectations, 
how Roosevelt perceived these obstructions, and finally the level of emotional frustration 
Roosevelt experienced. Section Four critically assesses three alternative explanations for the 
1906 intervention and highlights their empirical inadequacies: the security-concern argument, 
the economic-interest argument, and finally the opportunity-for-expansion argument. Section 
Five concludes. 
The Outcome - Regime Change in Cuba  
The second intervention in Cuba began on September 29, 1906, when two thousand US 
marines landed on Cuban soil by command of US Secretary of War William H. Taft. By the 
time the troops disembarked from their battleships, Cuba had lost its government. One day 
before the intervention was carried out, the President of the Cuban republic, Tomas Estrada 
Palma, had resigned together with his Vice President Domingo Mendez Capote on September 
28. Upon "[t]he failure of [the Cuban] Congress to act on the irrevocable resignation of the 
President of the Republic of Cuba",315 Taft, by order of his President, filled the power 
vacuum, proclaimed immediately upon arrival the establishment of a provisional US 
government, and became governor of the island until early October 1906, when US President 
Theodore Roosevelt appointed Charles Magoon as his successor. Cuba remained occupied 
under direct US rule from the day of the intervention until the US military left the country in 
February 1909.316 Before leaving, the US supervised elections from which the Liberals 
emerged victorious.317 Though nominally independent after the election of a new Cuban 
government and the withdrawal of the US military, newly elected President Jose Miguel 
Gomez assured Roosevelt in a telegram that he would "continue to give evidence of the full 
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consciousness of [Cuban] international duties",318 professing his recognition and approval of 
the possibility that the US might reoccupy the island if US expectations of order, peace, and 
stability could not be lived up to. 
The US decision to intervene and occupy the island was preceded by political turmoil 
in Cuba. The main source of contestation was the Cuban presidential election in December 
1905, but in anticipation of defeat, the Liberal party began to revolt as early as in November 
1905.319 Protesting against pre-election persecution, the disruption of opposition rallies, and 
the harassment of Liberal candidates, which even culminated in the assassination of one 
Liberal congressman, the Liberals withdrew from the general elections, paving the way for 
Tomas Estrada Palma's uncontested reelection on December 1, 1905.320 Following the 
election, protests erupted in the country and persisted up until the intervention. The political 
instability in Cuba had its roots in the deep conflict between the Liberals and the other major 
Cuban party, the governing Republicans, which later renamed themselves Moderates and 
supported Palma. Frustrated by election results that the opposition claimed to be fraudulent, 
rebels took up arms and began to revolt against the government. Unrest and violence peaked 
in what is referred to as the 1906 August Revolt, when Palma and his administration proved 
unable to quell the rebellion. Confronted with a rebel force of an estimated 24,000 fighters, a 
rural guard of only three thousand men and the absence of a standing army contributed to the 
government's loss of control.321  
 The US response to domestic political events in Cuba was premised upon Roosevelt's 
simultaneous determination to keep Cuba stable and his unwillingness to intervene militarily. 
Initially, the US government tried to mediate by bringing together Liberals and Moderates, 
but negotiations between the two parties never led to a political settlement. President Palma 
refused to strike a compromise with the rebels unless they would lay down their arms. 
Similarly, the revolting Liberals refused to put an end to the armed conflict unless Palma's 
cabinet would resign. Despite being concerned about the breakdown of the Cuban political 
system, one day before the beginning of the intervention President Roosevelt thought it 
would be "a misfortune […] to undertake to form a provisional government if there was a fair 
chance of obtaining peace by according to the Cubans themselves to form their own 
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provisional government".322 A plea sent to Palma by Roosevelt on September 25, 1906 to 
abide by the United States' mediation proposals was the last attempt to get the Cuban 
President and the rebels to the negotiation table. Palma refused and resigned three days later, 
prompting Roosevelt to eventually order intervention.323  
Intervention and occupation had far-reaching consequences for Cuban autonomy and 
sovereignty. The republic that had become nominally independent in 1902 was from 1906 to 
1909 once again governed by the US like in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War. 
Though formal annexation had been contemplated long before the Second Intervention,324 the 
US nominally retained Cuba's sovereignty and statehood. In a proclamation to the Cuban 
people on the day of the intervention, William Taft promised to conform "as far as may be to 
the constitution of Cuba" and called his provisional government a Cuban government.325 
Accordingly, the Cuban flag was not replaced by the American one, but remained hoisted 
during the time of occupation. Furthermore, though the occupying military forces were kept 
in Cuba, they did not appear in uniform. Despite the absence of outright annexation, formal 
sovereignty did not have any restraining effect on the powers of the directly governing 
occupier. The reins of rule were clearly in the hands of the US, and though Charles Magoon's 
administration was civilian rather than military, many American officers, who had already 
served in Cuba from 1898 until 1902, were reinstated.326 
The Historical Context 
The practice of regime change in 1906 Cuba cannot be understood if not put into its historical 
context. US-Cuba relations did neither start with Theodore Roosevelt's intervention in 1906, 
nor with the war of 1898. Inasmuch as the expansion of American influence in the nineteenth 
century did not only manifest itself in the acquisition and conquest of territory, but also in the 
projection of American dominance into the wider region, Cuba was, as any other country in 
the Americas, subject to US designs and ambitions since the beginning of that century. One 
of the most prominent manifestations of these ambitions was the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, 
which both urged European powers not to meddle in the United States' hemisphere and, at the 
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same time, entitled the US to regional hegemony. Newly independent states in Latin America 
were "not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers".327 In 
return, the US promised not to interfere in the affairs of existing European colonies, a 
rationale that aimed at staking out the boundaries of the American hemisphere, while 
separating it from the realm of European influence and possession. 
As the Monroe Doctrine slowly became "the bedrock of U.S. foreign policy in the 
Western Hemisphere",328 the principles laid down in it also determined US-Cuba relations of 
the nineteenth century. As a Spanish colonial possession, Cuba had been under European rule 
since the end of the fifteenth century, hence lying outside the self-declared hemisphere of the 
US. In accordance with its promise not to interfere in European colonies, the US assured to 
respect Spanish reign over the island, remaining neutral when the first rebellion against 
Spanish rule broke out in 1868. In June 1895, the US declared, once again, that its neutrality 
laws applied to the Cuban insurrection against Spain, which meant no US interference.329 
Despite this seemingly consistent approach to foreign policy in the region, the US disposition 
towards Cuba was in fact much more ambiguous. A closer look reveals how the US tried to 
strike a balance between, on the one hand, recognizing Spanish rule and, on the other hand, 
pursuing its own designs for Cuba. Twice, in 1848 and in 1854, the US tried to purchase the 
island from Spain and incorporate it into its own territory. After Spain repeatedly refused to 
sell its colony, the Ostend Manifesto, a report drafted by the US Ministers to Spain, Great 
Britain, and France in November 1854, alluded to the "great law of self-preservation" that 
would give the US the right to wrest Cuba from Spain if the latter refused to sell it.330 The 
reason why the manifesto invoked the law of self-preservation was the notion that Cuba was 
posing an existential threat to US security if left in Spanish hands: "Indeed the Union can 
never enjoy repose, nor possess reliable security, as long as Cuba is not embraced within its 
boundaries".331 To be sure, US President Franklin Pierce ruled out the use of force to gain 
Cuba, but the desire to annex the island was so pronounced that it drove "Cuba deep into the 
realms of national consciousness".332 In order to resolve the tension between this desire and 
Spanish sovereignty over Cuba, the US temporarily accepted Spanish rule, regarding it as a 
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substitute for annexation. The no-transfer principle, which did not accept any modification of 
sovereignty other than in the form of US acquisition of Cuba, was born.  
The next Cuban insurrection and struggle for independence, starting in 1895 and 
ultimately leading to the Spanish-American War, upset the fragile equilibrium between the 
US, Spain and Cuba. The transfer of sovereignty over Cuba from Spain to the US, which had 
been long contemplated, but never realized, now became a serious possibility. While the 
Spanish rulers were already struggling to quell the two previous rebellions, first from 1868 to 
1878 and then from 1879 to 1880, the third Cuban insurrection proved to be too difficult to 
control. Crumbling in the face of the rebels' forceful resistance, Cuban victory seemed 
inevitable by the early spring of 1898. To the US, the prospect of Cuban independence was 
everything but comforting. Sovereignty and control over Cuba was to either stay with Spain 
or to be transferred to the US, as was spelled out in the no-transfer principle. Since Spain was 
not only on the brink of losing the war with the Cuban rebels, but also about to lose its colony 
altogether, then-President William McKinley decided to intervene. Contrary to what the 
labeling of the war suggests, the "war was thus directed against both Spaniards and 
Cubans".333 
The American disposition towards Cuba and the Cuban struggle for independence 
became all but evident in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War. Emerging as military 
victor against Spain, the US kept its troops on the island and, rather than granting long-
awaited independence to the Cuban rebels, installed an occupying administration from 
January 1899 through to May 1902. Interestingly enough, occupation occurred despite a joint 
resolution of the United States Congress, the fourth article of which is known as the Teller 
Amendment. As a compromise struck in April 1898 between Congress, which in large parts 
supported the cause of Cuban independence, and the McKinley administration, the Teller 
Amendment disclaimed "any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or 
control over said island [Cuba] except for the pacification thereof".334 What at first glance 
seemed to rule out occupation was interpreted differently after the war: "'pacification' of the 
island manifestly meant the establishment in that island of a government capable of 
adequately protecting life, liberty and property".335 This newly constructed meaning of 
pacification was embodied by another central document, the Platt Amendment. In order to 
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ensure continuing US influence beyond the era of occupation, the US actively promoted the 
idea to codify the US-Cuba relationship in a Cuban constitution that was to be established by 
a constitutional convention by the end of 1900. To this effect, Congress passed the Platt 
Amendment granting the US the right to intervene.336 Reluctantly and after some resistance, 
the constitutional convention accepted the provisions in May 1901, for the alternative to 
limited independence was occupation.337 The Platt Amendment was certainly the reason why 
in 1902 Cuba became "independent in name only".338 It also reflected the American 
disposition towards Cuba. 
Emotional Frustration and Regime Change 
Roosevelt's Hegemonic Expectations Towards Cuba 
As shown, Cuba had occupied an exceptional place in the minds of US leaders since the 
beginning of the nineteenth century.339 Due to its close geographic proximity to the United 
States, many US leaders before Theodore Roosevelt showed great interest in the island. 
Having tried to buy Cuba from Spain at the beginning of the century, Thomas Jefferson, US 
President from 1801 to 1809, wrote in 1823: "I candidly confess, that I have ever looked on 
Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of States".340 
John Quincy Adams, then-Secretary of State, argued in the same year that "[t]here are laws of 
political as well as physical gravitation" pulling Cuba towards the US mainland,341 showing 
that the possession of Cuba was a major preoccupation for American policymakers.  
For Theodore Roosevelt, Cuba was an important subject of US foreign policy and the 
1906 August revolt inevitably thrust the island onto his foreign policy agenda. Musings on 
the possibility of annexation professed by a number of preceding US leaders, however, were 
not his. Strictly against annexation, Roosevelt did not get tired highlighting how his policies 
towards Cuba exhibited his aversion to it. Referring to the end of the first US occupation in 
1902, Roosevelt boasted in 1907 that "not a European nation would have given up Cuba as 
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we gave it up".342 In June 1904, at the national nominating convention of the Republican 
Party, the party platform proudly recalled that the Roosevelt administration "set Cuba free" 
and gave the island back to "the Cuban people with order restored" after nearly three years of 
occupation.343 Roosevelt presented his foreign policy towards Cuba as something distinct 
from how other great powers would have treated the island. Referring to the withdrawal of 
American troops from Cuba in 1902, Roosevelt proudly argued in his autobiography that the 
promise to leave the island was redeemed when the first occupation ended in 1902.344 
Annexation or expansion by conquest were not his preferred policy options in his dealings 
with the island. As Hugh Thomas puts it, "Roosevelt's conception of the U.S. was not its 
expansion through the capture or purchase of greater territory", making him "uninterested in 
the annexation of Cuba".345 
Rather than aiming for the annexation of Cuba and its integration into the Union, 
Roosevelt's approach towards the island centered on a specific set of expectations regarding 
what Roosevelt considered proper state conduct. His position was a middle way between two 
extremes: on the one hand, expansionists among the US policy elite who held on to a century-
old desire to incorporate Cuba into US territory, were eager to seize every opportunity to 
annex the island. US Senator Albert Beveridge, one of the most vociferous proponents of 
annexation among Roosevelt's contemporaries who in a speech in 1898 called Cuba "the 
richest spot on the globe",346 argued in the wake of the 1906 Cuban insurrection against 
President Palma that the US President "should at once take the Island".347 At the other 
extreme, Senator Joseph B. Foraker questioned Roosevelt's right to intervene "with force of 
arms to overthrow established government or compel it to make terms with lawless bands of 
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insurgents".348 Similarly, William Jennings Bryan, a leading Democrat, opposed intervention 
and called Roosevelt's Cuba policy "reckless militarism".349 
Roosevelt's middle way between these two extremes, annexation on the one hand and 
strict abstention from intervention on the other, was predicated upon his general outlook that 
sovereignty and independence came not only with state rights, but also with state 
responsibilities.350 In Roosevelt's view, each nation had to live up to a specific set of duties 
commensurate with its place in the world. Placed at the cutting edge of history by Roosevelt, 
the United States had the duty to act as "civilization's leading disseminators".351 Following 
the common doctrine of the time that nations could be divided into three developmental 
stages from savagery to barbarism to civilization, this view implied US duties vis-à-vis other 
states in the hemisphere and Roosevelt was willing to accept them, arguing that the US could 
not "perpetually assert the Monroe Doctrine [...] without ourselves [the US] accepting some 
responsibility in connection therewith".352 He also argued that  
[w]e have duties to others and duties to ourselves; and we can shirk neither. 
We have become a great nation, forced by the fact of its greatness into 
relations with the other nations of the earth, and we must behave as beseems a 
people with such responsibilities.353 
In Roosevelt's view, state responsibilities differed from state to state, depending on their 
developmental stage. From Cuba, as with any other country in the Western hemisphere, he 
expected first and foremost the maintenance of domestic peace and stability, conditions he 
regarded as necessary for the continued independence of the island. Without domestic order, 
by which Roosevelt meant the "universal respect for authority and for the rule of law",354 
social progress could not be sustained and states situated in the United States' hemisphere 
would forfeit their right to sovereignty and self-rule. Nowhere were these expectations of 
order, peace and stability articulated more clearly and explicitly than in his fourth annual 
message to congress on December 6, 1904:  
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[a]ll that this country [the US] desires is to see the neighboring countries 
stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct 
themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship [...]. It is a mere truism 
to say that every nation, whether in America or anywhere else, which desires 
to maintain its freedom, its independence, must ultimately realize that the right 
of such independence can not be separated from the responsibility of making 
good use of it.355  
Furthermore, Roosevelt's fourth annual message specified in what has come to be known as 
the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine what the United States, the most civilized 
nation in the region according to the US President, would do if a country in the hemisphere 
proved unable to live up to its assigned duties:  
chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of 
the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require 
intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the 
adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United 
States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or 
impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.356 
Concerning not only Cuba, but all states in what Roosevelt referred to as the "Western 
Hemisphere", the Roosevelt Corollary became a new principle of American foreign policy, 
establishing a set of state responsibilities that had to be fulfilled if American intervention was 
to be averted. Only if stability, order and prosperity, the three basic notions of desirable state 
conduct according to Roosevelt, were pursued by a state inside the hemisphere, did this state 
retain its right to independence.  
Roosevelt revealed his hegemonic expectations towards Cuba in the wake of the 1906 
August revolt in Cuba in exchanges with the Cuban leadership. In a letter to Don Gonzalo de 
Quesadas, Cuban Minister to the United States, written on September 14, 1906, two weeks 
before the American intervention, Roosevelt spelled out what he had expected from Cuba:  
[t]his nation asks nothing of Cuba, save that it shall continue to develop as it 
has developed during these past seven years [since US victory in the Spanish-
American War]; that it shall know and practice the orderly liberty which will 
assuredly bring an ever-increasing measure of peace and prosperity to the 
beautiful Queen of the Antilles [Cuba].357 
In another letter, this time to the Cuban President Tomas Estrada Palma, Roosevelt pleaded 
for the Cuban President to stay in office to prevent chaos and to fulfill his responsibilities as 
the country's President in a way that when he left office, he would leave his "country still 
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free".358 Similarly, Elihu Root, first Secretary of War from 1899 to 1904 and then Secretary 
of State from 1905 to 1909, expressed his views about the US attitude towards Cuba in a 
private letter to Leonard Wood, Cuba's military governor during the first American 
occupation from 1899 to 1902: "[t]he preservation of that independence by a country so small 
as Cuba [...] must depend upon her strict performance of international obligations".359 Root 
confirmed this expectation of orderly conduct and his opposition to annexation in a private 
letter to a journalist, underlining the notion he shared with Roosevelt that independence and 
the responsibility to provide for stability, order and prosperity were inseparably linked to 
each other: "[w]e do not want Cuba ourselves [...], we want her to govern herself decently 
and in order".360 Roosevelt's private correspondence with William Howard Taft, Roosevelt's 
Secretary of War, confirmed the centrality of expectations of orderly state conduct he had 
from the Cuba, especially after the August revolt had broken out. In a letter dating back to 
September 10, 1906, Roosevelt urged Taft to "tell Palma [Cuban President] to use in the most 
effective fashion all the resources at his command to quell revolt".361 
Cuban Obstruction 
Domestic political turmoil and armed insurrection against the Cuban leadership headed by 
President Palma alarmed the American leadership. Because Cuba was the American 
showcase of responsible state conduct and peaceful development up until the 1906 August 
revolt, the insurrection came as a major blow to the US government. Before August 1906, 
when Cuba was in the midst of an armed rebellion that threatened the very social and political 
setup the US had helped create during the first occupation from 1899 to 1902, Roosevelt had 
nothing but praise for the country. In December 1904, the US President commended the 
Cuban leadership for its "progress in stable and just civilization which with the aid of the 
Platt amendment Cuba has shown since our [US] troops left the island", wishing all countries 
in the region would follow Cuba's example.362 Just two weeks before the beginning of the 
August revolt, Secretary of State Elihu Root similarly expressed his satisfaction with the 
island, convinced that "[t]he Cubans have done admirably in their experiment in self-
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government" and that "they have maintained the governmental organization and methods 
which we [the US] turned over to them four years ago [1902]".363  
While Cuba met and even exceeded the expectations of the US government under 
Theodore Roosevelt in the wake of its formal independence, it was the same expectations of 
order, peace, stability and prosperity that the 1906 August revolt crushed. The severity of the 
revolt, whose ramifications were at first underestimated by the American mission to 
Havana,364 posed a serious threat to the internal stability of the Cuban polity, making a 
descent into violent chaos a real possibility. The extent to which the armed insurrection came 
as an obstruction to US expectations towards Cuban order, peace, and prosperity is reflected 
by Roosevelt's correspondence with the US mission to Cuba. On September 14, a month after 
the onset of armed rebellion in Cuba, Frank Steinhart, US consul general in Havana, spoke of 
a "prevailing state of anarchy"365 in his cable to Washington, DC. Roosevelt himself revealed 
how obstructive he perceived the revolt, confiding to a friend in a private letter that it was 
what he had "dreaded".366 Equating the revolt with "misrule and anarchy", Roosevelt 
regarded domestic events in Cuba as the opposite of what he had expected from Cuba: order, 
peace and stability.  
In addition to the 1906 August revolt, the response of Cuban President Estrada Palma 
to the armed uprising against him constituted another obstruction of US expectations of order, 
peace and stability. First, contrary to what Roosevelt expected from Palma, the Cuban 
President proved unable to quell the insurrection and prevent Cuba from moving closer to a 
full-fledged civil war. To be sure, President Palma confronted the rebels and tried to curb the 
revolt by issuing a decree on August 20, just a few days after the outbreak of the revolt, that 
ordered an increase of the size of the rural guard, Cuba's prime military institution, to "2000 
more members",367 increasing the pressure on the rebels by forming a "temporary national 
militia" in support and under the command of the rural guard five days later,368 by granting 
amnesty and an assurance of "no further molestation" to rebels "who voluntarily lay down the 
                                                 
363
 Root to Eliot, June 18, 1906, in Jessup, Elihu Root: 1845-1909, Vol. 1, 530. 
364
 While the American Chargé d'Affaires Jacop Sleeper reported from Havana on August 21, 1906 that the 
outbreak of the rebellion five days earlier was "more serious then the [Cuban] Government cares to admit", he 
was nevertheless convinced that there was "no reason why the [Cuban] Government should not crush the revolt 
with the resources at its disposal". "Dispatch No. 157", August, 21, 1906, PRFRUS 1906, Part 1, 455. 
365
 Telegram from Steinhart to the White House, September 14, 1906. Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Series 1: 
Letters and Related Material, 1759-1919, reel 68, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
366
 Roosevelt to Trevelyan, September 9, 1906 in Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt: The Big Stick, 
1907-1909, 401. 
367
 Decree by Tomas Estrada Palma, August 20, 1906, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Series 1: Letters and Related 
Material, 1759-1919, reel 67. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
368
 "Translation of Decree No. 370", August 25, 1906, PRFRUS 1906, Part 1, 458. 
 84 
arms of themselves" and return to their homes,369 and finally by declaring martial law and 
suspending pertinent parts of the Cuban constitution.370 These measures, however, proved 
ineffective. According to Jacob Sleeper, American Chargé d'Affaires in Havana, Palma's 
amnesty order did not have the "anticipated effect"371, leading to "alarming rumors relative to 
attack in Havana and accompanied by internal disorder" and President Palma admitting to his 
inability to "guarantee protection to lives and property".372 Confirming these rumors, 
Secretary of War Taft reported to the White House on September 20 that the Cuban 
government only controlled "coast towns and provincial capitals" with "[a]narchy 
elsewhere".373 Second, in addition to the government's difficulties in putting down the 
rebellion, Palma proved to be obstructive to American designs for Cuba in another respect: he 
was surprisingly stubborn and unwilling to negotiate a compromise with the rebels in order to 
solve the Cuban crisis peacefully. Worse still, confronted with ever-growing resistance to his 
rule, Palma chose to resign from office.374 
Roosevelt's Perception of Cuban Obstruction 
If the 1906 August revolt and Palma's inability to put it down came as an obstruction to 
American expectations towards the island, how was this obstruction perceived by the US 
leadership? This section argues that, based on Roosevelt's expectations of order and stability 
in Cuba, events in Cuba were not perceived as a Cuban matter, but rather as directed at the 
United States and fundamentally illegitimate. First, reports from the Cuban mission about the 
uprising that started on August 16, 1906, quickly drew Roosevelt's attention to Cuba. While 
he was first cautiously optimistic that US involvement would not be necessary to make Cuba 
return to peace and stability, his letters reveal how preoccupied he was with political turmoil 
there. Not only did he identify Cuba as one of two vexing issues in foreign policy, Roosevelt 
also believed that the rebels were about to destroy the American legacy of successful 
governance during and transition to independence after the first occupation, in which the US 
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"of course kept everything straight and decent in the island".375 Roosevelt's sense was that the 
revolt was not exclusively directed at the Cuban President, but just as much at the United 
States and its purported achievements in Cuba. When Taft suggested that the rebels were "in 
arms against the United States",376 Roosevelt urged Taft not to make public statements that 
would give this impression, but agreed with Taft's interpretation of the United States being 
the rebels' main target.377 What supported the conviction that the Cuban insurrectionists had 
not only an axe to grind with President Palma, but also with the US government, was 
Roosevelt and his government's expectations towards Cuba that made nominally domestic 
events in the island an important matter of concern to the United States. As much as 
Roosevelt was uninterested in annexing the island to US territory, his expansive notion of US 
responsibilities towards Cuba in case of what he had called "chronic wrongdoing" in his 
articulation of the Roosevelt Corollary, blurred the lines between Cuba and the US both 
geographically and mentally, leading to a view that made events in Cuba an immediate 
concern to the US.378 In fact, expectations were so expansive that Elihu Root compared the 
1906 intervention with the US government sending federal troops into a US state to quell an 
uprising and declare martial law.379 As early as 1902, Root called Cuba an "intermediate 
state", arguing that  
although it is technically a foreign country, practically and morally it occupies 
an intermediate position, since we [the US] have required it to become a part 
of our [the US'] political and military system.380  
Similarly, in a response to an inquiry made by Taft into whether Roosevelt could intervene 
without the explicit permission of Congress, the judge advocate general of the War 
Department drew an analogy between a possible intervention in Cuba and two occasions in 
which the US President intervened in Panama, but also argued that past federal actions 
against insurrections in US states constituted ample precedent for intervention, suggesting a 
minimum level of similarities between the domestic and Cuban context.381 That Roosevelt 
perceived the 1906 August revolt as an act of aggression not only directed at the Cuban, but 
                                                 
375
 Roosevelt to Trevelyan, September 9, 1906. Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Subseries 3B: Additional Copies of 
Letters Sent, 1888-1915, reel 413, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
376
 Taft to Roosevelt, September 25, 1906, ibid.  
377
 Roosevelt to Taft, September 26, 1906, ibid.  
378
 This perception was not self-evident, as the examples of Foraker and Bryan's attitude towards US 
interventionism show. 
379
 Root added that in such a case "the authority of the military commander supersedes the ordinary agencies of 
government" without violating the state's sovereignty. Root to A.K. McClure, October 26, 1906, in Jessup, Elihu 
Root: 1845-1909, Vol. 1, 537. 
380
 Root to Carnegie, March 20, 1902, in ibid., 327. 
381
 Judge advocate general to Taft, September 15, 1906. Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Series 1: Letters and 
Related Material, 1759-1919, reel 68, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
 86 
also at his own government, flew directly from his previously defined expectations towards 
order, stability and peace that lent high significance to domestic events in Cuba. 
Second, Roosevelt considered the Cuban insurrection as highly illegitimate. In his 
view, the rebellion against President Palma was not only obstructive to American designs 
centering on order and peace in the island, it was also perceived as lacking any legitimating 
basis. Roosevelt expressed his disdain for the rebels in a private letter to a friend, arguing that 
the rebels were "not suffering from any real grievance whatsoever" and that they had 
"deliberately plunged the country [Cuba] into civil war".382 In another confidential letter to 
Senator Foraker on September 28, one day ahead of sending US marines to Cuba, the 
American President expressed his "indignation with the insurgents", repeating that he did not 
consider the rebels' "grievances as justifying, or coming anywhere near justifying, their 
plunging the country [Cuba] into possible destruction by an insurrection".383 That Roosevelt 
disapproved of the uprising in such stark terms was more a consequence of how he judged 
such actions against the backdrop of his own designs and expectations for Cuba, rather than 
of a careful assessment of the underlying causes of the insurrection. His regarding the 
uprising as illegitimate and wrongful is all the more remarkable, considering that there was 
ample evidence of the existence of grievances and particularly election fraud in the previous 
presidential election, acknowledged by Taft after his sending to Havana in a telegram to 
Roosevelt. According to Taft, "the Palma government flagrantly and openly used and abused 
its power to carry elections and in so doing removed many municipal officers in many parts 
of [the] Island", leaving a "deep impression on [the] minds of people" and leading the Liberal 
party to "withdraw their [presidential] candidate from [the] main election" after they had 
experienced such "fraud and violence and terrorism".384 Indeed, the presidential election of 
1905 produced a "bitter struggle" between the Moderates and the Liberals who accused 
Palma of "resorting to violence, intimidation, and bribery to retain his position".385 Election 
fraud was so evident and corruption so widespread that, according to Faustino Guerra Puente, 
leader of the insurrectionists, "[i]f the American people had to endure such a Government as 
Palma's is to-day, they would not permit it to remain in power five days".386 Roosevelt, 
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however, disregarded such grievances, perceiving the revolt as an illegitimate obstruction to 
his expectation of order and peace in Cuba.  
Roosevelt's Emotional Frustration 
Roosevelt's perception of Cuban obstruction as both illegitimate and directed at the United 
States led to considerable frustration. By the time the American President landed marines on 
Cuban soil, his emotional state was notably marked by high levels of emotional arousal, even 
anger. While, in public statements, he made sure to convey how worried he was about 
developments in Cuba without giving the impression of being overly involved emotionally, 
Roosevelt made no efforts to hide his feelings in his private correspondence with friends. 
Once it was clear that the insurrection posed a real threat to the constitutional order of the 
Cuban republic, an exasperated Roosevelt ranted in a private letter from September 13, 1906:  
I am so angry with that infernal little Cuban republic that I would like to wipe 
its people off the face of the earth. All we have wanted from them was that 
they would behave themselves and be prosperous and happy.387 
The obstructive nature of the revolt threatened Roosevelt's vision of Cuba as peaceful, safe, 
and prosperous, but what made his frustration emotional was how he perceived the 
obstruction: in the next sentence of the same letter, Roosevelt argued that the insurrectionists 
had started "an utterly unjustifiable and pointless revolution" that, as he wisely predicted, 
"may got things into such a snarl that we [the US] have no alternative save to intervene".388 
One day before the intervention, Roosevelt confessed that he was "bitterly disappointed" that 
the Cubans should bear the brunt of "the criminal folly of this insurrection".389 His disgust 
and contempt for the insurrectionists was still palpable after the actual invasion. In October 
1906, he wrote to his son that it was hard to tell when "those ridiculous dagos [Cubans] 
would flare up over some totally unexpected trouble and start to cutting one another's 
throat".390  
One may wonder why Roosevelt's frustration over the threat to stability posed by the 
Cuban insurrection led to his decision to not only intervene against the insurrectionists, but 
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against the Cuban constitutional order altogether, which he had helped put in place in the first 
place. Roosevelt could have, after all, propped up the Palma government in its fight against 
the rebels. Even if difficult, this was certainly possible.391 Yet, Roosevelt eventually 
intervened against the young Cuban polity in its entirety, as he was just as much frustrated 
with Palma as with the revolt the Cuban President was desperately trying to fight off. Palma's 
refusal to agree to a compromise solution and peace proposal painstakingly worked out by 
Taft and Bacon caused so much frustration in Roosevelt that he called the Palma government 
"utterly unreasonable" one day before he ordered the intervention.392 Roosevelt, who 
generally thought highly of Palma, was shocked to see how stubborn the Cuban President 
proved to be, showing no willingness to strike a deal with the insurrectionists,393 and accused 
Palma of not acting "like a patriot" and being "sulky".394 Taft shared this interpretation, 
reporting from Havana that Palma and the Moderates would "take away their dolls and not 
play".395 What made Roosevelt furious was his conviction that Palma's obstinacy stemmed 
from his desire to drag the US into the government's armed conflict with the Liberals, arguing 
that the Palma government had "evidently been bent upon forcing us [the US] to an armed 
intervention in their support".396 He disapproved of Palma's decision to leave power, 
considered it irresponsible and blamed the Cuban President of leaving his country "in 
absolute chaos".397 Had the American President not perceived Palma's obstructive behavior as 
unpatriotic, irresponsible, and as an attempt to drag the US government into the violent 
standoff, his response would have been quite different:  
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[i]f the Palma government had [...] a sincere purpose to remedy the wrongs of 
which your [Taft's] telegrams show that they have been guilty [Palma's 
obstinacy and attempt to force US intervention in his support], I should have 
been inclined to stand by them no matter to what extent.398 
In Roosevelt's view, there could not have been another reason for Palma's decision to resign. 
That Palma did not want to accede to the US peace proposal because his "dignity, his concept 
of duty [...] would not allow him to compromise for the sake of political expediency",399 as 
Lockmiller argues, rather than because he was simply unpatriotic, trying to get the United 
States involved, was something that Roosevelt did not consider. Had he done so, his reaction 
might have been less furious and his decision regarding intervention different. 
Alternative Explanations for Regime Change in Cuba 
To compare the plausibility of the argument that Roosevelt's emotional frustration was the 
driving force for intervention, this section critically assesses alternative arguments prevalent 
in the literature about the sources of the 1906 intervention, grouping them together into three 
arguments that dovetail with general approaches concerning US intervention and 
expansion.400  
The first alternative argument about the sources of the 1906 intervention in Cuba 
centers on US security concerns and the geopolitical context of the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Following the logic of defensive realism,401 the 1906 August revolt and the ensuing 
political crisis in Cuba were, according to this view, a threat to US national security because 
of a possible intensification of international tensions between the US and European powers. 
The US feared, so the argument goes, that an unstable Cuba shattered by domestic chaos 
would invite foreign power intervention that in turn would jeopardize US regional hegemony, 
potentially rendering the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary meaningless.402 These 
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fears were a response to European involvement in the Western hemisphere, which was 
everything but unprecedented and therefore fueled American weariness about a possible 
confrontation with European powers. Especially the Anglo-German debt collection 
intervention in Venezuela in 1902 demonstrated European willingness to pursue own 
interests in the Western hemisphere.403 Two years later in 1904, Roosevelt, "concerned with 
keeping some other power, such as Britain, from intervening",404 intervened himself in the 
Dominican Republic to collect and manage the country's European-held sovereign debt.405 
With respect to Cuba, the geographic proximity of the island to the United States made the 
prospect of foreign intervention in case of domestic instability all the more worrisome.  
The security-concern argument seems plausible at first glance. After all, technological 
change and the onset of widespread industrialization enabled states to project power more 
easily, propelling "European forces and interests across the oceans, and potentially closer to 
the United States".406 Yet, evidence for the American fear of European intervention in Cuba 
is scarce. To be sure, Roosevelt repeatedly invoked this line of argument in public statements. 
In his fourth annual message to Congress, for example, Roosevelt argued that nations in the 
Western hemisphere that did not fulfill their state responsibilities, could potentially invite 
"foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations".407 Roosevelt's 
private correspondence, however, belies any serious apprehension about European 
involvement on the part of the US President. When informed by Taft on the day of Palma's 
resignation that "foreign consuls [in Havana] are about to take action with their own 
governments as to intervention",408 Roosevelt responded pointedly:  
I should not be at all sorry to have the foreign consuls act as to intervention of 
their governments, as you [Taft] state that they will, because it would make 
our [the US'] course even clearer and give us an even more complete 
justification.409 
                                                 
403
 Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force, 28, Howard C. Hill, 
Roosevelt and the Caribbean (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), 106-147, Munro, Intervention and 
Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921, 66-77, Michael Tomz, Reputation and International 
Cooperation: Sovereign Debt Across Three Centuries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 133-135. 
404
 Saunders, Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions, 188. 
405
 With respect to the Dominican intervention of 1904, Langley similarly argues that "Roosevelt was 
determined to prevent foreign intervention", see Langley, The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in the 
Caribbean, 1898-1934, 23. 
406
 Dueck, "The Sources of American Expansion," 179. 
407
 Roosevelt, Fourth Annual Message, December 4 ([cited). 
408
 Taft to Roosevelt, September 28, 1906, in William H. Taft and Robert Bacon, Cuban Pacification: Report of 
William H. Taft, Secretary of War, and Robert Bacon, Assistant Secretary of State, Annual Reports of the War 
Department (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906), 481. 
409
 Roosevelt to Taft, September 28, 1906, ibid. 
 91 
As this revealing correspondence shows, just one day before he ordered US marines into 
Cuba, Roosevelt viewed the attitude of European diplomats in Havana towards European 
intervention as a welcome support for justifications for his own intervention rather than as an 
imminent threat to US security. In the days leading to US intervention, Roosevelt was, in the 
words of Millet, "under no real pressure because Great Britain, France, and Germany 
believed the United States would protect their nationals without active intercession", making 
him feel "awkward", not worried, about the lack of foreign interest in Cuba.410 The second 
intervention was thus hardly a consequence of a Cuban or European threat to US national 
security. 
Another variant of this argument attributes Roosevelt's intervention to US concerns 
about the economic interests of US business groups, claiming that the US government was 
apprehensive of the economic implications of internal instability in Cuba after the August 
Revolt of 1906, with potential plunder and seizure of funds and treasuries providing on the 
rise. This view stems from revisionist historiography that treats US foreign policy as a 
function of economic considerations and imperatives dictated by domestic economic elites.411 
Since foreign property was predominantly American property, reflecting the far-reaching 
economic relations between the two countries, the Cuban political crisis during the conflict 
between Liberals and Moderates fueled American apprehensions of a political breakdown 
and damage to the US economic interests.412 When the destruction of American property 
became a possibility, the US responded with armed intervention according to this 
argument.413  
US concerns about the economic implications of the Cuban crisis were real. On 
September 8, 1906, for example, Cuban President Tomas Estrada Palma sent a message to 
US mission in Havana, conceding that his government "could no longer guarantee the safety 
of foreign property".414 These concerns alone, however, did not convince Roosevelt to engage 
in regime change. While attentive to the state of the US economy, the American President did 
not define American interests in economic terms, viewing the influence of big business on 
policymaking with great suspicion. In a letter to his friend Henry Cabot Lodge, Roosevelt 
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expressed his contempt for politicians who he saw as "beneficiaries of corporate wealth" and 
as "an appanage to Wall Street", arguing that his foreign policy would be immune to big 
business influence.415 Domestically, Roosevelt was known as a "trust buster", filing "43 suits 
against major corporations and alleged monopolies".416 With respect to the 1906 intervention 
in Cuba, there is little evidence that Roosevelt was driven by a concern for the well-being of 
US economic elites. In fact, the American President was so suspicious about such elites that 
"[o]ne of his major worries was that American business interests had financed the [Cuban] 
revolt", hardly a suspicion that would have led him to overcome his reluctance to 
intervene.417 
The third alternative argument attributes the 1906 intervention in Cuba to Roosevelt's 
imperialist posture and his expansionist tendencies. Drawing from offensive realism,418 this 
approach treats the Cuban crisis triggered by the 1906 August revolt not as a threat to the US, 
but rather as an opportunity for imperialism and expansion. That states "look for 
opportunities to take advantage of one another" and "act offensively to amass as much power 
as [they] can"419 was, according to this view, exemplified by Theodore Roosevelt's foreign 
policy. An "unabashed expansionist"420 and "early imperialist"421 with a "'big stick' approach 
to foreign policy"422 and an "almost indecent enthusiasm for U.S. participation in a world 
organized by force and power",423 Roosevelt is portrayed as a confident President "intrigued 
with power, with the problems of power, and with rivalries for power".424 With regard to the 
Cuban intervention of 1906, this approach argues that Cuban domestic turmoil came as a 
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godsend to Roosevelt who, by dispatching troops to Cuba, "took advantage of [the] clearly 
stated theoretical right to intervene [the Platt Amendment]".425  
While the opportunity-for-expansion argument fits neatly with the dominant narrative 
about Theodore Roosevelt's braggadocio, it is a hardly convincing explanation for the 
President's decision to interpose US troops between the two warring factions in Cuba and 
occupy the island for more than two years. More specifically, the argument about the link 
between capabilities and expansion is unconvincing, since it grossly overstates Roosevelt's 
appetite for intervention. Rather than welcoming an opportunity to occupy Cuba, Roosevelt 
was extraordinarily reluctant to respond to the Cuban crisis by force and intervention. This is 
documented in his private correspondence with friends and confidants. Opposed to any form 
of expansion, Roosevelt wrote on September 9, 1906: "I loathe the thought of assuming any 
control over the island [Cuba] such as we [the US] have over Porto Rico and the 
Philippines".426 Instead of intervening at the first opportune moment, the American President 
wanted to "exhaust all possible means [...] before we [the US] go into the business of armed 
intervention".427 Supporting the Cuban veterans in their attempt at effecting a compromise 
between Palma and the rebels428 and subsequently sending his Secretary of War and assistant 
Secretary of State to the island to reach a political settlement,429 Roosevelt had indeed tried 
many different options before finally resorting to force. 
Conclusion 
The 1906 intervention in Cuba was an unlikely event. Despite the Platt Amendment and the 
codified right of the United States to intervene in Cuba in case of domestic instability, 
Roosevelt was determined to avoid a military intervention. Once he did send US marines to 
Cuba, he did not support the constitutionally legitimate government, but decided to dismantle 
the constitutional structure of the island altogether and then occupy the island. As this chapter 
has shown, Roosevelt would have been unlikely to use force to engage in regime change, had 
he not been so frustrated with the 1906 August revolt, Palma's inability to quell it, his 
obstinacy in peace negotiations, and finally his decision to resign from the presidency. 
Roosevelt's expectations of Cuban order, stability, and prosperity coupled with the perception 
of Cuban obstruction as directed at the US and highly illegitimate, contributed to his high 
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levels of frustration. Without the need to receive approval from Congress, Roosevelt used 
forced when deemed necessary and responded to his frustration by engaging in regime 
change, punishing both Palma's Moderates and the insurgent Liberals. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The 1909 – 1912 Intervention in Nicaragua 
One month after the end of the Cuban occupation, Theodore Roosevelt's term as US President 
came to an end. His successor, William Howard Taft assumed office in March 1909. Hand-
picked by the outgoing President and his fellow Republican,430 Taft "promised to continue 
Roosevelt's reform program"431 and to live up to his decisive 1908 electoral victory, as 
"[m]any voters had chosen Taft with the explicit understanding that he would continue 
Roosevelt's policies".432 In his foreign policy towards the Western hemisphere, Taft set out to 
adopt Roosevelt's approach towards the Dominican Republic that involved an intervention in 
1905 to bring about stability in the island by overseeing the Dominican collection of customs 
and its repayment of debts.433 In what came to be known as dollar diplomacy, i.e. the attempt 
at creating US financial oversight in unstable countries with, in the words of Taft himself, the 
goal of avoiding "revolutions by assisting [Central American] Republics to rehabilitate their 
finances, to establish their currency on a stable basis, to remove the customhouses from the 
danger of revolutions [...] and to establish reliable banks",434 Taft thus planned the use 
financial means to achieve foreign policy ends.435 
Despite Taft's dollar diplomacy, the American President soon found himself 
interfering with the domestic governance structure of foreign countries and even using armed 
force, overshadowing the most aggressive and expansionist depictions of Roosevelt's 
handling of the Western hemisphere. Nowhere became Taft's resort to the use of force more 
evident than in Nicaragua where, at the height of an American regime change operation in 
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1912, Taft ordered "at that time the largest American armed force ever to land on foreign soil 
in peacetime".436 Initially planning on exclusively using non-military means to achieve 
foreign policy goals, Taft had become a proven regime changer. Why? What made the 
American President who "believed in the creation of a more peaceful and prosperous world 
order through the promotion of international law, trade, and investment", and whose 
proverbial dollars were "the primary means of a foreign policy based on the classical liberal 
assumption that the international system could be modernized and pacified through the 
benign effects of commerce and investment",437 resort to the most intrusive form of 
intervention: regime change?  
This chapter shows that Taft's decision to practice regime change in Nicaragua was a 
consequence of his intense frustration with the Nicaraguan President Jose Santos Zelaya. His 
and his Secretary of State Philander C. Knox' perceptions of Zelaya's foreign policy and 
domestic economic policies as illegitimate and directed at the United States made Taft first 
resort to diplomatic pressure, the withdrawal of diplomatic recognition, support for an armed 
anti-Zelaya insurgency, and finally the interjection of US forces into Nicaragua. Frustration 
with Zelaya was so strong that even his elected successor Jose Madriz, untainted by any 
direct association with Zelaya, became the target of Taft's emotional reaction to the 
obstruction caused by Zelaya. Rather than supporting the Madriz government and terminating 
his support for the rebels, Taft continued with his regime change operation, even adding a 
third episode to the campaign when he forcibly prevented pro-Zelaya rebels from retaking 
power in 1912, thereby putting the final nail in the coffin of dollar diplomacy, his often-cited 
attempt at substituting "dollars for bullets".438 
The outline of the chapter goes as follows: the following section presents the US 
regime change operation in Nicaragua as a series of interventions from 1909 to 1912. Section 
Two presents the main argument of the chapter, describing how the US government's 
expectations towards Nicaragua experienced a subtle expansion when Taft came into power, 
how and with what actions exactly Zelaya obstructed these expectations; explaining how such 
obstruction was perceived by the two US governments, and finally showing the emotional 
state of frustration Taft experienced after Zelaya's continued obstruction. Section Three turns 
to alternative explanations for US regime change in Nicaragua, discussing arguments inspired 
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by defensive realism, economic interest arguments, and offensive realism, and arguing that 
each of these arguments is empirically inadequate. Section Four concludes by showing how 
Taft failed to implement his foreign policy of dollar diplomacy in Nicaragua.  
The Outcome: A Series of Interventions 
US regime change in Nicaragua comprised three episodes from December 1909 to November 
1912. While some accounts treat cases of US interference in that period separately, only a 
look at the whole picture reveals the scope of the regime change operation and shows how the 
US pursued its intervention goals. Regime change in Nicaragua proved to be a slow process 
that experienced the deposing of three leaders, thereby changing the nature of the country’s 
authority structure over a period of three years. Each episode of US interference reveals how 
profoundly Nicaraguan affairs were subject to US influence, but taken together, the various 
episodes of intervention bring to the fore the comprehensiveness of the United States’ 
meddling in Nicaraguan politics. The result of regime change in Nicaragua was the overthrow 
of the Liberal Party’s sixteen years of rule, and the establishment of what has been referred to 
as the "first protectorate of the United States over an existing Central American country".439 
The succession of irregular leadership changes in Nicaragua between 1909 and 1911 
was a result of constant domestic power struggles and US interference. The first episode of 
interference began in December 1909, a time when Nicaragua had already plunged into civil 
war. An armed revolt led by the governor of Nicaragua’s Zelaya Department in eastern 
Nicaragua, Juan Jose Estrada, started two months earlier in October 1909, challenging the 
regime of the incumbent liberal President Jose Santos Zelaya. Uprisings of these kinds were 
no rarity at the time: General Juan Reyes, one of Estrada’s predecessors as governor of 
Zelaya, had launched an anti-Zelaya revolt in February 1899, but was decisively beaten by 
government forces after the initial seizing of the Department’s capital, Bluefields.440 
Despite the frequent occurrence of rebellions, Estrada’s 1909 revolt was different 
from previous uprisings in that it experienced US involvement. On December 1, Secretary of 
State Philander C. Knox issued a remarkable note to the Nicaraguan Chargé d’Affaires in 
Washington, which has come to be simply known as the Knox Note. In a language unusually 
blunt for diplomatic standards, the note denigrated the Nicaraguan regime as a "blot upon the 
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history of Nicaragua"441 and more importantly, unilaterally suspended US recognition of the 
Nicaraguan regime. That the US, in the words of Philander Knox, no longer felt "for the 
Government of President Zelaya that respect and confidence which would make it 
appropriate hereafter to maintain with it regular diplomatic relations"442 dealt the liberal 
regime under Zelaya a heavy blow at a time when the country was in the midst of domestic 
turmoil. The domestic uprising that the regime was confronted with was not unknown to 
Knox, but rather a condition that he consciously embraced. Coming down on the side of 
Estrada’s revolt, Knox asserted that "the United States is convinced that the revolution 
represents the ideas and the will of the majority of the Nicaraguan people more faithfully than 
does the government of President Zelaya".443 Moreover, Knox demanded the establishment of 
a new Nicaraguan government "entirely dissociated from the present intolerable 
conditions",444 which the US Secretary of State treated as the main precondition for 
reestablishing diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. The Knox Note did thus not only discredit 
the Zelaya’s regime, it simultaneously supported and emboldened the regime’s domestic 
adversaries. Along with the note, US gunboats and cruisers were stationed off the Atlantic 
Coast of Nicaragua in order to underscore the seriousness of Knox’ statements.445 
The consequence of Knox’s forceful statement was the resignation of President Jose 
Zelaya on December 16, 1909. It came after futile attempts on the part of the Nicaraguan 
President to accommodate US demands by proposing a commission be formed and 
investigate conditions in Nicaragua and by promising to resign if evidence of any government 
wrongdoing could be found.446 Once it became clear that the proposal had fallen on deaf ears, 
Zelaya, a few days later, submitted his resignation to the Nicaraguan congress and linked his 
departure to US interference. Expressing his reasons for resignation in a farewell speech, 
Zelaya accused the US of supporting the rebels and unjustly interfering in the domestic 
affairs of the country and understood the act of resigning as a blow to the United States, to 
which he did "not wish to give a pretext for intervention".447 To be sure, despite Zelaya’s 
accusations of US interference, he was not directly coerced out of office. Though the US 
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navy was stationed off the coast and was ready to intervene, no US marine had set foot on 
Nicaraguan soil before Zelaya’s departure. Nor did the rebels in the eastern province, who in 
fact appeared to be on the losing end just a few days before Zelaya’s resignation,448 prove to 
be strong enough to oust the President. Yet, by withdrawing American recognition, the Knox 
Note did not only put both factions of the civil war, the regime and its opponents, on equal 
footing in terms of US recognition, but also rendered the preservation of Zelaya’s regime 
prohibitively costly in the long-term, signaling to Nicaragua that the "United States would not 
rest until Zelaya was gone".449 
Zelaya’s resignation did not put an end to the domestic struggle for power in 
Nicaragua. His presidential successor, Jose Madriz, was elected by the Nicaraguan congress 
and took office on December 22, 1909, but was neither recognized by the rebels nor by the 
United States. Being member of the Liberal party and Zelaya’s personal choice for 
succession, Madriz was seen as a puppet that would continue Zelaya’s policies. Even the fact 
that the new President had been a well-respected judge of the Central American court before 
assuming office did not prevent the US from opposing his coming into power. US opposition 
went so far as to disapprove other states’ recognition of the Madriz administration.450 The 
following months were marked by unsuccessful peace negotiations between the two factions 
and failed American mediation attempts, while fighting continued unabated. The persistent 
American non-recognition of the Nicaraguan regime and US support for the rebels 
emboldened Estrada’s revolt, but could not weaken Madriz materially, which put the US in a 
delicate and uncertain position. While neither Nicaraguan side could decide the domestic 
struggle militarily, the United States abstained from intervening with its own forces.451 
After months of deadlock, the United States finally intervened militarily in May 1910, 
tilting the domestic balance of the two Nicaraguan factions towards the rebels. Up until the 
intervention, the Madriz government had slowly gained the upper hand vis-à-vis the 
conservative uprising led by Estrada to such an extent that the American consul at Bluefields, 
the capital of Zelaya Department, reported back to Washington that the revolt had "practically 
collapsed".452 To make matters worse for the rebels, who had retreated to Bluefields, the only 
city they were yet holding, the Madriz administration acquired a new gunboat and sent it to 
Bluefields where it seized the customs house and declared a blockade of the port, effectively 
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cutting the rebels’ supply route.453 At that time, government forces outnumbered the rebels 
four-fold.454 The heightened vulnerability of the rebels and the imminent seaborne 
bombardment by Madriz’ forces prompted the US to action. The commander of one of the 
American gunboats patrolling off the coast of Bluefields did not permit the Maximo Jerez, the 
newly-acquired Nicaraguan warship, to land troops or assault the city. In case of a 
bombardment, the naval officer "threatened the captain of the Maximo Jerez to fire at and 
sink her if our [Madriz’] troops attempted to attack Bluefields".455 In order to make sure that 
Madriz’ military would heed American warnings, the commander of the USS Paducah landed 
100 US marines in Bluefields,456 upsetting the regime’s attempt at retaking the last rebel 
stronghold and thereby potentially ending the civil war and extending its rule over the entire 
Nicaraguan territory. Madriz himself recognized what consequences the US decision to land 
troops had and expressed his opposition to the US intervention in a letter to US President 
William H. Taft:  
I can see no way in which the above-stated facts [the US intervention] can be 
reconciled with the principles of neutrality by the law of nations, and […] I 
have no hesitation in applying to your Excellency [President Taft] with the 
respectful request that the orders given to your naval authorities at Bluefields 
be rectified.457 
Madriz’ plea went unheeded. What is more, US marines completed the humiliation of 
Madriz’ force by disarming only them, but not the rebels, for rebel forces would supposedly 
shoot outward as opposed to the government forces that "would be firing toward us [US 
marines]".458 It was because of this blatantly disadvantageous treatment of the Madriz 
government that, according to David Healy, the "United States Navy took a hand, and quite 
literally saved the revolution".459 
The US military intervention of May 1910 and the reverse at Bluefields sealed the fate 
of Jose Madriz’ presidency and ended the sixteen-year-long rule of the Liberal Party. Unable 
to take the city, the government forces retreated from Bluefields, while the emboldened 
rebels started a military offensive from their US-provided sanctuary. After decisive rebel 
victories at Tipitapa and Granada, Madriz’ regime collapsed. The liberal President finally 
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resigned on August 20, 1910, just a few days before the rebels reached the capital, Managua, 
and took control of the city.460 With the coming into power of Juan Jose Estrada, the second 
episode of 1909-1912 regime change in Nicaragua was completed. This episode was more 
far-reaching than the first US intervention of 1909 both in terms of consequences and choice 
of means. While the US suspended diplomatic recognition of Zelaya’s regime with the Knox 
Note in December 1909, it went one step further in May 1910 by landing troops on 
Nicaraguan soil. Likewise, the resignation of Zelaya brought another Liberal leader into 
office, whereas the collapse of Madriz’ government ended the rule of the Liberal party 
altogether.461 The fall of Jose Madriz was so decisive and the new regime so dependent on 
the United States that the day of Estrada’s inauguration, August 21, 1910, has been regarded 
as the commencement of "the American rule of Nicaragua, political and economic".462 
After several crises and a change in leadership from Estrada to Adolfo Diaz, internal 
turmoil and factional bickering caused another civil war in July 1912.463 While the 1909-1910 
civil war was initiated by Conservatives led by a Liberal, Juan Jose Estrada, this time around 
it was a conservative, the incumbent Minister of War, Luis Mena, who led a Liberal revolt. 
Capitalizing on nationalistic sentiments among the Nicaraguan population, Mena, who had 
already been opposed to Madriz’ presidency, seized the opportunity to pursue his own 
presidential ambitions by siding with Liberal uprisings mounted in various parts of the 
country. As a response, President Diaz tried to wrest the war ministry from Mena and named 
Emiliano Chamorro new commander-in-chief in an effort to keep control of the Nicaraguan 
armed forces, inadvertently causing a split of the armed forces along the two Conservative 
factions.464 On July 29, 1912, when fighting broke out, Mena tried to seize Managua, but was 
forced to retreat, as government forces kept the upper hand. Despite this initial defeat, in the 
first days of August, Mena managed to take control of large portions of the Nicaraguan 
railroad system and a number of lake steamers owned by an American company. Soon after, 
revolutionary forces gained control of major cities like Granada and Leon, blocking the 
railway line from the capital to the Pacific coast.465 
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The 1912 civil war between the Diaz government and the Liberal rebellion supported 
by Louis Mena prompted the United States to intervene once again, marking the third and 
final episode of US President William H. Taft’s regime change operation in Nicaragua. 
Contrary to the 1910 US intervention, which was limited to the landing of US marines 
declaring neutral zones in battle areas, the third US intervention in 1912 saw American troops 
engage in actual battles with revolutionary forces. The official authorization of the 
intervention came on August 5 by US President Taft as a response to the request for troops by 
the American Minister to Nicaragua, George T. Weitzel.466 The first one hundred marines 
landed at the Pacific port of Corinto already on August 4 and arrived in the Nicaraguan 
capital a day later. Another 350 marines arrived on August 14 and soon they were nearly 
3,000 American forces on Nicaraguan soil.467 Their mission was to quell the uprising and 
prevent the Diaz government from being overthrown by the rebels. In the words of Dana 
Munro, "American forces had actually gone into battle to help suppress a revolution".468 
Opposition to Luis Mena and his Liberal allies was so strong that the United States gave up 
all semblance of neutrality vis-à-vis the warring factions and explicitly sided with Adolfo 
Diaz. The "authorized declaration of the policy of the United States", which outlined the 
United States’ attitude towards the Nicaraguan civil war of 1912, pledged to lend the United 
States’ "strong moral support to the cause of legally constituted good government", hence to 
incumbent President Diaz. 469 At the same time, the declaration expressed its condemnation of 
the Liberal uprising by likening Mena to Zelaya, assigning to the revolt "attributes of the 
abhorrent and intolerable Zelaya regime" and calling the revolt "in origin the most 
inexcusable in the annals of Central America".470 
The 1912 US intervention in Nicaragua succeeded in defeating the Liberal uprising, 
keeping President Diaz in power and consolidating his rule. After roughly two months of 
fighting, Luis Mena capitulated in late September, allowing the US to take the city of 
Granada. The war went on, however, for Benjamin Zeledon, a Liberal general of the 
revolutionary forces, refused to surrender. In a message to Admiral Sunderland in September 
1912, Zeledon protested the violation of Nicaraguan sovereignty, accusing the US of having 
established "foreign despotism" in Nicaragua.471 His resistance, however, did not last long: 
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Zeledon was killed on October 4 in one of the last battles of the war that pitted 850 marines 
against 800 rebels led by the Liberal general.472 By October 8, 1912, the war ended with a 
decisive victory of the United States, which immediately started to disband the rebels’ forces. 
In the aftermath of the conflict, all but 100 marines were withdrawn from Nicaragua and 
President Diaz won the presidential election of November 1912, which was boycotted by the 
Liberals.473 
Emotional Frustration and Regime Change  
Taft's Hegemonic Expectations Towards Nicaragua 
Among the countries in its region, Nicaragua occupied an elevated position in the minds of 
US leaders at the time of Taft's presidency and before. Ever since the idea of an US-owned 
inter-oceanic canal connecting the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean emerged in the nineteenth 
century, possibly to be built across Nicaragua where, according to an 1876 US Senate 
commission report, the envisioned canal route possessed "greater advantages, and fewer 
difficulties [...] than any one of the other routes shown to be practicable",474 this Central 
American country had figured prominently in American designs for the region and thus drew 
much attention from the political establishment in the US. Even after Theodore Roosevelt had 
decided to support Panama's separation from Colombia, formally recognizing the newly 
established Republic of Panama in November 1903 in what has been called "as brazen [...] an 
example of gunboat diplomacy as the world has ever seen",475 and in 1904 ordered the 
construction of the long-desired isthmus canal across the formerly Colombian province, 
Nicaragua remained in the spotlight of US dealings with Central America, for, as Elihu Root, 
Roosevelt's Secretary of State, put it, "[t]the inevitable effect of our [the US'] building the 
[Panama] Canal must be to require us to police the surrounding premises".476 
Regarding the United States' position and role in hemispheric affairs, William H. Taft, 
who was elected US President in November 1908 and started his four-year term in March 
1909, based his worldview on the same assumptions as Theodore Roosevelt, his predecessor. 
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According to this outlook, the United States occupied a superior position vis-à-vis all other 
states in the region. The distribution of international obligations coming with the right to state 
sovereignty and recognition had therefore to be unequal across states, commensurate with the 
unequal roles the United States and other states played in hemispheric relations. Paired with 
what has been called the "Social Darwinian bigotry of the day",477 the view that different 
races of human beings could be identified and ranked, and only people of European descent 
were capable of mastering and channeling their "lower passions",478 Taft's hierarchical view 
of state obligations determined his expectations towards countries in the region in general and 
towards Nicaragua in particular. Specifying these expectations, Taft established in his first 
annual message to Congress in 1909 that US relations to states in the Western hemisphere 
and "international credit, in diplomacy as well as in finance", depended on whether 
governments in the region were in terms of administration and diplomacy "faithful to the 
principles of moderation, equity and justice".479 With regard to Nicaragua, his Secretary of 
State Philander Knox seconded Taft's view, expressing his wish that "conditions of good 
government, progress, and prosperity" would be established and maintained in Nicaragua.480 
It was such statements and their resemblance to Roosevelt's repeated insistence on the 
observance of peace, stability, and order in the hemisphere,481 that allowed Taft to assert that 
"[t]he Pan-American policy of this [Taft's] Government has long been fixed in its principles 
and remains unchanged".482 
As much as Taft and Roosevelt's expectations towards states in the Western 
hemisphere exhibited a striking resemblance and despite Taft's public attempt at portraying 
his foreign policy as a seamless continuation of Roosevelt's, Taft, making his general outlook 
towards the region more hegemonic than Roosevelt's, added another dimension to 
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expectations towards states in the Western hemisphere. As he laid out in his inaugural 
message to Congress, this new dimension consisted of Taft's promise to vigorously support 
and protect American business interests abroad, assigning new responsibilities to both the 
United States and target states in the region: 
[t]o-day, more than ever before, American capital is seeking investment in 
foreign countries, and American products are more and more generally 
seeking foreign markets. As a consequence, in all countries there are 
American citizens and American interests to be protected, by their [US] 
Government [...]. The resultant situation inevitably imposes upon this 
Government vastly increased responsibilities. This Administration [...] is 
lending all proper support to legitimate and beneficial American enterprises in 
foreign countries.483 
Taft's more expansive notion of expectations and state responsibilities not only brought the 
US government closer to US business interests,484 it also sowed the seeds of conflict between 
the US and states in the region, as it imposed upon target states the duty to guarantee to US 
business free access to their domestic markets. A report by the newly created Bureau of Latin 
American Affairs in the US State Department explicated the rationale behind Taft's statement 
two months before Taft sent his message to Congress, reinforcing the President's express 
wish to have free access to foreign markets:  
to avoid the perils of over-production and congestion, we must find foreign 
markets for our surplus products. The time is coming when the foreign market 
will be more important to our [the US'] prosperity than at present [...].485 
In a speech on May 2, 1910, Taft himself asserted that it was of  
utmost importance that while our [the US'] foreign policy should not be turned 
a hair's breadth from the straight path of justice, it may well be made to 
include active intervention to secure for our merchandise and our capitalists 
opportunity for profitable investment which shall inure to the benefit of both 
countries concerned.486 
Because of Taft's more hegemonic notion of expectations towards Central America, his 
assistant Secretary of State, Francis M. Huntington Wilson, wrote in his memoir that both the 
Roosevelt government and the Taft were willing to "respect every American republic" as long 
as it acted in accordance with their expectations — "if it would be respected, a government 
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must act respectably" — but confirmed that a "much stricter application of this reasonable 
criterion characterized the Latin-American policy of the Taft Administration".487 
Nicaraguan Obstruction 
When Taft took office in March 1909, Nicaragua was under the rule of Jose Santos Zelaya, 
member of the Liberal Party who, terminating 36 years of Conservative rule in Nicaragua, 
had come to power through an uprising in 1893 known as the July Revolution.488 Despite 
Zelaya's hard grip on power and his authoritarian methods of governance, US-Nicaragua 
relations were initially "fairly cordial for most of the Zelaya dictatorship".489 At least in two 
cases, US support for Zelaya was so great that the US leadership decided to assist the 
Nicaraguan dictator even militarily: first, when President Zelaya tried to extend his rule over 
the eastern part of Nicaragua, the US landed marines and helped drive out the British 
military, effectively putting an end to the Misquito protectorate and paving the way for the 
unification of Nicaragua, which was achieved in November 1894.490 Then, two years later in 
1896 amidst a rebellion against Zelaya, US ships cut off arms supplies to the anti-Zelaya 
insurgents by blocking one Nicaragua port, "which quickly ended the rebellion" and helped 
Zelaya stay in power.491 
While bilateral relations between the two states were generally good in the first years 
of Zelaya's rule, they had already begun to deteriorate when US President Taft came into 
power. The main obstruction to US expectations was the growingly intransigent foreign 
policy of the Nicaraguan President. Rather than conforming to US desires of order and US 
control in the Western hemisphere, as succinctly as self-congratulatory summed up by 
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Philander C. Knox, Taft's Secretary of State, in a private letter to the American President as 
"a measure of benevolent supervision over Latin American countries",492 Zelaya's foreign 
policy exhibited defiance and aimed for autonomous decision-making, effectively 
undermining both Roosevelt and Taft's preference for unequal state responsibilities in the 
region. Being "conspicuously offensive to the American government",493 Zelaya proved to be 
especially obstructive to American designs for the region when he first refused to be 
represented at a regional peace conference in September 1906 on the ground that "he did not 
wish to recognize the right of the United States to interfere in Central American affairs",494 
and then when he, more strikingly, invaded neighboring Honduras in early 1907 to support a 
domestic revolt there.495 These two acts alarmed the Roosevelt government, as they collided 
with American efforts to foreclose interstate wars in Central America to stabilize the 
"surrounding premises" of the Panama Canal, as Roosevelt's Secretary of State Elihu Root 
demanded.496  
After the change in US presidency from Roosevelt to Taft, Zelaya remained 
unabatedly obstructive to US expectations towards Nicaragua and Central America more 
broadly. According to Dana Munro, "[Philander] Knox and [Francis Huntington] Wilson 
blamed the Nicaraguan dictator for most of the trouble that had occurred in Central America 
since 1907",497 convinced that Zelaya's government was "the principal obstacle to the 
establishment of peace in the Isthmus".498 Knox' State Department declared in April 1909 that 
Zelaya's foreign policy was "in open defiance of international comity and conventional 
obligations".499 As offensive Zelaya's foreign policy was, however, it was far from being the 
only bone of contention between him and the Taft government. Coupled with his 
continuously offensive foreign policy, it was Zelaya's domestic economic policies, lying at 
odds with Taft's expectation of free business access to foreign markets, that added fuel to the 
fire. Constituting an additional obstruction to the preferred foreign policy approach of the 
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new US government, Zelaya granted monopolies to select firms and thereby hampered 
competition for concessions. Indeed, disputes over Zelaya's treatment of US business 
between the Nicaraguan and the US government arose primarily over concessions bought by 
American businessmen for Nicaragua’s natural resources. A case in point was the 
controversy surrounding Zelaya’s decision to cancel an American businessman’s concession 
to cut lumber, which prompted the concerned lumber merchant, George D. Emery, to turn to 
Washington, demanding compensation for incurred losses. 500 With a 1909 State Department 
report calling the cancellation from August 1906 "an arbitrary and unwarranted act of 
Zelaya",501 Knox backed the Emery claim, telling the Nicaraguan representative on March 
10, 1909, just four days after he had taken office as Secretary of State, that further delay in 
reaching a settlement would be "unnecessary, unwarranted, and dilatory".502 Although 
Emery's case was eventually settled in September 1909,503 obstruction persisted, as Zelaya 
continued to grant monopolies to favorites and, according to Huntington Wilson, the 
American assistant Secretary of State, robbed his "countrymen by graft to the extent of 
making himself a multi-millionaire".504  
Another of Zelaya's domestic economic policies obstructed Taft's expectations 
towards Nicaragua. In addition to his policy of granting concessions to his favorites, Zelaya 
was, in the eyes of the US government, also guilty of a decrease of American exports to 
Nicaragua. While Philander Knox' famous Knox Note from December 1909 did not dwell on 
Zelaya's obstructive economic policies, an internal State Department report revealed the true 
extent of what bothered the US government, chastising Zelaya for the imposition of duties on 
American products "to such extortionate figures as to make their importation practically 
prohibitive", calling the Nicaraguan President "the arch enemy of American trade extension", 
and finally concluding that "the annual exports from the United States to Nicaragua have 
decreased to an appalling extent".505 
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US Perception of Nicaraguan Obstruction 
I have so far shown that while the actions of the Nicaraguan leadership did not change across 
the administrations of Roosevelt and Taft, obstruction was more extensive during Taft's 
presidency, as US expectations became more hegemonic. US expectations changed, not 
Nicaraguan behavior. Examining how the two US governments perceived Zelaya's behavior 
in terms of foreign policy and domestic economic policy, the emotional ramifications of 
which will be discussed in the next section, this section argues that despite the absence of 
change in Zelaya's behavior across the two presidencies, there was a notable divergence in 
how the two US governments perceived Nicaraguan obstruction.  
Based on the relatively larger set of expectations Taft had towards Nicaragua, he 
perceived more of Zelaya's actions as obstructive than his predecessor. Zelaya's domestic 
economic policies did not go unnoticed during Roosevelt's presidency, but judging the 
Nicaraguan President's actions in light of more limited expectations, the same Nicaraguan 
decisions regarding monopoly rights and concession grants that sounded alarm bells during 
Taft's presidency, were not obstructive in Roosevelt's eyes. The Emery claim is a case in 
point, lending itself to a cross-government comparison, as Zelaya's cancellation of Emery's 
concession occurred during Roosevelt's presidency and its settlement lingered over into Taft's 
term. As seen above, for the Taft government, the cancellation of the American 
businessman's concession in August 1906506 and Zelaya's unwillingness to reach a quick 
settlement were highly obstructive in the eyes of William Taft and Philander Knox. Decisions 
taken after Taft's inauguration and internal State Department reports confirm how the Taft 
government, based on its larger set of expectations towards Nicaragua, immediately "took a 
more vigorous stand on the Emery claim",507 giving it high priority in the context of US-
Nicaragua relations. Because Zelaya's handling of the matter was obstructive to Taft's 
expectations, the "Taft administration barely took time to settle into office before it began 
pressuring Nicaragua on the Emery claim",508 and what is more, initiated an anti-Zelaya 
media campaign to "turn public opinion against Zelaya".509 
Compared to Taft's response to Zelaya's handling of the Emery case, his presidential 
predecessor had been almost negligent in his dealings with the case. As Nicaraguan domestic 
economic policy was neither a major concern nor part of Roosevelt's expectations towards 
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Nicaraguan state conduct, Roosevelt "paid little attention to the complaints of businessmen 
like Emery".510 Rather than according high importance to Emery's complaint about the 
cancellation of his concession, the matter "was handled as a routine matter by the lawyers in 
the State Department".511 Roosevelt simply did not consider conflicts between American 
business groups in Nicaragua and the government of Nicaragua as a matter grave enough to 
risk embittering the bilateral relations between him and Zelaya. To be sure, relations between 
the two governments were not exactly friction-free. Zelaya's aggressive foreign policy and his 
military forays into neighboring countries were certainly obstructive to Roosevelt's 
expectations of peace and tranquility in Central America and his Secretary of State even 
believed that Zelaya was "bent on conquest and if driven from one pretext immediately finds 
another or goes on without any".512 And yet, Roosevelt still referred to Zelaya as a "great and 
good friend"513 and "may even have seen a reflection of himself" in the Nicaragua,514 all this 
in spite of the same economic policies of the Nicaraguan government that were heavily 
obstructive to Roosevelt's presidential successor. 
What is more, the obstructions themselves, irrespective of their different extent across 
the Roosevelt and Taft governments, were perceived differently. While Roosevelt and Root 
considered Zelaya's domestic economic policies as a routine matter, even if they clashed with 
American business interests in Nicaragua, and his obstructions in foreign policy as a 
necessary evil typical of interstate relations, Taft and Knox perceived Nicaraguan obstruction 
as illegitimate and directed at the US, convinced that the source of Zelaya's behavior was a 
deep-seated hatred for the United States. This negative perception shaped how the Taft 
government interpreted events in Nicaragua and Zelaya's actions, as is documented by the 
government's internal correspondence. When, amidst its fight against the Estrada rebellion, 
the Nicaraguan government captured and later executed two Americans who had joined the 
insurgents in their fight against Zelaya, the US consulate in Managua cabled to Philander 
Knox that the Nicaraguan President "hastened to do it [the execution] [...] not so much 
because they were revolutionists, but because they were Americans",515 discounting the fact 
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that the rebellion posed a serious threat to the survival of the Nicaraguan regime and that 
Zelaya had little interest in antagonizing the US, drawing it into the conflict, and providing a 
pretext for intervention, as Zelaya himself explained in his resignation speech.516 Zelaya's 
actions were thus perceived as having "become too outrageous" to warrant US recognition.517 
In terms of foreign policy, a State Department report noted that, rather than being a response 
to the hostile disposition of Nicaragua's neighbors towards Zelaya,518 his military cross-
border actions and forays into foreign territories were "deliberate and insolent".519 That the 
US government perceived Zelaya's obstructions as malicious actions directed at the US is 
reflected by the belief that Zelaya's attitude "toward the Government of the United States and 
American citizens is uniformly malevolent and vindictive", "of a special hostility to this 
country [the US]", and that the Nicaraguan President was moved by "intense hatred [...] of 
everything American".520 
Taft's Emotional Frustration 
Tracing Zelaya's actions back to an allegedly deep-seated anti-Americanism on the part of the 
Nicaraguan President, Taft and Knox' negative perception of Zelaya's obstructions of their 
expectations towards Nicaragua led to considerable frustration. After months of diplomatic 
pressure and Zelaya's continued intransigence both in foreign policy and domestic economic 
policies, Taft decided in November 1909 that Zelaya had to go. Knox' unusually blunt 
message to the Nicaraguan Chargé, the famous Knox Note, made clear that there was nothing 
Zelaya could do to stay in power.521 For too long had he menaced Taft, who, making no 
efforts to hide his sentiments about the lack of peace in Central America and continuous 
obstructions, wrote to Enrique Creel, Mexican ambassador to the US and trusted friend, about 
his desire to "knock their heads [Latin Americans] together until they should maintain 
peace".522 Convinced that there was "no hope of improvement through friendly pressure" and 
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that "the only pressure known to this [the Nicaraguan] Government [was] force",523 Taft's 
frustration with Zelaya made regime change an attractive foreign policy alternative to 
terminate the Nicaraguan President's rule and his perceivedly unrelenting anti-Americanism.  
As shown above, Zelaya resigned from the presidency merely two weeks after the 
Knox Note and decided to leave the country. Up until then, the Taft government had 
supported the Estrada rebellion, but had not used direct force to unseat the obstructive 
President. When Jose Madriz succeeded Zelaya as Nicaraguan President, Taft could have 
recognized the new government and terminated his interference with Nicaragua's authority 
structure. Yet, his frustration with Zelaya and his government was so profound that he did not 
consider taking this step and instead, and against all odds and the advice of both the Mexican 
and British government,524 broadened his support for the insurgents until Madriz was 
defeated as well. To the minds of Taft and Knox, Madriz was indeed a Zelayista, someone 
who would continue Zelaya's obstructive policies.525  
The decision to treat Madriz just like Zelaya must seem puzzling if we disregard the 
effects of the US President's emotional frustration. First, despite being Zelaya's former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Madriz was not Zelaya's first choice, as some suggest.526 After 
several other names that were unacceptable to the US had been discarded, Madriz was a 
compromise solution that Nicaraguans thought would receive Taft's endorsement, given that 
he was "the Nicaraguan delegate for the Central American Court of Justice"527 known for his 
opposition to Zelaya.528 Second, The practice of regime change in Nicaragua did not aim at 
installing a particular regime to the United States’ liking. In terms of preferences for one of 
the two dominating parties in the Nicaraguan political system, the Conservatives and the 
Liberals, the US was surprisingly indifferent to the identity of the ruling faction. When the 
United States asked a former US Minister to Nicaragua, William L. Merry, to name potential 
candidates for Zelaya’s replacement in December 1909, Merry was explicitly instructed to 
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disregard the Nicaraguan partisan divide. While the central criterion for potential candidates 
was strong opposition to President Zelaya, party membership was at best a secondary 
issue.529 Third, once in office, Madriz immediately tried to prove his willingness to find a 
negotiated settlement and terminate the civil war, even proposing "a committee of honorable 
persons to discuss an amicable and equitable settlement of the present strife with the 
revolutionary leaders".530 Furthermore, in January 1910, Madriz "took action to punish those 
responsible for executing Cannon and Groce",531 the two Americans who had fought for 
Estrada and were caught by Zelaya's forces. Fourth, the argument that the Taft government 
was hostile towards Madriz because of strategic reasons, particularly the fear that Madriz 
would not consent to US financial oversight regarding Nicaraguan customs and debts, is 
unfounded. While the Liberal party in Nicaragua, to which Madriz belonged, was generally 
more apprehensive of US encroachment in Nicaragua, Madriz was far from being a 
principled guardian of Nicaraguan sovereignty. Just as he offered "to Great Britain the 
controversial canal rights" in June 1910 shortly before he resigned,532 it is not entirely 
unimaginable that he would have accepted the creation of an American customs collectorship 
if the US had let him stay in power. As a consequence, with Madriz not being Zelaya's hand-
picked successor, trying to reach a negotiated settlement under US supervision, his apparent 
willingness to negotiate sovereign rights away to great powers, and the Taft government's 
indifference with respect to the two Nicaraguan parties, we cannot understand Taft's 
fundamental opposition towards the Nicaraguan President if we do not take the US 
President's intense frustration into account.  
Alternative Explanations for Regime Change in Nicaragua 
While diplomatic history literature and most of IR literature do not conceive of the series of 
US interventions in Nicaragua between 1909 and 1912 as an instance of regime change,533 
the sources and motivations of Taft's decision to intervene in Nicaraguan domestic affairs 
have been broadly discussed. Grouping together these different explanations based on general 
outlooks on how the United States viewed its regional neighbors, one can discern three 
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different arguments inspired by defensive realism, an argument about US economic interests, 
and offensive realism. 
The argument that is most prominent in the literature and most closely aligned with 
the official justifications of the Taft government is based on the logic of defensive realism, 
asserting that US regime change in Nicaragua was predicated upon the US leadership's 
perception of Zelaya's activities, both domestic and international, as a threat to US interests 
and security.534 According to Dana Munro, the strongest advocate of this view, "Taft and 
Knox believed that the United States must promote stable government and economic progress 
as the best means of warding off European interference".535 European interference was 
thought to be a likely scenario because Nicaragua was the most significant Central American 
state, "possessing an excellent canal route and bordered by islands which may serve as naval 
bases".536 Consequently, "American interests would be seriously menaced should a non-
American power secure canal concessions in Nicaragua", with weak Central American 
republics keeping "alive the fear of non-American aggression" in the minds of US foreign 
policymakers.537 While domestic instability was, following the logic of the argument, a 
possible invitation for European powers to extend their influence in Central America and 
regain lost ground in the Western hemisphere, a more direct threat to US security was 
Zelaya's aggressive foreign policy and his "ambition to unite Central America under his own 
leadership".538 After all, in the first decade of the twentieth century, Nicaragua was, 
according to one historian, a "regional power to be reckoned with".539  
A careful assessment of the empirical evidence confounds the view that US regime 
change in Nicaragua was predicated upon the US leadership's perception of Zelaya as a 
national security threat to the United States. Although the prevention of "foreign 
entanglements"540 in Nicaragua was cited by assistant Secretary of State Huntington Wilson 
is a prime reason for US involvement in the country, it is unlikely that the Taft government 
felt threatened by Zelaya's activities, whether directly or indirectly. As obstructive as his 
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forays into military adventures were, given the immense discrepancy between Nicaraguan 
and US military capabilities, both Zelaya and the US leadership knew that Zelaya's 
aggressive foreign policy was hardly elevating Nicaragua to a position of counterweight to 
US influence in the region. Nowhere became this more evident than in Zelaya's invasion of 
Honduras in March 1907. At the height of Nicaragua's military campaign against the 
combined forces of Honduras and El Salvador,541 the US government decided to simply 
forbid the shelling of Honduran towns at the Atlantic coast. In a letter to the secretary of the 
navy, Elihu Root established, almost like a neutral arbiter to the conflict, that such action was 
not "permitted".542 As Jessup shows, this striking high-handedness, which was testament to 
the superiority of the US vis-à-vis Nicaragua, was "not what it would have been during a war 
between European countries",543 and while the Nicaraguans "resented the fact that the United 
States was 'mediating' with battleships", such action was "so usual [...] that the United States 
naval officers in charge were able in almost every case to act in perfect harmony with the 
commanders of the local troops".544  
Regarding the argument that Nicaragua was not a direct, but surely an indirect threat 
to the US through the possibility of European interference, confirming evidence is similarly 
elusive. First, the Taft administration did not seem to be fearful of European involvement. In 
fact, Taft's confidence in US regional superiority was so strong that he questioned the 
underlying logic of the Monroe Doctrine, which had shaped the fundamentals of US foreign 
policy in the Americas for nearly a century, in his first annual message to Congress, 
proclaiming that "the apprehension which gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine may be said to 
have nearly disappeared".545 This growing confidence was reflected by the British withdrawal 
from Central America and the Caribbean which left American influence in the region 
unchecked by any of the other dominant world powers of the time. While the second half of 
the nineteenth century was marked by Anglo-American competition in Central America, the 
balance continuously tilted towards the United States, exemplified by the succession of 
bilateral treaties regarding isthmian canal rights from the 1850 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty to the 
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1901 Hay-Pauncefote Treaty,546 to the point that "by the 1900s American hegemony in the 
circum-Caribbean region was a rapidly developing fact of international life".547 What is more, 
the United Kingdom was not only retreating from the region, it also had no intention to regain 
lost influence to challenge the United States. As Walter Scholes shows, "Sir Edward Grey, 
the British Foreign Minister, made it perfectly clear to Lord Bryce [British ambassador to the 
US] that England would make no political move in this area [the Caribbean] so long as the 
United States kept an open-door policy".548 Second, according to the logic of the argument 
about the central role of US apprehension towards potential European interference, President 
Taft should have put a premium on domestic stability in Nicaragua. What the administration 
did instead, however, was to actively foment revolution, providing support to the Estrada 
rebellion against both Zelaya and Madriz rather than propping them up against the armed 
insurgents. Ironically, the effect of US support for the Estrada rebels made European 
involvement more likely: desperately trying to subdue the rebellion led by Estrada, Madriz, 
Zelaya's successor as head of state in Nicaragua, approached the UK government "with a 
request for their good offices in mediating between himself and the Government of the 
United States".549 While the UK, apprehensive of the ramifications for its relations to the US, 
eventually turned down the mediation offer, one British foreign office clerk astutely noted 
that rather than bringing about stability in Nicaragua, the US government copied "the 
methods of the Central American governments in encouraging revolutions against their 
political opponents".550 
Against the backdrop of dollar diplomacy as the guiding principle of Taft's foreign 
policy towards the Caribbean and Central America, another argument has it that the US 
intervention in Nicaragua was due to the influence of US business interests on US foreign 
policy. Questioning Huntington Wilson’s statement that "Government was using Wall Street 
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to serve our [US] national interest",551 the argument flips the relationship between the two, 
treating the US government as a tool in the hands of powerful American corporations not 
only domestically, but also concerning foreign affairs. In the case of the Taft administration, 
so the argument goes, big business was particularly successful to steer US foreign policy due 
to the business background of many foreign policy elites like Secretary of State Philander 
Knox who had represented major American companies as a corporate lawyer before joining 
the administration.552 Based on the basic premise of business dominance in foreign affairs, 
US corporations pushed for regime change in Nicaragua, according to this view, because 
Zelaya "continually clashed with American companies operating in his country".553 
US business groups played an important role in the 1909 uprising against Zelaya, as 
they supported Estrada and the insurgents financially.554 Moreover, as argued previously, Taft 
and Knox were more attentive to US business interests and their access to foreign markets 
than the Roosevelt government. The influence on US foreign policymaking of US 
corporations with a vested interest in receiving protection from the US government, however, 
should not be exaggerated. Dollar diplomacy indeed served to bring together, on the one 
hand, US interests in peaceful and stable state conduct in Central America, and on the other 
hand, the interests of American business, but the impulse came from the Taft government, not 
from the economic sector. According to Scholes, "the [US] bankers seldom forced their plans 
on the [State] Department". Rather, "the Department had to work very hard to get bankers to 
interest themselves in the political and economic affairs of Latin America".555 US business 
groups did not benefit extensively from the scheme, for the State Department "made a special 
effort to make sure that the contracts were not unfair or injurious to Nicaragua".556 Munro 
argues that business conditions were so volatile due to political instability in Nicaragua that 
the "fascination of cooperating with the American government in a constructive enterprise in 
a strange country outweighed sound business judgment in leading bankers into it".557 
A third argument emphasizes the US government's appetite for expansion and 
imperialism as the main driving force for US military intervention in Nicaragua. This 
argument claims that the US sought, first and foremost, control over Nicaragua, not peace in 
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the region. While some go so far as to argue that the United States’ drive to dominance was 
inevitable, for "strategic geography dictates political events",558 others start from the premise 
that US foreign policy elites sought control over Central America and the Caribbean because 
they were strongly influenced by naval ideas about the importance of controlling the sea. 
Thayer Mahan’s sea power doctrine had, according to this argument, the biggest impact on 
how foreign policy elites thought about their place in the world, assigning a key role to 
controlling the region and relegating the importance of maintaining regional peace to a 
secondary consideration.559 Recalcitrant regimes like Zelaya’s Nicaragua were seen as a 
danger to US designs for the region, making intervention and the fomenting of revolution a 
viable and attractive foreign policy tool in order to bring leaders into power who would 
accept American hegemony.560 The Taft government was quick to interject the US into the 
Nicaraguan struggle for power when the "opportunity for U.S. intervention arose in 1909".561 
The appetite-for-expansion argument correctly gauges the Taft government's 
predisposition in terms of expectations towards Nicaragua. The self-assigned responsibility to 
oversee Nicaraguan affairs and guarantee peaceful international conduct as well as domestic 
economic policies that would allow US business to have access to Nicaraguan markets, 
fundamentally shaped Taft's foreign policy outlook on the Central American republic. To 
infer from these expectations that the US was eager to engage in regime change, however, 
overstates Taft's appetite for involvement in Nicaraguan affairs. The actual idea of dollar 
diplomacy was to make target states adhere to his pre-specified expectations without needing 
to resort to the use of armed force and military intervention. As his Secretary of State laid out 
in a foreign policy speech, the ultimate goal of the government's foreign policy was to 
provide for stability in Central America so as to "diminish our [US] responsibilities in 
proportion", arguing that the "most effective way to escape the logical consequences of the 
Monroe doctrine is the help them [Central American states] to help themselves".562 That Taft 
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eventually engaged in regime change was thus not testament to his untamable appetite for 
expansion, but rather to the failure of dollar diplomacy.563 
Conclusion 
US regime change in Nicaragua was a consequence of Taft and Knox' emotional frustration 
with Zelaya's conduct, both domestic and international. Based on hegemonic expectations 
towards Nicaragua, the Taft government interpreted Zelaya's obstructions as an expression of 
deep hatred for the United States and concluded that only the overthrow of the Nicaraguan 
President and the elimination of Zelayist elements from the country's political authority 
structure would put an end to Nicaragua's obstructive conduct in terms of foreign policy 
aggression and domestic economic policies biased against US business. These sentiments ran 
so deep that even Jose Madriz could not escape being associated with Zelaya's regime, 
sealing his fate as a perceived American adversary and target of continued US regime change 
activity. Had Taft regarded Madriz' brief rule as legitimate and friendly to US interests, he 
might have extended diplomatic recognition to his regime and reached the goals of dollar 
diplomacy without substituting bullets for dollars. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The 1965 Dominican Intervention 
The Cold War provided the United States with multiple opportunities for meddling, 
intervention, and regime change in foreign countries. In Latin America alone, an area which 
the United States had considered its backyard even before the global competition with the 
Soviet Union broke out during Harry Truman's presidency, upheavals and domestic turmoil 
in a number of states led to the overthrow of ten Latin American dictators between 1956 and 
1960.564 A "series of pro-democratic populist revolutions" invited US involvement,565 
drawing the country deep into the domestic affairs of its hemispheric neighbors. While 
American regime change efforts and interference with the governance structure of targeted 
states in the hemisphere comprised covert operations in Guatemala in 1954, the failed 1961 
Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, and the overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende in 
1973,566 the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic was one of few overt US regime 
change operations during the Cold War, making it an extra-ordinary event in US foreign 
policy. 
The Dominican intervention began on April 28, 1965 when US President Lyndon B. 
Johnson ordered four hundred US marines to the island in reaction to a political crisis in the 
Dominican Republic.567 Four days earlier, on April 24, constitutionalists supporting the 
ousted Dominican President Juan Bosch had overthrown the incumbent military junta headed 
by Donald Reid Cabral, precipitating a standoff between constitutionalist and loyalist 
forces.568 In order to prevent the constitutionalist forces from gaining the upper hand and 
bringing the democratically elected Juan Bosch back into power, Johnson successively 
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increased the number of American troops within ten days from the initial sending of marines 
to nearly 23,000 forces, "almost half as many as were then serving in Vietnam".569 What was 
initially proclaimed to be a limited rescue operation became a full-scale invasion and 
seventeen-month-long military occupation, during which the Johnson administration 
negotiated a settlement between the two Dominican factions, established a provisional 
government, and paved the way for free elections in June 1966. Once the defeat of the 
constitutionalists was certain and final, the regime change operation came to a symbolic end 
when the former President Juan Bosch accepted his party's electoral defeat on June 13, 
angrily accusing the United States of having abused "its military power to impose its will on 
the Dominican Republic against all right and reason".570 
Given that the 1965 Dominican intervention was the "first instance of American boots 
on the ground in the Caribbean since the 1930s"571 and, in the words of Fred Halliday, "the 
largest ever military operation conducted by the USA against a Latin American country",572 
reminding many around the world of the era of gunboats and big sticks,573 it begs the 
question of why the Johnson administration ordered it. This chapter contends that Johnson's 
emotional frustration with Juan Bosch led to the US President's fundamental opposition to the 
return of the Dominican ex-President to power. The administration believed that Bosch's 
obstructive stance towards the United States during and after his presidency was a product of 
an intense hatred for the United States the administration believed Bosch harbored. Rather 
than seeing Bosch's behavioral deviations from US expectations towards him with regard to 
the persecution of Dominican Communists and an implementation of economic policies in 
line with the Alliance for Progress as a phenomenon that could be traced back to domestic 
pressures Bosch had to deal with, the Johnson administration was convinced that his 
obstruction could be equated with an anti-American attitude. Causing high emotionality and 
frustration with Bosch, the decision to intervene can therefore only be understood if we take 
the impact of Johnson's emotional state on his decision-making into account. 
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section One provides an overview of the 
events in the Dominican Republic preceding overt US intervention. Section Two deals with 
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the intervention itself, describing the different periods of the intervention, which together 
constituted US regime change. Section Three turns to the main argument of the chapter, 
describing how US expectations, Bosch's obstruction and the perception thereof produced 
high levels of frustration within the Johnson administration. Section Four discusses the 
security-threat argument, the economic-interest argument, and the hegemonic-control 
argument as three common alternative explanations for Johnson's intervention. Section Five 
concludes.  
The Constitutionalist Uprising 
The immediate backdrop to Lyndon B. Johnson's decision to land US marines on Dominican 
soil was the imminent victory of the constitutionalist rebellion574 that had unseated the leader 
of the Dominican junta and was about to defeat the military forces of the struggling regime. 
The constitutionalist uprising began on April 24, 1965, when Captain Mario Pena Taveras, 
"one of the staunchest and most enterprising of the constitutionalists", arrested army chief of 
staff General Rivera Cuesta and his deputy.575 Other constitutionalist army officers seized 
two military bases, while the civilian leader of the uprising, Joao Francisco Pena Gomez, 
announced the downfall of Donald Reid Cabral, the civilian head of the junta, and the return 
to constitutionality.576 Although anti-regime demonstrators flooded the streets, the regime 
recaptured a seized radio station, arrested Pena Gomez, and declared that the coup had 
failed.577 The US embassy in Santo Domingo, relying on information from the regime, was 
confident that the civilian junta was in control of the situation. While still trying to ascertain 
the nature of the uprising and its main actors, the embassy told Washington that the uprising 
was confined to a limited number of Army officers.578  
The following days belied the embassy's initial assessment. Not only was the split 
within the Dominican Army caused by Rivera Cuesta's arrest more serious than the regime 
had wished, but also were Cabral's prospects to stay in power severely compromised, as even 
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generals in the Dominican military who were apprehensive of the constitutionalist uprising, 
did not support the civilian leader. Characterizing the asymmetric relationship between the 
Triumvirate led by Cabral and the military leaders, Piero Gleijeses pointedly asserts: "Reid 
Cabral was merely a nice young man who had been placed at the head of the government by 
the armed forces, to which he was responsible".579 When the rebels entered Santo Domingo 
from their camps outside the capital in the morning of April 25, Cabral's generals did nothing 
to prevent their advance. This allowed the rebels to seize the Dominican capital without any 
resistance from Reid Cabral's troops, storm the Presidential Palace in downtown Santo 
Domingo, and arrest the vanquished Triumvir.580 Since Juan Bosch was in exile at that time, 
the last President of the Dominican parliament before Bosch's overthrow in September 1963, 
Jose Rafael Molina Urena, was named provisional constitutional President, being the first in 
line of succession among those former officeholders not in exile according to the 1963 
constitution.581 To make clear what the political goal of the uprising was, Colonel Francisco 
Caamano announced that the former President Juan Bosch would return from exile in "the 
shortest possible time" to reassume the presidency and "to return to the people what was 
taken from the people".582 
As events unfolded, the constitutionalist overthrow of the Triumvirate did not result in 
Juan Bosch's return from exile, but rather completed the split within the Dominican armed 
forces. Only few hours after the storming of the Presidential Palace on April 25, the 
Dominican air force under General Juan de Los Santos ordered the bombing of the Palace, 
triggering a bloody conflict between constitutionalists and conservative army generals who 
opposed a return to constitutionality. Minutes before the strafing, intense negotiations 
between the military chief of the constitutionalists, Miguel Hernando Ramirez, and 
representatives from the air force, police and navy had failed to reach an agreement because 
Hernando Ramirez, insisting on a return to constitutionality, rejected the establishment of a 
military junta, the loyalists' preferred solution.583 The strafing of the Palace escalated the 
domestic Dominican confrontation with means unprecedented, as it was "the first time that 
Dominican planes had strafed Dominican civilians".584 Yet, the constitutionalists led by 
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Ramirez were convinced that the air force and other anti-Bosch generals would soon give up 
and accept the supremacy of constitutionalist forces in Santo Domingo, not least because they 
expected the United States to recognize the return to constitutionality.585  
April 26, the third day of the revolt, saw Santo Domingo's residents reentering the 
fray. As the strafing by the loyalist air force continued, killing as many as fifty people, 
thousands of Dominicans supporting the constitutionalist cause took to the streets as on the 
first day of the revolt, but this time armed by Molina Urena's provisional government with 
submachine guns and rifles.586 Violence gripped the Dominican capital, as demonstrators 
attacked police stations. Popular participation notwithstanding, the loyalist forces seemed to 
gain the upper hand. In addition to General Elias Wessin y Wessin's tanks ready to break into 
the city from the east and three days of incessant bombing by General de Los Santos' air 
force, an army regiment joined the anti-constitutionalists on April 27, beginning to move 
towards the capital from the west, while in the afternoon, General Wessin's tanks moved into 
the city crossing the Duarte Bridge in the capital's east.587 Heavy fighting broke out, as 
protestors tried to stop the advancement of tanks into the city. In the words of Abraham 
Lowenthal, "[h]undreds of people – some soldiers, mostly civilians – were killed or wounded 
in the heavy fighting around the bridge, the bloodiest single battle in Dominican history".588 
The situation looked so desperate for the constitutionalists that by the afternoon of the 27th 
"virtually the entire PRD [the constitutionalists' party] had deserted".589 When finally Molina 
Urena resigned as well, seeking asylum in the Colombian embassy, loyalists claimed victory 
and American media declared the end of the revolt.590 
Had the conflict ended with Molina Urena's resignation and had all constitutionalists 
surrendered, US military intervention would have become obsolete. In a dramatic turn of 
events, however, thousands of civilians joined by the hard core of constitutionalist soldiers 
and officers, pushed Wessin's tanks back, forcing them to retreat out of Santo Domingo. 
Being more than a battle in which the materially inferior side gained the upper hand, the 
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victory of the masses supporting the constitutionalists was an unprecedented event in 
Dominican history, as Dan Kurzman illustrates:  
[a]t the moment when the tanks started to recede, history reached a turning 
point for the Dominican people. In a sense, it was the climax for them of more 
than 450 years of suppression, subjugation, and hopelessness […]. Always had 
they been at the mercy of men with guns […]. They [the people] realized for 
the first time that they possessed a strength they had never before imagined 
could be theirs.591  
The "miracle at the [Duarte] bridge"592 gave the constitutionalists new determination. On the 
next day, April 28, Francisco Caamano, now the leader of the revolt, led new attacks on 
police stations, while loyalist troops were demoralized and on the brink of collapse. It was 
this dire state of the loyalists, unable to defeat the constitutionalist revolt, that prompted the 
United States to intervene with its own forces. Before landing marines, the United Sates 
"urged the formation of a junta", hoping to reunite the fragmented and demoralized forces of 
the loyalists. The new head of the loyalist junta, Colonel Pedro Bartolome Benoit, 
immediately requested American forces. Tapley W. Bennett, American Ambassador in Santo 
Domingo, accepted the request and in the evening of April 28, the American navy sent five 
hundred marines ashore,593 being the first deployment of marines in the hemisphere since 
1927 and heralding the start of US regime change.594  
Johnson Decides to Intervene 
Designed to be a limited intervention that would quickly end violence and strife, the 
deployment of US troops in the Dominican Republic increased dramatically in the days 
following the landing of marines on April 28. The primary goal of the intervention, namely to 
prevent a loyalist defeat, did not change throughout the military operation.595 What did 
change, however, was the belief in the ability of the loyalists to defeat the constitutionalists 
and reestablish stability without overt American military support. Up until the day of the 
intervention, the American embassy in Santo Domingo was convinced that anti-Bosch forces 
would prevail. On April 27, the State Department predicted that "General Wessin would soon 
control Santo Domingo".596 Then the "miracle at the bridge" happened, which forced the US 
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to reconsider its initial assessment. When fifteen hundred more marines landed on April 29, 
the US military still hoped to be able to avoid being dragged into the fighting.597 Ambassador 
Bennett expressed his optimism that "additional Marine support would spur the San Isidro 
forces [loyalists] on".598 Bennett's optimism, however, was unfounded. The limited 
intervention did not reinvigorate the loyalists' will to fight, but rather raised hopes that the US 
would adopt a more proactive stance and fight the loyalists' war against the constitutionalists. 
What made matters even worse was the fact that to the extent that Colonel Caamano did not 
cease to mount constitutionalist attacks, he did not seem to be intimidated by the United 
States entering the fray.599 Thus, more US troops landed in the Dominican Republic in the 
following days: On April 30, two thousand paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne reached Santo 
Domingo, kicking off a military buildup that reached 23,000 troops within the next ten 
days.600 By then, the realities on the ground coupled with the unexpected resilience of the 
constitutionalists had triggered the transformation of a limited intervention into a full-scale 
invasion. 
In the first phase of the intervention, US policy was based on a double strategy of 
preventing both a constitutionalist victory and a direct engagement in armed fighting. After 
capturing the Duarte Bridge and establishing control of its western approach, the US worked 
first on a cease-fire agreement between the two factions that was mandated through American 
efforts at the OAS. Under the supervision of special envoy John B. Martin, who himself had 
been Ambassador in Santo Domingo under John F. Kennedy, both constitutionalist and junta 
representatives acceded to OAS' call for a halt in the fighting.601 Immediately after securing 
the agreement, the US forcefully moved to curb the constitutionalists' ability to continue its 
military advances. Despite Martin's pledge to Francisco Caamano that US forces would 
adhere to their position, paratroopers advanced from the Duarte Bridge into the center of 
Santo Domingo and established a narrow corridor, linking up to marines in the western sector 
of the city, sealing off constitutionalist forces in the center and bisecting them from their 
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strongholds north of the corridor.602 In doing so, this policy "permitted U.S. forces to adopt a 
more nearly neutral stance in the days and weeks that followed".603 
Despite the cease-fire and US efforts to bring the ongoing violence under control, the 
constitutionalists did not knuckle under to the superiority of US forces. Trying to govern the 
limited sector in downtown Santo Domingo that was still under their control, the 
constitutionalists elected Colonel Francisco Caamano as constitutional President of the 
Dominican Republic just one day after the US had sealed them off from the rest of the city.604 
Faced with the constitutionalists' unwillingness to surrender, the United States opened 
negotiations to find a peaceful settlement to the protracted strife. The opening of talks, 
however, did not prevent the United States from turning a blind eye on a loyalist military 
offensive north of the corridor: while the talks were going on, loyalists started what has come 
to be known as Operation Limpieza ("cleanup"), in which as many as five hundred civilians605 
and constitutionalist rebels died during the eight days of the attack between May 14 and May 
21.606 Already at the time, news reports saw contradictions between the United States' claim 
to impartiality and that "U.S. military forces appear[ed] to be aiding the junta troops of Gen. 
Antonio Imbert in their campaign to knock out the rebel forces militarily".607  
Ushering in the second phase of US regime change in the Dominican Republic, 
Hector Garcia Godoy, who had served as a diplomat both under Trujillo and Bosch, became 
provisional President on September 3, 1965. Detached from politics after the military coup of 
1963 and a wealthy businessman,608 he was the "best man available" because of his 
willingness to work closely with the US and adopt a firm stance against Dominican 
Communists.609 His appointment put an end to both the constitutionalists' and loyalists' 
month-long efforts at gaining recognition as the sole legitimate representative of the country. 
The loyalist Government of National Reconstruction (GNR) collapsed when its leader 
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General Antonio Imbert resigned on August 30.610 On September 3, when Francisco 
Caamano stepped down from his position as constitutional President under the 1963 
constitution, lamenting the "humiliation to which the government of the United States of 
America subjected the Dominican Republic with its military invasion",611 the 
constitutionalists yielded to the realities on the ground, too.  
On June 1, nine months after Godoy had come into power, presidential elections were 
held. The US-favored candidate, Joaquin Balaguer, won the elections with 56 percent of the 
votes, while former President Juan Bosch surprisingly lost with a vote share of 39 percent. 
Bosch's defeat sealed the failure of the constitutionalists to regain power. The defeat at the 
polls, the last in a series of bitter defeats since the uprising of April 1965, was so traumatizing 
to Bosch and his supporters that the constitutionalists refused to accept Balaguer's victory 
until more than two weeks after the election. In the immediate aftermath of the election, 
protests flared up, causing deadly confrontations between left-wing militants and security 
forces three days after the election,612 while officials of Bosch's Revolutionary Party 
considered the election to be fraudulent and themselves to "have been cheated out of the 
election".613 Finally, on June 13, Bosch acknowledged his defeat, while still claiming to have 
found proof of fraud, hinting at US involvement in the election.614 Indeed, the Johnson 
administration had established a covert program to funnel funds to Balaguer's electoral 
campaign. Financial support and propaganda in favor of Balaguer were President Johnson's 
explicit desire, as Richard Helms, CIA Acting  Director explained in a memorandum:  
[H]e [President Johnson] expected the Agency [CIA] to devote the necessary 
personnel and material resources in the Dominican Republic required to win 
the presidential election for the candidate favored by the United States 
Government. The President's statements were unequivocal. He wants to win 
the election, and he expects the Agency to arrange for this to happen.615  
Going further, Piero Gleijeses argues that what undermined Bosch's victory was not only US 
support for Balaguer's campaign, but also Godoy's interim presidency that prevented a 
collapse of the loyalist armed forces and so made  "Bosch's victory at the polls in June 1966 
highly unlikely".616 After Balaguer assumed the presidency on July 1, 1966, the last IAPF 
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troops left the country on September 21, bringing the United States' regime change operation 
in the Dominican Republic to its formal end.617  
Emotional Frustration and Regime Change 
US Hegemonic Expectations Towards the Dominican Republic 
As this section shows, the US had hegemonic towards the Dominican leadership long before 
the Lyndon B. Johnson's 1965 Dominican intervention. The Cuban Revolution and the ouster 
of Fulgencio Batista in January 1959 made the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations 
rethink their approach towards the region which culminated in the proclamation of the 
Alliance for Progress in 1961, specifying new criteria of desirable state conduct in Latin 
America which Johnson willfully adopted in his foreign policy towards the Dominican 
Republic. 
Lyndon Johnson was not the first US President with hegemonic expectations towards 
the Dominican Republic and towards the wider region, more broadly speaking. At least since 
the beginning of the twentieth century, when Theodore Roosevelt enunciated his Corollary to 
the Monroe Doctrine, relations between the US and the Dominican Republic were marked by 
the role of regional superiority that the United States assigned to itself. Indeed, Roosevelt's 
1904 Corollary had its origins in the US approach towards the Dominican Republic, was 
shaped by developments there and would therefore not have been conceivable without the 
domestic unrest in the Caribbean nation that prompted Roosevelt to elevate his expectations 
of domestic order and stability in hemispheric nations to a basic principle of US foreign 
policy towards the region.618 Expectations of domestic stability and order towards Latin 
American leaders, attached to the explicit threat of military intervention, persisted across 
different US administrations up until the 1930s, when "the Roosevelt Corollary was 
disavowed by Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt".619 It was above all Franklin 
Roosevelt who, in his 1933 inaugural address, "dedicated this Nation [the US] to the policy of 
the good neighbor",620 affirming in a later speech that "the definite policy of the United States 
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from now on is one opposed to armed intervention".621 Yet, as serious and novel as Franklin 
Roosevelt's repudiation of Theodore Roosevelt's Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine was, it 
solely disavowed the use of force, but not the extent of US expectations towards the region, 
which continued to exhibit a vision of an unequal distribution of duties and responsibilities in 
the hemisphere: in the words of Stephen Rabe, "[Franklin] Roosevelt administration expected 
Latin Americans to respect U.S. foreign investments and to follow the U.S. lead on the global 
stage",622 making the non-intervention pledge conditional upon the extent to which states in 
the region would accept a subordinate position vis-à-vis the United States. 
Growing competition with the Soviet Union after the end of World War II raised the 
importance of US expectations towards states in the Western hemisphere. The priority of 
containing Soviet influence, famously championed by George Kennan who defined 
containment as the "adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly 
shifting geographical and political points", arguing that "the main element of any United 
States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and 
vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies",623 made the prevention of Communist 
takeovers in the Western hemisphere an unavoidable necessity in the minds of US leaders. 
Both Harry S. Truman and his successor Dwight D. Eisenhower expected Latin American 
leaders to keep a tight grip on their societies in order to prevent any Communist penetration. 
Convinced that authoritarian regimes would fare better in keeping internal stability, the 
expectation of these US Presidents oftentimes amounted to open support for notorious Latin 
American strongmen, again best captured by Kennan's reasoning that the US "should not 
hesitate before police repression by the local government" and that "[i]t is better to have a 
strong regime in power than a liberal government if it is indulgent and relaxed and penetrated 
by Communists".624 
The established notion in the minds of US leaders that Latin American dictators 
would better conform to US expectations of domestic order and stability than more 
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democratic forms of government, received a severe blow when the Cuban Revolution 
unseated US long-time ally Fulgencio Batista. Rather than being a bulwark against 
Communist penetration, Batista's shocking inability to prevent Fidel Castro from gaining 
power, made it "painfully obvious that rightist dictatorships [...] were creating an 
environment ripe for Communist exploitation".625 This reappraisal of the benefits of 
collaborating with Latin American dictators was so fundamental that it led to a cautious 
readjustment of US relations with the Dominican Republic under US President 
Eisenhower.626 Worried that the brutal rule of Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo would 
create conditions in the country similar to pre-revolutionary Cuba, the US government 
"turned against its client of three decades",627 deciding in November 1959 that the Dominican 
strongman had to cede power.628 
The 1959 Cuban Revolution changed not only the perceived relationship between 
regime type and the ability to maintain domestic order and stability, but also the US 
government's expectations towards the region. John F. Kennedy, Eisenhower's presidential 
successor, systematically expanded the set of expectations the US would have towards the 
Dominican Republic and other states in the Western hemisphere as a response to Fidel 
Castro's successful revolution. Still wishing to consign domestic unrest and regime 
contestation to oblivion in hemispheric states, Kennedy pushed for an ambitious regional 
modernization project almost immediately upon taking office. On March 13, 1961, less than 
two months into his presidential term, the new US President announced what has been called 
a "Marshall Plan for Latin America":629 the Alliance for Progress. This new policy, in 
Kennedy's own words "a vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of 
purpose",630 aimed at modernizing Latin American societies in a way that would make them 
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both more stable and more liberal. In August 1961, the signing of the Charter of Punta del 
Este formally inaugurated the Alliance, with the United States pledging to provide $20 billion 
in investment over the next ten years to reach an annual growth rate of 5.5 percent in Latin 
American countries.631 
What Kennedy, who was convinced that "only the most determined efforts of the 
American nations themselves can bring success to this effort [the Alliance]",632 expected 
from his fellow hemispheric governments was not only capital investment of $80 billion in 
the course of one decade, but, more importantly, a strict implementation of a particular model 
of modernization that his administration had set up. This developmental model was inspired 
by Walt W. Rostow's modernization theory which propagated that "economic development 
followed discernible paths in Western and the United States" and that "it could be followed 
by other nations".633 In order to move Latin American countries to the next economic stage, 
they needed, according to Rostow, a "well-funded economic aid program" that "could serve 
as [a] sharp stimulus".634 This economic aid program was the Alliance for Progress. In the 
minds of Kennedy and his administration officials, modernization in Latin American would 
follow a pre-defined path that the US President expected states in the region to follow.635 
Apart from expectations regarding the economic dimension of Kennedy's new foreign policy 
initiative, the administration's support for liberal governments in the region was predicated 
upon how credible their anti-Communism was. After all, as much as the Alliance for Progress 
was an economic project to facilitate modernization and progress, its main rationale was 
political, i.e. to "immunize Latin America against Castro-type revolutions",636 evidenced by 
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an internal task force report charged with formulating Kennedy's approach to Latin America 
before he took office. The report declared that the  
greatest single task of American diplomacy in Latin America is to divorce the 
inevitable and necessary Latin American social transformation from 
connection with and prevent its capture by overseas Communist Power 
politics.637 
Countries in the region were thus not only expected to follow a specific economic path of 
development, but also a political one that lived up to the promise of resisting any Communist 
influence on their regimes.638 
With respect to the fulfillment of its expectations of anti-Communist political freedom 
paired with economic modernization and material progress stimulated by the Alliance for 
Progress, it was the Dominican Republic in which the Kennedy administration put 
exceptionally high hopes. In fact, expectations were so high that the administration hoped to 
turn the Caribbean nation into a "showcase for democracy", proving that the "goals of the 
Alliance [for Progress] could be successfully implemented".639 At the beginning of his 
presidential term, Kennedy firmly believed that the Dominican Republic could set an 
example for the whole region by combining US-inspired economic progress, strict anti-
Communism, and a more liberal political order. Referring to the end of Trujillo's regime in 
his 1962 state of the union address, the US President proclaimed enthusiastically and 
confidently that "[t]he people of the Dominican Republic, with our firm encouragement and 
help [...], are safely passing through the treacherous course from dictatorship through disorder 
towards democracy".640 To assist the Dominican Republic on its path towards democracy, the 
Kennedy administration tried to control "the threat from the far left (Castro/Communist) and 
the far right (Trujillistas)" by following a plan of action that envisaged free elections.641 After 
months of preparation, elections took finally place on December 20, 1962.642 In a landslide 
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victory, Juan Bosch won the presidential election by a two-to-one margin, while his party, the 
left-of-center Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), won "25 of the 27 members of the 
Senate and 52 of the 74 members of the Chamber of Deputies" in the congressional 
election.643 Immediately upon Bosch's electoral victory, the Kennedy administration invited 
the Dominican President-elect to Washington, signaling its willingness to closely collaborate 
with the new Dominican government. Bosch himself felt "a truly sincere willingness on the 
part of the White House, not just President Kennedy, but also his assistants, to help" the 
Dominican leadership in its efforts to modernize the country.644 Indeed, evidenced by a secret 
memorandum, the Kennedy administration believed, despite feeling "somewhat tentative 
about making an appraisal of Bosch at this point [January 1963]",645 that "Dr. Bosch 
responded with a strong endorsement of the Alliance for Progress".646 As a representative of 
the democratic left, Bosch was "the best hope of bringing modernization to Latin America 
without violence and without stirring up hatred for the yanqui".647 
Dominican Obstruction 
The Kennedy administration's high hopes in Juan Bosch and in the much-desired Dominican 
showcase for Kennedy's ambitious modernization project in the Western hemisphere very 
soon turned into bitter disillusionment. Rather than representing a new type of Latin 
American leader who would enact Kennedy's envisioned and delicate balance between 
economic development, democracy and strict anti-Communism, the new Dominican 
President preferred to pursue his own designs for economic and political development in his 
country. Bosch's presidency proved to be especially obstructive to Kennedy's hegemonic 
expectations in terms of implementing the Alliance for Progress and the question of how to 
deal with Dominican Communists domestically. 
During his brief seven-month presidency, Juan Bosch's attitude towards the Alliance 
for Progress was ambivalent. While he embraced the necessity of outside economic aid for 
his country's development, his approach towards the program was rather pragmatic, 
welcoming aid programs he deemed useful, but not shying away from criticizing aspects he 
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deemed inadequate or insufficient. In his first conversation with US President Kennedy, 
Bosch pointed out that the Dominican Republic "had short-term needs as a result of 
unemployment, under-investment, a lack of farm-to-market roads and inefficient and slow 
production", needs that Bosch thought were not satisfied by the long-term goals of the 
Alliance for Progress.648 When the Dominican President realized that American funds were 
insufficient and that Kennedy was preoccupied with the "American balance of payments 
problem and the sizable gold and dollar drain",649 he turned to alternative sources, securing a 
"loan from a European banking consortium in April 1963".650 According to the US 
Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, John B. Martin, the Dominican President wished "to 
avoid public identification with [the United States] through AID and the Alianza", refused "to 
publicly embrace the Alianza", and worse, was "rumored to have said that he will sign no 
more Alianza agreements".651 But Bosch not only looked for other ways to receive economic 
aid, he also professed a type of economic nationalism that was obstructive to the expectations 
of the Kennedy administration. His efforts at balancing the Dominican budget by curbing 
state expenditures threatened to undermine the US desire to export American products to the 
island, went against the US expectation of domestic Dominican capital investment, and 
irritated "New Deal-style liberal sensibilities",652 evidenced by John B. Martin, US 
Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, who argued that Bosch "was running the 
government like an old lady saving string".653 
Apart from Bosch's intransigence with regard to the implementation of the Alliance 
for Progress, what constituted the most severe obstruction to Kennedy's expectations towards 
the island was the Dominican President's refusal to embrace the most fundamental goal of the 
modernization project, i.e. US-style resistance towards Communist influence in the 
Dominican Republic. To be sure, Bosch's presidency was decidedly committed to anti-
Communism. In a speech shortly after his inauguration, Bosch declared in March 1963 that 
the choice before his country was one between democracy and Communism, with 
Communism equaling "death, war, destruction and the loss of all our blessings".654 His 
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democratic credentials were so impeccable that it has been correctly noted that he "took 
power inflexibly determined to set an example of peaceful, tolerant, constructive democracy 
for this [his] and future generations".655 Communists in the Dominican Republic understood 
Bosch's belief in democratic government, arguing that he was nothing but a "pawn of Yankee 
imperialism".656  
As much as the Dominican President was opposed to Communism, he was not willing 
to follow US expectations and persecute his political adversaries. As Patrick Iber correctly 
puts it, Bosch "thought that the most effective anti-Communist policy for the Dominican 
Republic was one that refused to make martyrs of the small and ineffective Communist Party 
by outlawing its activity",657 a policy that was in stark contrast to US expectations of 
McCarthyism and thus highly obstructive. Convinced that "any attempts to suppress the 
native Communists by direct persecution only succeeds in turning them into guerillas and 
terrorists",658 Bosch allowed a number of Communist activists to return from their exile and 
to resume their political activities in the country.659 Even retrospectively, the Dominican 
President argued that his strategy of inclusion was effective in neutralizing Communist 
subversion. In August 1965, Bosch, looking back on his presidency, wrote that  
[l]ittle by little, as the days passed, the non-Communist and anti-Communist 
members of the June 14th Movement [a leftist anti-Trujillo movement] were 
gaining ground against the Communists, since they were able to prove to their 
companions that my [Bosch's] democratic government neither persecuted them 
nor took orders from Washington.660  
The main achievement of his term, the new Dominican constitution of 1963, was a testimony 
to Bosch's conviction that civil liberties were for all, including Communists, granting 
unprecedented rights, both political and economic, to the Dominican people.661  
Bosch's inclusive vision for his country obstructed the Kennedy administration's 
desire to isolate and exclude any kind of Communist activity in the Dominican Republic. 
While the Dominican President's understanding of democratic openness was in line with 
some US officials, most notably with supreme court justice William O. Douglas who was an 
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ardent defender of free speech and dissented from a US supreme court judgment upholding 
the Smith Act which targeted US Communists,662 the Kennedy administration "constantly 
badgered Bosch about restricting the freedom of Dominican leftists".663 When Bosch resisted 
US attempts at making him deploy McCarthyite methods towards the Dominican far left and 
argued that a "Dominican version of the Smith Act" would be unconstitutional,664 his 
democratic credentials did not protect him from accusations of being too soft on 
Communism.665 Despite recognizing that a Dominican "crack-down on Communist activities 
will depend largely upon his being convinced that the Communists represent a direct threat to 
his administration", a June 1963 State Department assessment of Bosch's policies towards 
Dominican Communists argued that "Bosch's present tolerance of Communist activities in the 
Dominican Republic is a dangerous risk".666 Therefore, the Dominican President's insistence 
on protecting the civil liberties of everyone regardless of their political orientation "did not 
meet U.S. expectations of a Cold Warrior".667 
US Perceptions of Dominican Obstruction 
As I argue, the perception of a target state's obstruction to prior expectations plays a key role 
in experiencing emotional frustration which in turn led to Johnson's decision in favor of an 
anti-Bosch intervention. While expectations towards the Dominican Republic remained 
virtually unchanged in terms of the US preoccupation with conformity to the goals of the 
Alliance for Progress and against Communist subversion in the country,668 Bosch's 
obstruction to US expectations was perceived differently across the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations.  
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Despite Bosch's continuously obstructive behavior with regard to the implementation 
of the Alliance for Progress and the inclusive approach in his dealings with Dominican 
Communists, the Kennedy administration remained generally supportive of him throughout 
his presidency. Even in the days before Bosch was eventually ousted by a military coup, 
Ambassador John Martin argued in a secret cable to the US State Department that he 
continued to believe that "our [US] interests lie in supporting the Bosch Government".669 
True, the administration regarded Bosch's obstructive conduct as disappointing and was "not 
upset when the [Dominican] military ousted him [Bosch] in September 1963".670 When the 
Dominican President asked for US assistance in order to confront rumors of a coup one day 
before his removal, the Kennedy administration remained inactive, arguing that it could do 
little to keep Bosch in power.671 Yet, despite the Kennedy administration's general 
dissatisfaction with Bosch's presidency, succinctly summarized by then-vice President 
Lyndon B. Johnson who argued that "Bosch was no Betancourt",672 Kennedy and his advisors 
rarely perceived Bosch's behavior as deliberately hostile towards the United States.673 On the 
contrary, the general perception within the Kennedy administration was that Bosch had valid 
reasons for his undesirable and obstructive actions. Trying to understand the Dominican 
President and his perspective on contested issues, government assessments as to why Bosch 
resisted the Alliance for Progress and US pressure to restrict Communist activities in his 
country, were astonishingly benign and understanding. A secret CIA estimate from June 1963 
drew attention to the notion that Bosch gave Dominican Communists freedom to return to the 
island and to organize not because he was a Communist himself or because he tried to upset 
the US, but rather because he believed "[w]ith reason" that "the principal immediate threat to 
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the accomplishment of his mission [his presidential agenda] is the constant possibility of a 
reactionary coup [from the right]".674 A memorandum for Kennedy's National Security 
Advisor McGeorge Bundy argued that "by allowing the Communists [...] to organize and 
operate freely, Bosch is obviously asking for trouble in the future", essentially confirming 
that Bosch's behavior was highly obstructive to US expectations, but then similarly explained 
such behavior with recourse to the perception that Bosch regarded "the threat from the right 
as more dangerous".675 The perception of key decision-makers within the Kennedy 
administration that Bosch's obstruction was understandable, perhaps even rational, went even 
further: assessing Bosch's criticism of the Alliance for Progress, Ambassador John Martin 
expressed understanding for the Dominican President, arguing that the "need to tie our [US] 
foreign aid to U.S. procurement", one of the central contentions between the administration 
and the Dominican government, "works against us politically [...], driving a friend [Bosch] 
away" and forcing "him to turn to Europe and make his purchases there".676 In the same 
document, Martin provided another reason for Bosch's intransigence, arguing that his 
obstructive behavior and seemingly anti-American attitude could be traced back to domestic 
political fears and that the fact that "Juan Bosch does not ask us for help" was because of "his 
fear of the left" and that "it [the Dominican left] will attack him if he goes along with us [the 
Kennedy administration]".677  
After Kennedy's assassination had brought Lyndon B. Johnson into power, 
perceptions of Bosch's behavior and attitude towards the US started to change markedly. 
What had been considered an undesirable, yet rational stance towards the United States and 
domestic adversaries during Kennedy's times, was now perceived as much more illegitimate 
and hostile under Lyndon B. Johnson's rule. Bosch's obstructive behavior remained the same, 
but interpretations with regard to its assumed sources and motivations became more 
unfavorable. Living in his Puerto Rican exile after having been ousted by the September 1963 
military coup, the ex-Dominican President did not give up his political career, but remained 
at the helm of the opposition movement against the military-backed Dominican government, 
"constantly sending instructions and exhortations, both public and private, to his followers" in 
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the Dominican Republic, much to the dismay of the Johnson administration.678 Adding to his 
prior obstructions, Bosch's political activities from his exile were not only perceived to be 
detrimental to the bilateral relations between the governments of the two countries, but were 
also regarded by the US embassy in Santo Domingo as an indication of a hostile stance 
towards the United States:  
My own feeling [Tapley Bennett, US Ambassador] is that Bosch is basically 
anti-American. This feeling is shared by members of the Embassy who were 
here during the Bosch period [...]. The pact he has just signed with the 
violently anti-American Social Christian leadership679 [...] certainly gives 
grounds for questioning Bosch's personal orientation".680 
Strikingly, for the US embassy in Santo Domingo, Bosch's political initiatives in exile were 
not only attempts at regaining power, but also testimony to his anti-American attitude, 
supporting "his friends' campaign of defamation against the [United States]" and enabling 
them to oppose the Dominican government as well as to "jab and kick at Uncle Sam".681 This 
view was shared by other US officials. Reaching to the heart of Johnson's circle of advisors, it 
was Thomas Mann who professed in a telephone conversation with the President that "he did 
not see that [Bosch] would help [the US] a bit" because, according to Mann, "he [Bosch] is 
against us, criticizing us, saying we [the US] were supporting the other side".682 Similarly, 
when former Ambassador John B. Martin met with Bosch in San Juan in early May, trying to 
find a negotiated solution to the Dominican impasse, he declared that negotiations were not 
fruitful because Bosch had "been turning anti-American".683 An FBI report called the former 
Dominican President a "controversial figure" not only "characterized as an individual who is 
motivated by a burning desire to justify himself in the eyes of history", but also "by a 
boundless hatred for the United States".684 Thus, key actors within the Johnson administration 
perceived Bosch's obstructive behavior as indication of Bosch's alleged anti-Americanism, 
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significantly departing from how Bosch's obstructions had been perceived when he was in 
power. Rather than seeing Bosch as a President who could not openly side with the United 
States because of domestic considerations, a perception widely shared in the Kennedy 
administration, the Johnson administration perceived Bosch as someone who "was no friend 
of the United States even though he professed to be".685 This is all the more surprising, as 
Bosch himself stayed in US territory during his time in exile and showed no willingness to 
harm the United States, assuring that his efforts were directed at the military coup 
government in the Dominican Republic, not at the US government. 
Johnson's Emotional Frustration with Bosch 
Lyndon Johnson's decision to prevent the constitutionalist uprising in the Dominican 
Republic from gaining the upper hand in the violent clashes with the right-wing faction of the 
Dominican military was considerably influenced by hegemonic expectations towards the 
country and by how the US President viewed Bosch and his political career. Johnson's 
perception of Bosch's obstructive behavior as a product of his hatred for the United States led 
to emotional frustration, prompting Johnson to send US troops to the Dominican republic in 
order to prevent Bosch's return to power. Had Johnson not reacted emotionally to his 
perception of Bosch as an anti-American opportunist willing to harm the United States, he 
would have been unlikely to side with right-wing anti-Bosch forces in the Dominican 
Republic, which exposed him to considerable domestic criticism in the United States and 
created a "credibility gap" that came back to haunt Johnson's foreign policy, particularly with 
regard to the deteriorating situation in Vietnam.686  
Fearing the "long-term consequences of another Bosch regime",687 the utmost priority 
of the US President, from the very onset of the constitutionalist uprising, was to prevent a 
possible return of the former Dominican President to the country. While the administration 
took sides in the Dominican struggle between constitutionalists and right-wing loyalists, 
"vigorously intervening against the constitutionalists from almost the first hours of the 
revolution [uprising]",688 what really drove the administration's opposition to the 
constitutionalists was its hostility towards Juan Bosch. In the first documented telephone 
conversation dealing with the Dominican crisis on April 26, 1965, two days after the uprising 
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had started, Johnson told Thomas Mann, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and 
one of Johnson's most trusted confidants in the administration, that "this [Juan] Bosch is no 
good", arguing that even regime change would be a possible means to prevent Bosch from 
returning to power: "we are going to have to really set up that government down there [in the 
Dominican Republic], run it and stabilize it some way or another".689 Despite public 
assurances to the contrary, Mann agreed with the President, calling Bosch "no good at all" 
and warning Johnson that with him or "another Bosch, it [the Dominican Republic] is just 
going to be another sinkhole".690 On the same day, a CIA staff officer intelligence report 
confirmed that Bosch's return "to his former position [the presidency] would be highly 
undesirable".691 
The administration's fundamental opposition to Bosch's return to the Dominican 
Republic foreclosed a non-military solution to the conflict. As has been correctly noted, 
rather than invading the island, the Johnson administration could have "supported Molina 
Urena [the constitutionalists' provisional President] and/or arranged to bring Bosch back to 
the country, using "its influence to aid the moderate PRD leadership within the 
constitutionalist movement".692 This view was shared by Senator J. William Fulbright, then-
chairman of the US senate committee on foreign relations and one of the most vocal critics of 
Johnson's handling of the Dominican crisis,693 who in a widely noted speech in September 
1965 accused the Johnson administration of having failed to "to take advantage of several 
opportunities in which it might have changed the course of events".694 Indeed, Molina Urena 
and other leading constitutionalists consulted the US embassy in Santo Domingo on April 27, 
demanding US mediation in the conflict. Their proposal fell on deaf ears. US Ambassador 
Tapley Bennett declined to help find a negotiated settlement, disingenuously arguing that an 
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agreement should be reached by "Dominicans talking to Dominicans".695 Shortly after, 
Bennett recommended the "immediate landing " of US marines.696 
What was the Johnson administration's vigorous opposition to Bosch's potential return 
to the Dominican Republic based on and what led eventually to Johnson's decision to interject 
a high number of US troops into the Dominican power struggle? Convinced that Bosch's 
behavior was guided by an intense hatred for the United States, the prospect of his imminent 
return to the Dominican Republic frustrated the US President so much that he quickly 
decided to engage in a massive regime change operation, the mission of which was to prevent 
the constitutionalists from bringing the ex-President back to power.697 As soon as 
constitutionalist military officers ousted Donald Reid Cabral, Johnson became obsessed with 
the Dominican Republic, a country he had previously paid little attention to. According to 
one administration official, his preoccupation with the unfolding Dominican crisis was so 
pronounced that "he assumed the direction of day-to-day policy and became, in effect, the 
Dominican desk officer".698 Johnson would "spend more time on the situation in the 
Dominican Republic than he would on any other issue, including civil rights and Vietnam" 
from "late April through June of 1965".699 
A number of internal administration deliberations provide evidence for Johnson's 
belief that Bosch's continued obstruction was predicated upon his anti-American tendencies. 
Explaining his initial sending of four hundred marines to the island on April 28, 1965, 
President Johnson told his friend Abe Fortas during a telephone conversation that he felt the 
urge to act after he had received a cable from the US embassy, recommending "armed 
intervention which would go beyond the mere protection of Americans and seek to establish 
order in this strife-ridden country [the Dominican Republic]".700 Fearing that the 
constitutionalists would prevail in the Dominican civil war, Johnson expressed his mistrust of 
Bosch and his intentions when he asserted that the former Dominican President was "just a 
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stooge in the [constitutionalist] deal",701 willing to do anything that could bring harm to the 
United States. His advisor Thomas Mann was convinced that Bosch was unwilling and 
unable to contain anti-American forces if he was to became President again: "we do not think 
that this fellow Bosch understands the Communist danger [...]. They [Communists] are so 
much smarter than he is, that before you know it, they'd begin to take over".702 Bosch's 
purported inability to contain anti-American forces in the Dominican Republic and his 
tendency to ignore or even support them was a main factor in Johnson's preference for 
intervention. In a conversation with Abe Fortas, Johnson proposed that Bosch's promise to 
call for a cease-fire should be discarded because Bosch had been "moved completely out of 
the picture" and was "their [the rebels'] captive".703  
President Johnson's perception of Bosch's conduct led to a state of emotional 
frustration. Seeing Bosch as an anti-American stooge, a sense of urgency gripped the 
President. Deeply suspicious of the ex-Dominican President, Johnson became frustrated with 
the Dominican crisis and "began to panic",704 feeling that he needed to act swiftly. Anxious 
about his government's perceived inactivity, Johnson lamented that he had not done enough 
to stop the constitutionalists from gaining ground:  
[t]hey're killing our people and as you [Fortas] say they have captured tanks 
now; they're taking over the police marching them down the street and they 
got a hundred of them as hostages [...]. We're doing nothing to them [...]. 
We've done this now for a week - nothing.705 
In a conversation with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in which Johnson made clear 
that he wanted to send more marines to the island, he confided that he was "distressed".706 
Dissatisfied with the extent of engagement of other external actors, which added to Johnson's 
"intense frustration",707 the President lambasted the OAS, complaining to his friend Mike 
Mansfield that they were "just phantoms", the "damnedest fraud" he had ever seen, and that 
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"international organizations ain't worth a damn except window-dressing".708 In the same 
conversation, Johnson admitted that he was "very puzzled and frustrated on what to do in the 
Dominican Republic".709 Despite having sent troops to the Dominican Republic and pushing 
for more and despite an optimistic assessment of his advisors,710 Johnson felt that his 
government had "done nothing", which he felt "terrible about".711 Without the conviction that 
Bosch's anti-American tendencies prompted him to turn a blind eye towards more radical 
elements in the constitutionalist movement, Johnson would have probably been less likely to 
intervene on the side of the anti-Bosch forces and to quickly escalate his military 
engagement. When Bosch assured that the constitutionalist movement was democratic in 
nature, Johnson asserted in one of his many conversations with Abe Fortas that Bosch was 
purposively "misleading the press". Johnson simply did not believe that one could draw a line 
between the democratic forces within the constitutionalist movement and Dominican 
Communists.712 Conversations with skeptical advisors and a telegram in which Juan Bosch 
himself declared that "the constitutionalist forces are democratic and have complete control 
of the situation" in the Dominican Republic were to no avail.713 
Alternative Explanations 
Due to the complexity of the 1965 decision to intervene in the Dominican turmoil, there are a 
number of different accounts of why the United States used force to manipulate the 
Dominican authority structure. This section identifies the most common explanations and 
assesses their empirical accuracy.  
The most prominent argument, which is inspired by defensive realism and most 
closely aligned with the Johnson administration's public justification for the intervention,714 
                                                 
708
 Recording of Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Mike Mansfield", April 30, 1965, 
11:51am, Tape WH6504.08, Citation No. 7410, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, 
LBJL. 
709
 Ibid. 
710
 Recording of Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and George Ball", April 29, 1965, 
2:22pm, Tape WH6504.06, Citation No. 7380, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, 
LBJL. 
711
 Johnson quoted in Beschloss, Reaching for Glory: Lyndon Johnson's Secret White House Tapes, 1964-1965, 
300. 
712
 Recording of Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Abe Fortas", April 30, 1965, 
12:17pm, Tape WH6504.08, Citation No. 7413, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, 
LBJL. 
713
 See Juan Bosch to Lyndon B. Johnson, April 29, 1965, NSF, Country File, Dominican Republic Vol. 2, Box 
38, LBJL. 
714
 While the first official reason provided by the US government was the protection of American lives - on 
April 28, 1965, Johnson declared in a White House press release the intervention was "necessary to give 
protection to hundreds of Americans who are still in the Dominican Republic and to escort them safely back to 
[the United States]" - Johnson invoked a different rationale for the invasion shortly thereafter, arguing on April 
 147 
holds that the April 24 constitutionalist revolt constituted an imminent threat to US national 
security. In the words of one author, the 1965 intervention was "predicated on a strongly held 
view that a serious security threat existed", namely "the spread of communism".715 Arguing 
that the United States resorted to intervention because "President Johnson and his advisers 
were terrified of a Communist takeover",716 the intervention was a defensive means to keep 
Dominican Communists away from power, as the "American policy towards the Dominican 
Republic in 1965 [...] was keyed not to opportunity but to threat".717 Apprehensions about a 
Communist takeover were, according to this view, predicated upon the assumption that the 
Dominican constitutionalists, who demanded a return of the ousted President Juan Bosch, 
were at best subverted by militant Communists or at worst Communists themselves. As 
preventing "a second Cuba" was the overriding concern, "U.S. officials believed that, no 
matter the good intentions of some of the rebels, a pro-Bosch victory would increase the 
likelihood of a Communist takeover".718 Therefore, the "principal motivation for the US 
intervention was the fear of the Dominican Republic becoming a 'second Cuba'".719  
The Communist threat argument seems plausible at first glance. Against the backdrop 
of intense Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, it certainly 
stands to reason to assume that the Johnson administration saw foreign events through the 
lens of a possible Communist incursion in Latin America. Yet, the empirical evidence lends 
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little support to the argument. Despite Johnson's public assertion that the 1965 intervention 
was meant to ward off a Communist takeover, discussions within the Johnson administration 
reveal that evidence for the purported dominance of Communist forces within the rebel ranks 
was at best scarce. Even before journalists started deflating the list of fifty-three identified 
Communists and thereby turning it into a major embarrassment for the administration,720 
Johnson's aides warned the US President of exaggerating the Communist threat. When 
Johnson inquired about the nature of the constitutionalist uprising one day before he decided 
to send troops, Thomas Mann answered that he did not think that Bosch was a Communist.721 
In discussions about the draft of Johnson's first public announcement on April 28, Johnson's 
aides convinced the President of omitting any explicit or implicit reference to the supposed 
Communist threat due to lack of usable evidence.722 On April 30, some hours before 
Johnson's second statement, administration officials again advised Johnson against making 
unsupportable claims about the Communist threat in the Dominican Republic. Johnson's 
Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, told the President that he should not "point a finger 
to the Communists' participation in this [the constitutionalist uprising]". Hinting at the lack of 
evidence about the involvement of Communist third parties, McNamara added: "you 
[President Johnson] don't know that [Fidel] Castro is trying to do anything".723 When Johnson 
asked whether the CIA could document foreign support from the Cuban leader, McNamara 
simply replied: "I don't think so, Mr. President".724 Similarly, Johnson's National Security 
Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, added that "nobody has yet said that anyone of these 
Communists is actually in command of a column" and argued that he "wasn't sure that these 
Communists were that much in control of this messy movement [the Dominican uprising]".725 
While Bill Moyers, then-White House press secretary, urged the President not to insist on the 
Communist threat because he thought such an assertion "would raise the prestige and status 
of the Cubans"726 and because it "might drive [the constitutionalists] together",727 most of 
Johnson's aides favored omitting references to the supposed Communist subversion of the 
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constitutionalists simply because they thought evidence for such a claim was weak. Johnson 
himself acknowledged in an off-the-record interview with a journalist on April 29, 1965 that 
"no one on earth knew if this [the Dominican uprising] was a pro-Castro or Communist 
affair".728 Therefore, evidence suggests that the Communist threat was deliberately 
exaggerated in Johnson's public statements. It figured prominently in public justifications not 
because it reflected genuine apprehension, but rather because Johnson, worried that Congress 
and public opinion would consider keeping "the Communists from taking over" as the "only 
basis for action",729 viewed it as a valuable means to legitimize his intervention. In the words 
of one author, Johnson "used the gambit of Communist subversion in an attempt to win 
support in the court of U.S. domestic public opinion".730 Hence, Johnson chose to commit 
troops to the Dominican intervention not because of evidence of a Communist threat, but 
rather in spite of a lack thereof. When the decision to intervene was made in Washington, 
"the White House – and especially Johnson – disregarded the lack of hard evidence about 
Communist control over the Dominican situation".731 
A second, less prominent argument treats Johnson's decision to intervene as a 
consequence of US concerns with the "fate of US private investments in the Dominican 
Republic".732 According to this argument, the Johnson administration was worried about the 
implications of the revolt and a possible return of Bosch for its trade relations with the island. 
In the words of Walter LaFeber, the US government cared about "Latin American stability 
[...] that would be attractive to private investors".733 Since Bosch's economic policies during 
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his brief presidency were more protective of domestic labor, creating "a situation wherein 
sugar workers won the first real improvement in decades",734 it is argued that prospects for 
US corporations must have looked bleak if Bosch had returned to power. Having the second-
largest US sugar investment in the world in the 1960s, the Dominican Republic was 
especially important for sugar corporations like South Puerto Rico Sugar, which was the 
"largest U.S. owner of sugar cane plantations in the world" and got "two-thirds of its sugar 
from the Dominican Republic".735 Protecting these industries was a prime concern of the 
Johnson administration and, according to the argument, eventually prompted the US 
President to intervene.  
The deep US penetration of the Dominican economy is beyond dispute. Nor is it 
unlikely that the prospect of instability caused by the Dominican crisis of April 1965 was a 
major concern for US corporations doing business in the country. Whether these concerns 
extended to the foreign policy circles of the Johnson administration, however, remains highly 
doubtful. While the US President and his aides were aware of the economic significance of 
sugar for the Dominican Republic, evidenced by the telephone conversation between Johnson 
and Mann on April 25, in which Mann explained that the "low sugar price" was "hurting 
them [the Dominican government under Donald Reid Cabral]",736 there is no evidence that 
the decision-making of the administration was influenced by economic interest 
considerations. What is more, Dominican dependence on the United States as its main trading 
partner was asymmetric: as one author shows, "[g]iven the world oversupply of sugar, neither 
the United States nor American companies [were] particularly dependent on Dominican 
sugar".737  
The third prevalent argument in the literature treats US regime change in the 
Dominican Republic as a hegemonic act.738 Discarding the characterization of the Dominican 
uprising as a Communist threat to US national security, this view regards the domestic crisis 
in the Dominican Republic as an opportunity for imperial expansion and domination that the 
US was quick to seize. Though both the security-threat argument and the hegemonic-control 
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argument agree on the notion that the Johnson administration opposed the constitutionalist 
movement, they assign different motives to this choice which characterized the intervention 
early on. The US rationale for casting its lot with the loyalist forces around Wessin y Wessin, 
Benoit and Imbert might have had something to do with the charge that Bosch was too soft 
on Communism, as Piero Gleijeses readily admits, but the main driving force for intervention 
was rather, according to the hegemonic-control argument, US opposition to Bosch's quest for 
sovereign decision-making. As such, Gleijeses explains that 
beyond any shadow of doubt, Juan Bosch was a man of the 'democratic left'; 
therefore, according to the rhetoric of the Alliance for Progress, he should 
have enjoyed U.S. support. But he was too independent; he bluntly refused 
U.S. control and 'advice'. This alone would have cost him membership in the 
'Democratic left made in USA'.739  
In a similar account, Richard Barnet argues that US intervention  
signified that the political and economic relationships on which the United 
States preferred to base its dominant influence in the economy and politics of 
the Dominican Republic had broken down.740  
The decision to side with the loyalists had less to do with the purported Communist threat, 
but was rather the consequence of the belief that the US "could control the military and thus 
guarantee U.S. domination", whereas the "constitutionalists, with their independent, armed 
civilian cadres, presented a more formidable obstacle to manipulation".741 Consequently, the 
purpose of the intervention was to keep a subordinate country ruled by a military junta under 
US control and to prevent the constitutionalist uprising from returning a formerly ousted 
President as head of an intransigent government bent on fulfilling its own destiny free from 
American influence.  
Although evidence from Juan Bosch's seven-month tenure suggests that he was 
unwilling to compromise Dominican sovereignty in his dealings with the United States, the 
hegemonic-control argument overstates the Johnson administration's appetite for control and 
domination. True, both Juan Bosch's own writings and US officials' portrayals of his 
personality indicate that Bosch attached great importance to national sovereignty. Offering a 
striking glimpse into his self-perception and his role as President compared to his country's 
past leaders, Bosch wrote in 1964:  
[D]ealing with me was no easy matter. I am fully aware of that. I was very 
sensitive to anything that might affect Dominican sovereignty. My poor 
country had had, from the first breath of its life as a republic, a string of 
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political leaders who had dedicated all their skills and resources to looking for 
any foreign power on which to unload our independence […]. I felt wounded, 
as if it were a personal affront, at the spectacle of so many men without faith 
in the destiny of their own country […]. When it fell to me to be leader of a 
political party and the President of my country, I was very careful always to 
conduct myself as a Dominican who was proud of his nationality.742 
Contrary to the hegemonic-control argument, however, US objection to Bosch's quest for 
independence did not arouse a thirst for domination. When armed fighting between the 
constitutionalists and loyalists broke out in April 1965, the Johnson administration was 
anything but enthusiastic about intervening, confounding its alleged hegemonic 
predisposition. Though US intervention was forceful, the Johnson administration decided to 
intervene only reluctantly, being anything but quick to seize the opportunity to inject itself 
into the Dominican power struggle. While the US government closely followed the unfolding 
events in Santo Domingo from the first day the uprising started, it passed on opportunities to 
intervene earlier: the first opportunity to intervene came on April 25, one day after the 
beginning of the uprising, when the US administration turned down two intervention 
requests, one made by Donald Reid Cabral, the ousted head of the Triumvirate who asked for 
US help to suppress the uprising, and one by constitutionalists, who "strongly desired U.S. 
presence as indication [of] 'moral, material guarantee' by U.S. to [the] new government".743 
On April 26, the US embassy in Santo Domingo turned down another intervention request, 
this time made by the loyalists: "[b]oth Wessin and de los Santos [two loyalist generals] have 
asked for U.S. troops and we have told them that we have no plans [to] bring in U.S. 
troops".744 On April 27, four days into the uprising, Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent a 
telegram to the American embassy in Santo Domingo, urging the US diplomats on the ground 
to help establish a "military junta to act as provisional government", but explicitly ordered not 
to become "involved in details of formation of junta".745 Even on April 28, the day of the 
sending of the first marines, the request of the loyalists to receive military assistance was first 
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turned down, as a telegram sent to the State Department by Ambassador Tapley Bennett 
shows: "Col. Benoit, member of junta, just telephoned embassy to ask that U.S. land 1200 
marines 'to help restore peace to this country [Dominican Republic]' […]. He was given no 
encouragement".746 Thus, by the time marines were finally ordered to the island later the 
same day, a number of opportunities to deploy troops had deliberately been squandered. Had 
the Johnson administration been as eager to maintain control over the island, as the 
hegemonic control argument has it, it is not clear by any means why, in the words of 
Abraham Lowenthal, "American officials let pass a number of possible opportunities to exert 
their influence directly, choosing instead to abstain from overt involvement".747 Therefore, 
documentary evidence lends little support to the hegemonic-control argument. 
Conclusion 
The 1965 Dominican intervention was a "major episode in world politics, a watershed in 
inter-American relations".748 On the surface, this rare case of overt US regime change appears 
to be a consequence of the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, with the all too often assumed Communist threat being the main driving force for 
Johnson's decision to intervene. While acknowledging that the Cold War paradigm inevitably 
dominated Johnson's thinking, this chapter offers a new interpretation of the Dominican 
intervention, arguing that the decision-making process leading to the military invasion was 
marked by high emotional frustration with the former Dominican President Juan Bosch. Had 
the US President, on the basis of hegemonic expectations, not interpreted Bosch's series of 
obstructive behavior as a clear sign of his hatred for the United States, the Johnson 
administration might not have intervened so forcefully, exposing itself to harsh criticism, 
both domestic and international, and putting the final nail in the coffin of the Alliance for 
Progress, Kennedy's much-anticipated modernization project for Latin America. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The 2003 Invasion of Iraq 
The end of the Cold War made the United States the unipole in the international system of 
states, heralding a new and unprecedented era in international politics, but it had little impact 
on the US proclivity to intervene militarily in foreign countries. Relations between various 
US governments and Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime in Iraq testify to the continued 
persistence of regime change on the menu of US foreign policy options. With the 2003 
invasion of Iraq being the poster child of this foreign policy, no other empirical case is as 
closely associated with the concept and phenomenon of regime change as the US-led 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein. The Bush administration's clear intent to get rid of Saddam 
Hussein and his disliked regime makes the 2003 Iraq War the paradigmatic case of regime 
change. Even semantically, the Iraq case is quintessential, because the term as such originated 
in debates about US policy towards Saddam Hussein's Iraq in the late 1990s.749 No serious 
assessment of US regime change can therefore neglect "the Mother of all Regime 
Changes".750 
The US regime change operation in Iraq started on March 19, 2003 when US 
President George W. Bush gave US CENTCOM commander Tommy Franks the order to 
execute Operation Iraqi Freedom in the morning hours of that day.751 Following intense air 
strikes, US-led coalition ground troops moved swiftly into Iraq and towards Baghdad, the 
power center of Saddam Hussein's regime. With a ground force numbering 183,000,752 
coalition forces managed to overcome the Iraqi armed forces with little effort, as the 
"stunning American sweep of Iraq"753 needed less than a month to terminate Saddam's rule, 
symbolized by the toppling of his Firdos Square statue in central Baghdad on April 9, 
2003.754 After Bush had proclaimed the end of major combat operations on May 1 as the first 
phase of the battle to overthrow the Iraqi regime,755 Iraq remained officially under US 
occupation for fifteen months until June 28, 2004.756 Following the de jure termination of 
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occupation, a security agreement allowed US troops to remain in the country until December 
31, 2011.757  
Reflecting the controversy it stirred and attention it gained in world politics during the 
years and months around the invasion in March 2003, regime change in Iraq has figured 
prominently in public debates and discussions. Many aspects of the invasion have been 
subject to inquiry, e.g. its ramifications for international law, its role in the flare-up of the 
Sunni insurgency and the solidification of sectarian fault lines in Iraq, and its geopolitical 
implications for the wider Middle East. Among these discussions, one aspect has been 
especially hotly debated: the underlying rationale for the US decision to engage in regime 
change and overthrow Saddam Hussein. Just as the Bush administration provided changing 
justifications for its invasion, explanations prevalent in the literature highlight different 
underlying motives. These range from support for the official justifications provided, i.e. the 
goal of removing a vital threat to US national security and promoting democracy in Iraq, to 
more critical accounts stressing the role of the invasion in protecting Israel, promoting US 
corporate interests and controlling Iraqi oil. Without reaching a consensus more than a decade 
after the ouster of Saddam Hussein, "the debate over why the United States invaded Iraq has 
not abated".758 
This chapter argues that we cannot understand regime change in Iraq without taking 
into account the emotional frustration experienced by President Bush and many of his foreign 
policy aides. The terrorist attacks of September 11, their impact on US expectations towards 
Iraq, and perceptions of Iraqi obstruction as hostile and directed at the United States led to an 
emotional state that cast its shadow on the decision-making process prior to the 2003 
invasion, prompting an administration that came into office with a decidedly restrained 
foreign policy program, to resort to military aggression in order to get rid of a perceived 
menace. Saddam Hussein's perceived anti-Americanism sealed the Iraqi dictator's fate, 
leading to such high levels of emotional frustration within the Bush administration that there 
was nothing, not even credible disarmament, that Saddam could have done to stay in power. 
As an aggressive response to frustration, regime change was therefore not a means to serve 
disarmament or to confront an imminent threat to the security of the United States, but rather 
the consequence of high emotional frustration within the Bush administration. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. The next section provides a historical 
overview of the US approach towards Iraq prior to George W. Bush's taking office. Section 
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Two describes the shift from containment to regime change in the new President's Iraq 
policy, identifying the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as a critical turning point. 
Section Three turns to the main argument of the chapter about the role of emotional 
frustration, juxtaposing US expectations towards Iraq, Iraqi obstruction, and the US 
perception thereof in the periods before and after 9/11. Section Four presents and critiques 
three alternative explanations for US regime change in Iraq, while Section Five briefly 
concludes. 
The Prelude: US Policy Towards Iraq Before George W. Bush's Presidency 
With regime change in 2003 being predicated upon previous US dealings with the Iraqi 
regime – one author correctly notes that "[t]he seeds of the second President Bush's decision 
to invade [Iraq] were planted by the unfinished nature of the 1991 war" –759 understanding 
the overthrow of Saddam Hussein requires taking the immediate history of US-Iraq relations 
into consideration. Beginning with Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the 1990s 
saw a deterioration of bilateral relations that used to be famous for collaboration and mutual 
partnership based on common fears towards the revolutionary regime in Iran. Soon after 
Saddam Hussein, who became President of Iraq on July 16, 1979,760 launched military attacks 
against Iran in September 1980, precipitating an eight-year long war of attrition, the US 
President Ronald Reagan decided to side with the Iraqi regime in order to prevent an Iranian 
victory. As a first symbolic step in February 1982, Reagan ordered Iraq's removal from a list 
of countries that "repeatedly supported acts of international terrorism".761 In December 1983, 
Donald Rumsfeld, Reagan's personal representative in the Middle East, traveled to Baghdad 
to meet with Saddam Hussein in what was the "highest-level contact by any U.S. official with 
Iraq's leadership in twenty-five years".762 Another year later, in November 1984, the US 
restored full diplomatic relations with Saddam Hussein's regime after a break of seventeen 
years.763 As Donald Rumsfeld later explained in his memoir, the rationale for the uneasy 
partnership between the US and the Iraqi leader, whose career Rumsfeld describes as "forged 
in conflict and hardened by bloodshed",764 was the perceived existence of convergent national 
security interests:  
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America could assist Iraq by discouraging other countries from selling arms to 
Iran, and Iraq could assist America by holding the line against an ascendant 
radical Islamist and terrorist-supporting regime in Iran.765  
In the words David Newton, who became the first US ambassador to Iraq after the restoration 
of diplomatic relations in 1984, the tilt towards Iraq was justified, as the US was "concerned 
that Iraq should not lose the war with Iran, because that would have threatened Saudi Arabia 
and the Gulf".766 
The end of the Iran-Iraq War removed the threat of a possible expansion of Iranian 
influence in the region, but it had little impact on the US stance towards the Iraqi regime. 
George H.W. Bush, who in January 1989, a few months after the end of the conflict, had 
become US President, continued friendly relations with Saddam Hussein in the framework of 
what has been called a "policy of constructive engagement".767 Just like his presidential 
predecessor, Bush rejected repeated calls from Congress to impose economic sanctions on 
Iraq for its biological and chemical weapons program and the use of chemical weapons 
during the Iran-Iraq War culminating in the infamous Halabja chemical attack on March 16, 
1988.768 Arguing that sanctions would be ineffective in convincing Saddam Hussein to 
abandon his weapons program and would instead harm the United States' economic posture 
in the region,769 the preferred "policy of constructive engagement" offered political and 
economic incentives to the Iraqi regime as a means to moderate Saddam Hussein's aggressive 
foreign policy. National Security Directive No. 26, issued on October 2, 1989, defined a 
conciliatory US approach towards Iraq based on "normal relations", "opportunities for U.S. 
firms to participate in the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy", and "sales of non-lethal forms 
of military assistance".770  
While bilateral relations between Iraq and the US remained friendly in the immediate 
aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the following 1991 Gulf War 
signaled a marked shift in Bush's approach towards Iraq. On April 3, 1991, UN Resolution 
687 reaffirmed the continuation of prewar sanctions which had demanded the withdrawal of 
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Saddam Hussein's troops from Kuwait, and established the UN Special Commission 
(UNSCOM) to oversee and enforce Iraqi disarmament.771 The American approach towards 
Iraq switched from prewar engagement to a postwar policy of comprehensive containment, 
consisting of four central elements: UN-imposed sanctions and the UNSCOM inspections 
regime, complemented by a permanent US military presence in the Persian Gulf and two no-
fly zones in Northern and Southern Iraq prohibiting any activity by Iraqi aircraft.772 President 
George H.W. Bush seemed to understand the consequences of having left the Iraqi regime 
intact, writing in his diary on the day he called a ceasefire that what was missing from the 
Gulf War was Saddam Hussein's unconditional surrender to "make this [the 1991 Gulf War] 
akin to WWII, to separate Kuwait from Korea and Vietnam".773 In remarks on the 
establishment of the no-fly zone in Northern Iraq seven weeks later, the US President 
specified his sentiments by declaring that "there will not be normalized relations with the 
United States […] until Saddam Hussein is out of there [Iraq]" and that the "most important 
thing" would be "to get Saddam out of there",774 implying at the declaratory level that 
sanctions would not be lifted even if the Iraqi regime complied with provisions mandated by 
UN Resolution 687, while containment remained the actual policy in practice. 
Despite later public statements to the contrary, containment remained the official US 
approach towards Iraq under Bill Clinton, George H.W. Bush's successor. Clinton 
emphasized Iraq's obligation to comply with its disarmament obligations on a number of 
occasions in 1993 without linking a potential end to economic sanctions to Saddam Hussein's 
overthrow. In March 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher declared that the US was 
trying to "depersonalize" US-Iraq relations, implying that sanctions were not related to 
Saddam Hussein's remaining in power.775 President Clinton himself had stated in January 
1993 that he was seeking a change in Iraqi behavior and did not regard the Iraqi President as 
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an irredeemable foe.776 Growing increasingly frustrated with the sanctions regime and Iraq's 
intransigence in dealing with UN inspections, the Clinton administration tilted more and 
more towards calling for Saddam's removal, but only in public statements, not in practice. 
While on March 26, 1997, Secretary of States Madeleine Albright gave a speech on US 
policy towards Iraq in which she asserted that "evidence is overwhelming that Saddam 
Hussein's intentions will never be peaceful",777 indicating that fulfilling UN obligations 
would not be enough to redeem the Iraqi regime,778 little changed in the US approach towards 
Iraq. 
Changes at the declaratory level were so far-reaching that regime change in Iraq 
became official US policy in 1998. After months of public pressure on Bill Clinton to choose 
a tougher stance towards Iraq, Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act in October 1998, 
which declared under section three that  
[i]t should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the 
regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the 
emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.779  
President Clinton signed the bill into law on October 31, stating that the "United States looks 
forward to a democratically supported regime that would permit us to enter into a dialogue 
leading to the reintegration of Iraq into normal international life",780 but little change in terms 
of actual policy. To be sure the majority of targets during Operation Desert Fox, a four-day 
air campaign in December 1998 comprised of the "biggest U.S. military strikes in Iraq since 
the end of the 1991 war",781 were key elements of Saddam Hussein's domestic power base 
such as command-and-control facilities. While Bill Clinton claimed that the goal of 
Operation Desert Fox was to "degrade Saddam's capacity to develop and deliver weapons of 
mass destruction [WMD]"782, only eleven of the ninety-seven air strike targets were WMD 
facilities.783 This notwithstanding, there were no signs that the Clinton administration would 
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use extensive force to overthrow the Iraqi time.784 Most importantly, there were no 
considerations of using ground forces to invade Iraq. Rather than tilting towards military 
intervention, the political cost of the US-British air campaign against Iraq was a 
fundamentally divided UN Security Council with France and Russia growing increasingly 
weary of the UN sanctions regime. As economic sanctions crumbled and more and more 
countries seemed willing to do business with Iraq, the years of 1999 and 2000 saw a gradual 
increase in Iraqi prestige and economic power.785 Faced with these challenges, the Clinton 
administration did not make a determined effort to implement its official policy of regime 
change, even showing willingness to lift economic sanctions if Saddam cooperated in his 
disarmament tasks mandated by the new UN Resolution 1284.786 
US Policy Towards Iraq under George W. Bush 
Containment Before 9/11 
From today's perspective, it seems plausible to assume that the US stance towards Iraq shifted 
significantly with the inauguration of George W. Bush. Against the backdrop of what has 
been described the "bevy of neo-conservative advisers and officials who streamed into 
government" and "the strong streak of American ultra-nationalism in a number of key 
appointments",787 one is tempted to make such assumption. Indeed, many argue that 
"President Bush and top officials of his administration were determined from early 2001 to 
bring about regime change in Iraq".788 In reality however, remarkably little changed in US-
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Iraq relations with the start of George W. Bush's presidency in January 2001. In the first 
months of his term, President Bush did not regard foreign policy issues as his top priority and 
seemed to be reluctant to adopt a major change in Iraq policy towards regime change.789 
Before the September 11 attacks, the George W. Bush administration's policy vis-à-vis Iraq 
was in fact a continuation of Bill Clinton's policy of containment, the 1998 Iraq Liberation 
Act notwithstanding. In March 2001, Bush maintained that US policy towards Iraq would 
"continue to be containment of Saddam".790 The regime change invasion that was to take 
place two years later was far beyond the most offensive policy preferences voiced in internal 
administration discussions during a policy review at the beginning of Bush's term.791 If 
anything, the Bush administration tilted away from, not towards regime change.  
In the administration's policy review, the main question was not regime change, but 
rather how the sanctions and inspections regime could be modified in order to counter 
Saddam Hussein's gradual economic and political rehabilitation after a decade of sanctions. 
In fact, because Vice President Dick Cheney, later to be one of the staunchest proponent of 
regime change in Iraq, argued in a March 2001 interview that he did not think the 
administration should hinge its policy "just to the question of whether or not the inspectors go 
back in there [into Iraq]" and that inspections "may not be as crucial if you've got other 
measures in place and you've got a sanctions regime", many saw the administration's policy 
review as evidence that the US was "backing down in the face of Iraqi intransigence".792 
Skepticism towards the level of toughness with which the administration appeared to confront 
Iraq was in fact so high among conservative lawmakers who accused the administration of 
being too soft on Iraq, that it prompted Secretary of State Colin Powell to defend the 
administration in a committee hearing, arguing that sanction reform was not an "effort to ease 
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the sanctions", but rather to "rescue the sanctions policy that was collapsing".793 In sum, the 
Bush administration chose to tweak Clinton's containment approach instead of turning to 
regime change in the first months after coming into power, exposing itself to accusations that 
it was too soft on Iraq.  
The Turn to Regime Change After 9/11 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, the internal power balance shifted 
considerably towards the proponents of regime change, leaving the voices of containment 
advocates unheard. President Bush announced on September 20, 2001, that the "war on terror 
begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of 
global reach has been found, stopped and defeated".794 That the defeat of "terrorist groups" 
would involve a confrontation with Saddam Hussein became more and more clear in the 
months following 9/11. Even before Bush's 2002 State of the Union Address in January 2002, 
in which he asserted that Iraq co-constituted "an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of 
the world"795, did administration officials call for turning to Saddam Hussein as the next 
target in the "war on terror". At first, these considerations proposed the limited use of force to 
overthrow Saddam Hussein short of a full-scale invasion. In a discussion with President Bush 
on September 15, 2001, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz reiterated the "enclave 
strategy" to seize Iraqi oil fields in Southern Iraq and provide a sanctuary for Shiites hostile to 
the Iraqi regime.796 Soon later, however, key administration officials became convinced that 
the limited use of force would not bring about regime change. When on January 3, 2002 Vice 
President Dick Cheney and his chief of staff Scooter Libby met with CIA Director George 
Tenet and two of his aides to discuss CIA operations inside Iraq, one of Tenet's aides 
emphasized that "covert action could accomplish a good deal, but it could not, by itself, oust 
Saddam".797 This meant that an invasion with ground troops would be necessary to change 
the Iraqi regime. Planning for contingencies, the administration had started updating its war 
plans with Iraq immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11, but these plans 
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seemed to become more and more concrete. Countless meetings between Secretary of 
Defense and US CENTCOM commander Tommy Franks, in which the war plan was 
constantly updated, took place between November 2001 and the end of 2002.798 
Regime change became reality with the invasion of Iraq on March 19, 2003. When 
President Bush addressed the nation in the evening of that day, announcing "the early stages 
of military operations",799 the ultimatum of 48 hours for Saddam Hussein and his sons to 
leave Baghdad had passed.800 Military action was initiated with missile strikes that 
unsuccessfully aimed at decapitating the Iraqi President whom the Bush administration 
suspected to be at a complex outside Baghdad.801 Already on the first full day of war, on 
March 20, the United States military gained control of 25 percent of Iraqi territory with a 
force of roughly 250,000 military personnel involved in the overall operation.802 The invasion 
proceeded without much resistance from the Iraqi military so that fears of potential 
contingencies such as Iraqi use of WMD against advancing coalition forces, missile attacks 
on Israel, oil fields set to fire, widespread starvation, a public health crisis, or the so-called 
"Fortress Baghdad", "a long and bloody standoff […] in the urban environment",803 did not 
materialize.804 After the fall of Tikrit on April 14, which was the last major battle,805 Bush 
announced the end of major combat operations on May 1, 2003, less than a month after the 
onset of the invasion.806 The Bush administration promised to withdraw its troops from Iraq 
once the Iraqi dictatorship was dismantled and Iraq set on a path of peace and security. The 
occupation of Iraq lasted until June 28, 2004, but US troops remained in the country until the 
end of 2011 with the last American troops leaving Iraq on December 18, 2011.807 
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Bush's Emotional Frustration and US Regime Change in Iraq 
Why was there a shift in the George W. Bush administration's foreign policy towards Iraq 
from containment to regime change after the first months of Bush's presidency? Taking 
advantage of the analytical leverage provided by the terrorist attacks of September 11 as a 
critical turning point in the administration's approach towards Iraq, the section separately 
examines the administration's general foreign policy outlook and its specific expectations 
towards Iraq's leadership, continuity in Iraqi obstruction and the Bush administration's 
perception thereof, and the level of emotional frustration within the administration, both 
before and after September 11, 2001. 
Bush's Expectations Towards Iraq Before 9/11 
What explains the Bush administration's initial choice for containment in the face of growing 
Iraqi intransigence? Despite daily obstructions in the shape of resistance to the enforcement 
of no-fly zones, a central component of containment, the Bush administration did not resort to 
regime change. Instead, it responded by striking Iraqi targets and by trying to strengthen the 
containment policy that had been put in place a decade earlier. This choice for limited missile 
strikes had something to do with Bush's initial foreign policy outlook. In one of his earliest 
speeches on foreign policy and the United States' role in the world, Bush made, as 
presidential candidate, a careful distinction between international engagement and 
international dominance. Worried about an overstretch of the US military, he argued that 
"American internationalism should not mean action without vision, activity without priority, 
and missions without end – an approach that squanders American will and drains American 
energy".808 Without questioning that "American armed forces have an irreplaceable role in 
the world", he noted in another speech that Americans could not be "permanent peacekeepers, 
dividing warring parties".809 The intended recalibration of US missions abroad was in line 
with Bush's conception of America's place in the world. Reaffirming America's predominant 
global role as the most powerful state internationally, Bush did not fail to stress that  
America cherishes freedom, but we do not own it. We value the elegant 
structures of our own democracy – but realize that, in other societies, the 
architecture will vary. We propose our principles, we must not impose our 
culture.810 
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In one of three presidential election debates in October 2000, Bush reinforced his view that 
the central responsibility stemming from the United States' immense power was to project a 
humble picture of the US to the world, arguing that "if we're an arrogant nation they'll view 
us that way, but if we're a humble nation they'll respect us".811 A good example for the extent 
to which Bush put a premium on staying out of the affairs of other states unless core national 
interests were concerned, was his stance towards the peace process in the Middle East, about 
which he said: "[w]e can't dictate the terms of peace […]" and "[i]t's got to be on the 
timetable of the people that we're trying to bring to the peace table".812  
At the time of his statements on foreign policy during the 2000 presidential campaign, 
Bush had no prior executive experience at the federal level and was widely seen as a foreign 
policy novice.813 While his relative inexperience might have had an impact on the stability 
and reliability of his foreign policy outlook, the latter was widely shared with and reinforced 
by some of his most important foreign policy advisers. Condoleezza Rice, who became 
Bush's first National Security Advisor, formulated her outlook in an article in 2000 that 
contained what has been called "Bush's guide to the world" before 9/11.814 In it, Rice argued 
that a strong US military tasked with the defense of the US homeland should not imply a 
foreign policy of arrogance, but rather the pursuit of US interests "without hectoring and 
bluster".815 More importantly, the article testifies to Rice's embrace of the principle of 
sovereign equality. Criticizing the Clinton administration's over-reliance on the military for 
purposes other than self-defense, Rice explained that "[u]sing the American armed forces as 
the world's '911' will […] fuel concern among other great powers that the United States has 
decided to enforce notions of 'limited sovereignty'".816 In the article, Rice stressed her respect 
for the sovereignty and autonomous decision-making of other states is reflected in statements 
about bilateral relations with China and Russia, in which she recognized limits to US power 
and the notion that "it is simply not possible to ignore and isolate other powerful states that 
do not share [American] values."817 Based on an outlook that emphasized US restraint in the 
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dealings with other states, the US President was predisposed to a cautious foreign policy 
without hegemonic expectations towards Iraq prior to 9/11. 
Iraqi Obstruction Before 9/11 
The Bush administration's initial preference for containment must be judged against the 
backdrop of Iraqi foreign policy behavior and is all the more remarkable given that Saddam 
Hussein's conduct was hardly restrained. Crumbling economic sanctions reinvigorated the 
Iraqi economy and the years of 1999 and 2000 saw a gradual increase in Iraqi prestige and 
economic power.818 More importantly, Iraq grew more assertive vis-à-vis the United States. 
In 1999, the Iraqi regime started resisting the enforcement of the no-fly zones in Northern and 
Southern Iraq, regularly targeting US and British aircraft and making a deadly shoot-down 
increasingly more likely.819 As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld put it, Iraq became 
"the one place on the face of the earth where American men and women in uniform [were] 
getting fired at with impunity, day after day after day".820 According to reports, Iraq shot 51 
times at British and American pilots patrolling the no-fly zones from the beginning of 
January through mid-February 2001 and more in January 2001 alone than in the entire 
previous year.821 Clearly, the regular Iraqi firings of anti-aircraft artillery constituted an 
obstruction to the enforcement of no-fly zones and were perceived accordingly by the Bush 
administration. On February 16, 2001, George W. Bush responded to the growing danger of 
Iraqi shootings by authorizing strikes against Iraqi anti-aircraft facilities beyond the no-fly 
zones for the first time in two years.822 But as remarkable as these strikes were, they were 
limited and part of the enforcement of no-fly zones. The Bush administration's response to an 
Iraqi regime growing more assertive vis-à-vis the United States, did thus not go beyond the 
containment policy put in place by Bush's presidential predecessors. In the words of National 
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, the focus of the administration "was not […] on the 
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overthrow of Saddam Hussein", but rather were the administration's efforts "aimed at trying 
to strengthen the containment regime".823 
The Bush Administration's Perception of Iraqi Obstruction Before 9/11 
Based on the foreign policy outlook of sovereign equality, the Bush administration did not 
perceive Saddam Hussein's obstructive behavior as deliberately directed at the US, something 
highly unexpected, or rooted in hatred. Instead, administration officials perceived the Iraqi 
regime's growing assertiveness and the regular targeting of US aircraft enforcing the no-fly 
zones as a type of obstructive behavior that remained within the framework of normal 
politics, failing to instigate an emotional response. With the low-level combat over the no-fly 
zones continuing, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld laid out a number of potential 
foreign policy options vis-à-vis Iraq in a memorandum sent to Condoleezza Rice on July 27, 
2001. Proposing a National Security Council (NSC) meeting to discuss the administration's 
Iraq policy, Rumsfeld revealed his characterization of Saddam Hussein by trying to put 
himself into the shoes of the Iraqi dictator, arguing that "[h]e [Saddam Hussein] has his own 
interests" and that "he might prefer […] to make some accommodation".824 Rumsfeld's view 
that Saddam had "his own interests" indicates that at least parts of the Bush administration 
regarded Iraqi intransigence as a normal and therefore predictable act of foreign policy in a 
world in which states naturally pursue their interests.825 To be sure, the Bush administration 
considered Iraqi foreign policy behavior a serious menace that needed to be confronted. This 
menace, however, was not one that took the administration by surprise, nor was it considered 
out of the ordinary or an expression of deep hatred. 
Another indication for the perception of Iraqi obstruction as an act of normal politics 
was the Bush administration's characterization of its response to Iraqi shootings. When 
President Bush authorized US bombings of Iraqi targets outside the no-fly zones, something 
that had not happened in two years, he insisted publicly that these were routine operations 
rather than a sign of departure from previous US policy. On the day of the attacks, when 
journalists confronted Bush with the bombings in an unrelated press conference, the US 
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President tried to avoid giving the impression that something unusual was happening, 
repeating twice that a "routine mission was conducted to enforce the no-fly zone" and that he 
did not make the decision himself, but rather authorized a decision made by the "commanders 
on the ground".826 When the US bombed Iraqi targets months later in what was the "strongest 
attack on Iraq since February [2001]",827 Bush reiterated that attacks were a routine operation 
initiated by the military on its own, stressing that the "[US] military can make decisions as 
they see fit to protect our pilots".828 
No Regime Change 
The continuation of containment, the de-facto US policy towards Iraq up until the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, was the result of a long weighing of different options. Almost 
immediately after George W. Bush came into office in January 2001, an extensive policy 
review on Iraq took place,829 but while the overthrow of Saddam Hussein as a possible US 
aim was certainly discussed, at no time did any administration official propose a massive 
ground invasion of the kind that took place in March 2003 after 9/11.830 Assigning duties to 
his cabinet – reviewing the sanctions regime, examining military options, and improving 
intelligence on Iraq – at the first NSC meeting of his presidency on January 30, 2001,831 Bush 
insisted that a range of different options be considered, something that became unimaginable 
after 9/11. The following months were marked by an intense internal debate about how best 
to deal with the Iraqi regime. Rather than taking a decision without much deliberation, the 
policy review allowed NSC members to present and defend their preferred policy approaches 
to Iraq. The deliberations proved to be so extensive that "[a]s of late summer 2001, neither 
Rumsfeld nor the President had decided on what U.S. policy toward Iraq should be".832 
Mostly at the deputies committee level, the cabinet's second tier, administration officials 
considered options to confront Iraq's regular targeting of US aircraft. The State Department 
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suggested an overhaul of the sanctions regime with a more specific list of items Iraq would be 
disallowed to purchase; the Department of Defense and the Vice President's office favored a 
more aggressive approach to Iraq that would center on the support of Iraqi opposition 
groups.833 Despite the Iraqi regime's unabated intransigence in its dealings with the United 
States, the discussions dragged on for months. The time devoted to the formulation of a 
comprehensive policy towards Iraq meant that before the President and his top advisers left 
for vacation in August 2001, no "policy recommendation on Iraq" had been "forwarded to the 
president",834 which meant that the Bush administration's approach to Iraq remained within 
the framework of containment, however perceivedly ill-suited to confront Iraq.835 
Bush's Hegemonic Expectations Towards Iraq After 9/11 
The terrorist attacks of September 11 changed the way George W. Bush and other officials of 
his administration viewed the United States' role in the world and its relationship to other 
states. According to CIA Director George Tenet, after 9/11 "[m]any foreign policy issues 
were […] viewed through the prism of smoke rising from the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon".836 In the words of Bush himself, "[t]hrough the lens of 9/11, my view changed".837 
The pre-9/11 outlook, taking the sovereign equality of states for granted, changed into one 
that emphasized the United States' predominant role in dealings with other states. Weighing 
the respect for sovereign equality against a new urge to restructure relations to other states on 
the basis of US predominance, key decision-makers in the Bush administration started 
rethinking the United States' role in the world in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. While 
states were regarded as sovereign equals up until the terrorist attacks, now the outlook 
divided states into enemies and friends. In the evening of September 11, Bush asserted that 
his government would "make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these 
[terrorist] acts and those who harbor them",838 essentially declaring "a sweeping new doctrine 
in American security".839 A few days later in a speech before Congress on September 20, 
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2001, the US President stated that "[e]very nation, in every region, now has a decision to 
make: [e]ither you are with us, or you are with the terrorists."840  
A memo produced by Douglas Feith, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 
testified to this change in view and US expectations towards Iraq. Tasked by Donald 
Rumsfeld with developing an analysis of the United States' role in a post-9/11 world,841 Feith 
formulated a new foreign policy outlook whose rationale and logic explicated much of what 
has come to be known the Bush Doctrine, i.e. the notion that "new and vigorous policies, 
most notably preventive war",842 were necessary to confront great threats. In his memo titled 
"sovereignty and anticipatory self-defense", Feith articulated the administration's new 
perspective on the significance and nature of sovereignty in international relations. While the 
administration's pre-9/11 outlook emphasized a lack of intention to impose limited 
sovereignty on states the United States dealt with, the new foreign policy outlook made a 
dramatic departure from what Feith called "the traditional view of sovereignty", i.e. the 
notion that states "have the sovereign right to do whatever they want within their own 
borders".843 Now, after 9/11, the Bush administration claimed residual rights in its dealings 
with specific target states, rights that would elevate its position vis-à-vis other states, allow it 
to confront behavior it deemed hostile and to quit according "full respect to the sovereignty of 
a hostile power".844 With the new doctrine, the US adopted hegemonic expectations and 
would now be in a position to rightfully expect compliance with its expectations. With 
respect to Iraq, this meant a new urge to demand disarmament from Saddam Hussein. 
Iraqi Obstruction After 9/11 
The Bush administration's move from containment to regime change after 9/11 was not 
preceded by a change in Iraqi behavior. Just as prior the terrorist attacks, Saddam Hussein 
remained defiant in his foreign policy after the attacks, but did not expand his obstructive 
actions. Just like before 9/11, Iraqi attempts at shooting down US aircraft patrolling the no-fly 
                                                                                                                                                        
Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, 77. Bush himself admits that his new doctrine "overturned the 
approach of the past, which treated terrorist groups as distinct from their sponsors " and forced "nations to 
choose whether they would fight the terrorists or share in their fate", see Bush, Decision Points 137. 
840
 George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the 
Terrorist Attacks of September 11 (2001 [cited April 15, 2014]); available from 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=64731&st=saddam&st1=iraq. 
841
 Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, 423. 
842
 Robert Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine," Political Science Quarterly 118, no. 3 (2003): 365. Jervis 
argues that the Bush administration's labeling of preventive wars as preemptive, implying that a target state's 
attack on the US would be imminent, does "violence to the English language" (369).  
843
 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Policy, Sovereignty and Anticipatory Self-Defense, August 24 
(2002 [cited April 15, 2014); available from http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/294/2002-08-
24%20From%20OSD%20Policy%20re%20Sovereignty%20and%20Anticipatory%20Self-Defense.pdf. 
844
 Ibid. 
 172 
zones occurred regularly. According to Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Iraq was still engaged in low-level combat with US planes at the time of his testimony in 
September 2002.845 While Iraqi shootings decreased in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, 
possibly because Saddam Hussein "wanted to avoid provoking the United States", the month 
of April 2002 experienced the most intense skirmishes since August 2001.846 In addition, 
Iraq's intention to pursue a program of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) remained 
unchanged after 9/11, at least in the eyes of the Bush administration. However false the belief 
of US intelligence and foreign intelligence agencies about the extent of Iraq's WMD program 
was, it was based on evidence collected almost exclusively before 9/11. The national 
intelligence estimate (NIE) on the status and prospects of Iraqi WMD, which was 
collaboratively produced by the entire American intelligence community and delivered to 
Congress in early October 2002, was based on an array of analyses and estimates that had 
already been previously produced by various US intelligence agencies.847  
The Bush Administration's Perception of Iraqi Obstruction After 9/11 
Despite the unchanged nature of Iraqi obstruction, the Bush administration's perception of 
Iraq's foreign policy behavior changed markedly after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In contrast 
to how Iraqi obstruction was perceived in the beginning of Bush's presidential term, US 
administration officials now took Iraqi intransigence as a sign of deep hostility towards the 
United States, considering Saddam Hussein's behavior as a clear indication of his staunch 
anti-Americanism.848 The expectation of compliance with the administration's disarmament 
demands led many government officials, including the President himself, to be surprised by 
Saddam Hussein's unabatedly obstructive behavior. Proceeding from the assumption that his 
expectations towards Iraq were clearly communicated, Bush did not expect the Iraqi dictator 
to remain unwilling to knuckle under US pressure to disarm. The US President reasoned: "[i]f 
Saddam doesn't actually have WMD […], why on earth would he subject himself to a war he 
will almost certainly lose?".849 In a later interview, Bush revealed that "he was surprised to 
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learn Saddam Hussein did not believe he would take military action in 2003".850 Indeed, 
expected compliance with US demands of disarmament were so strong that it did not occur to 
the US President and his aides that Saddam Hussein's perceived obstruction had little to do 
with the United States. 
In addition to being surprised by the Iraqi dictator's perceived unwillingness to 
disarm, the Bush administration was convinced that Iraq's alleged WMD program was a sign 
of Saddam Hussein's intention to hurt the United States. Calling the Iraqi leader "a homicidal 
dictator pursuing WMD and supporting terror at the heart of the Middle East",851 Bush saw in 
Saddam Hussein a high degree of Iraqi hostility and a "sworn hatred of America".852 
Interpreting Iraqi obstruction as "evidence of dangerous malignity" towards the US,853 Bush 
shared his views on Saddam Hussein's alleged hatred for the United States in September 
2002:  
this man [Saddam Hussein] poses a much graver threat than anybody could 
have possibly imagined. Other countries, of course, bear the same risk. But 
there's no doubt his hatred is mainly directed at us [the United States]. There's 
no doubt he can't stand us.854  
Similarly, when the US President set an ultimatum for Saddam's departure from Iraq in 
March 2003, he argued that the Iraqi regime not only had "a history of reckless aggression in 
the Middle East", but also "a deep hatred for America and our friends".855 Bush made similar 
remarks in private, adding further credence to the sincerity of how he perceived Iraqi 
obstruction after 9/11: in a closed-door meeting with members of Congress, Bush, using 
cruder language, argued that Saddam's foreign policy towards the United States was nothing 
but a "Fuck the United States!",856 revealing the extent of Saddam's alleged anti-Americanism 
Bush sensed. This perception and deep mistrust of Saddam Hussein's stance towards the 
United States was a likely cause, not consequence, of Bush's genuine belief in Iraqi WMD, 
the official justification for regime change. Had Bush not perceived the Iraqi dictator as an 
anti-American villain willing to use anything at his disposal to hurt the United States, the US 
President might have drawn more cautious conclusions about Iraq's alleged WMD and might 
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not have regarded "any ambiguity concerning Iraqi WMD [as] evidence of their existence and 
Saddam's commitment to conceal capabilities".857 
Bush's perception that Saddam's obstructive behavior, i.e. his assumed WMD program 
and the continued targeting of US aircraft, could be traced back to the Iraqi dictator's 
allegedly implacable hostility towards the United States, left no room for alternative views on 
the sources of Saddam Hussein's behavior. That Iraqi obstruction could have been an 
outgrowth of other factors was hardly considered. The times when the administration 
meticulously analyzed Saddam's behavior in order to reach a better understanding of the 
mercurial Iraqi dictator and his opaque regime were long gone. Instead, evidence that pointed 
towards other reasons for Iraq's obstruction was largely ignored and never seriously 
considered in the aftermath of 9/11. Interestingly, Saddam Hussein was in reality "much more 
interested in the threat from Iran than the threat from the United States".858 It did not occur to 
the Bush administration that his obstructive behavior was informed by what captured records 
of internal Iraqi deliberations suggest to be an unwillingness to signal "weakness that might 
encourage an Iranian or Israeli attack".859 Preoccupied with his regional adversaries rather 
than driven by a desire to attack the United States, Saddam was convinced that he "needed to 
withhold cooperation from UN inspectors to prevent Iraq's enemies from collecting 
intelligence and to preserve Iraq's honor and dignity".860 As interviews with the Iraqi dictator 
after his capture show, Saddam's ambiguity about a potential WMD program was a 
consequence of his belief that "Iraq could not appear weak to its enemies, especially Iran", 
that he regarded the "possibility of Iran trying to annex a portion of Southern Iraq" as the 
"most significant threat facing Iraq", and that Saddam was "more concerned about Iran 
discovering Iraq's weaknesses and vulnerabilities".861 Indeed, then-CIA Director George 
Tenet admits in his memoir that the administration failed to consider the possibility that the 
reason why Saddam Hussein did not admit to the absence of Iraqi WMD was unrelated to the 
United States, but rather a consequence of regional security concerns on the part of the Iraqi 
dictator.862 David Lake is therefore correct in arguing that the Bush administration ruled out 
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the possibility that Saddam's continued obstruction after 9/11 "might be directed at his 
domestic and regional opponents rather than at Washington".863 
Bush's Emotional Frustration with Saddam Hussein 
The emotional state of US administration officials in the aftermath of 9/11 cast its shadow on 
the administration's decision-making process in foreign policy. While it has been widely 
argued that the terrorist attacks of September 11 changed the administration's threat 
perception,864 their direct emotional impact on the US President and his government officials 
should not be underestimated.865 The anxiety-inducing character of the attacks had 
considerable impact not only on ordinary Americans, but also on the highest echelons of US 
power. In an atmosphere in which "[e]motions were raw",866 the US President himself 
experienced "this terrible new reality [9/11] as directly and emotionally as any American".867 
While fear and what Condoleezza Rice called "a virtual state of shock" might have dominated 
with other government officials,868 the President himself experienced high levels of anger. 
Not only was Bush outraged by the attacks and the audacity of their perpetrators to launch 
deadly attacks on American soil, he also vowed that "[t]hey [the perpetrators] were going to 
pay" when the news of the second plane hitting the World Trade Center in New York City 
was delivered to him.869 When he then learned that a third plane had crashed into the 
Pentagon, his outrage and quest for revenge intensified:  
[t]he first plane could have been an accident. The second was definitely an 
attack. The third was a declaration of war. My blood was boiling. We were 
going to find out who did this, and kick their ass.870 
Bush's anger had immediate consequences for the actions the US President envisioned to take 
in response to the attacks. In an interview he gave later, he claimed to remember exactly what 
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he was thinking at the moment the news reached him: "I made up my mind at that moment 
that we were going to war".871 Reflecting upon the lack of urgency he felt regarding the threat 
emanating from Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden prior to September 11, a threat that upon 
Bush's inauguration had been identified by CIA Director George Tenet as "one of the three 
top threats facing the United States",872 Bush tellingly justified his pre-9/11 inaction by 
saying that his "blood was not nearly as boiling".873 Now, Bush's outrage propelled him to a 
type of action that was consciously chosen to be different from previous ways US 
governments had responded to terrorist attacks: in the words of the President himself, his 
military response would be more comprehensive than "pinprick cruise missile strike[s]" that 
would not do more than put "a million-dollar missile on a five-dollar tent".874 
As Bush's outrage and anger translated into military action in Afghanistan and the 
toppling of the Taliban, his emotional arousal persisted, evolving into frustration with what 
would become the second target in Bush's "war on terror": Iraq. Based on the widespread 
perception within the administration that Saddam Hussein's obstruction was an outgrowth of 
his inexcusable hatred for the United States, Bush became emotionally frustrated with the 
Iraqi leader. Prior to 9/11, Iraq's obstructionism was a serious foreign policy problem to 
Bush. After 9/11, with a radical shift in US expectations in the shape of the Bush Doctrine 
combined with a much less favorable view of the sources of Iraqi foreign policy behavior, the 
same obstructionism, now turning into a top US foreign policy priority, aroused deep 
frustration. While somewhat guarded from public view and carefully cloaked into the 
language of imminent security threats and necessary self-defense against terrorism, a 
language that would resonate both with a wounded post-9/11 American public and the 
international normative context with respect to the utility and permissibility of the use of 
military force, this emotional frustration became palpable in Bush's private interactions and 
deliberations within his administration. At a time when Bush publicly professed not to have 
any Iraq war plans on his desk,875 he privately told his press secretary Ari Fleischer in an 
outburst standing in stark contrast to the language the administration used publicly: "I'm 
going to kick his [Saddam's] sorry motherfucking ass all over the Mideast".876 Such visceral 
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reactions testifying to Bush's frustration with Saddam remained mostly invisible to the eye of 
the American and international public, but they were numerous. During a discussion with US 
senators in March 2002 about how to deal with Iraq, Bush "waved his hand dismissively [...] 
and neatly summed up his Iraq policy" by saying "Fuck Saddam, we're taking him out".877 
Having "strong feelings about Saddam Hussein",878 Bush did not try to hide his frustration in 
private settings. Only in rare occasions did he reveal his determination to overthrow Saddam 
Hussein, like in April 2002 when he caused considerable irritation in front of journalists, 
signaling that "even Iraqi compliance with UN demands on weapons inspections might not be 
enough to avoid war": "I made up my mind that Saddam needs to go".879 
President Bush's emotional frustration with Saddam Hussein was so intense that there 
was no conceivable option left to the Iraqi dictator to stay in power. No commitment to 
disarmament, which according to the publicly stated justification for the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq was the official goal of regime change, could have been credible enough to ameliorate 
Bush's feelings of frustration and to avoid war. In the words of James Mann,  
[a]dministration officials viewed the two goals of disarmament and regime 
change as inseparable because they assumed Saddam Hussein would never 
give up the programs for weapons of mass destruction they were convinced he 
possessed.880 
The Bush administration's belief in Iraqi hostility and feelings of deep frustration with 
Saddam Hussein rendered any combination of Iraqi concessions short of relinquishing power 
unacceptable, making any outcome of the inspections regime mandated by UNSC Resolution 
1441 other than military action impossible. In the course of UN weapons inspections, White 
House press secretary Ari Fleischer laid out why there was close to nothing Saddam could do 
to convince the United States of his commitment to disarmament. On December 2, 2002, he 
said that "[i]f Saddam Hussein indicates that he has weapons of mass destruction […], then 
we will know that Saddam Hussein again deceived the world"; "[i]f he declares he has none, 
then we will know that Saddam Hussein is once again misleading the world",881 revealing 
how deeply entrenched the belief in Iraqi hostility and its concomitant existence of WMD 
stockpiles was. Hence, it was "Washington, not Baghdad, that kicked weapons inspectors out 
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of Iraq, advising them to leave three days before the invasion".882 Actions on the part of the 
Iraqi regime, be it concessions or continued intransigence, would not be used to update prior 
perceptions about Iraqi hostility, but would instead be judged in light of those firm post-9/11 
perceptions.883 The decision-making process after 9/11 differed starkly from the decision to 
pursue a policy of containment before 9/11. The belief that Iraq was intentionally trying to 
harm the United States was not based on intelligence, whether faulty or not, but was an 
outgrowth of the administration's negative perceptions and hegemonic expectations resulting 
in emotional frustration. 
Alternative Explanations 
As already mentioned, explanations for the 2003 Iraq War and Bush's decision to overthrow 
Saddam Hussein abound. According to one author, "there are few instances that match the 
invasion and occupation of Iraq for complexity of motive and ambiguity of purpose".884 This 
section presents three common arguments and assesses their explanatory power. 
The most prominent argument about the sources of regime change in Iraq is the notion 
that Saddam Hussein's WMD program posed an imminent threat to the national security of 
the United States. Believing that the Iraqi dictator would not shy away from using any violent 
means in furthering his aims, the Bush administration was, according to this argument, 
apprehensive of the Iraqi regime's attempts at developing WMD. In the words of Melvyn 
Leffler, the goal of regime change was thus "to enhance the nation's [US] security and rid the 
world of a defiant and portentous foe rather than promote democracy or remake the Middle 
East".885 The security-threat argument is closely aligned with the Bush administration's public 
pre-invasion justifications for regime change,886 given that Iraq's WMD program occupied a 
central place in the administration's official presentation of the case for regime change. As 
one author correctly notes, "the most urgent rationale for war, and the strongest rebuttal to 
those critics who argued that Iraq could be contained" was the argument that "the United 
States could not afford to wait to strike Iraq because Saddam possessed horribly destructive 
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weapons and might get more".887 In his address to the UN General Assembly in September 
2002, President Bush asserted that the "conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority 
of the United Nations, and a threat to peace", arguing that "Saddam Hussein has defied all 
these efforts [previous UN resolutions] and continues to develop weapons of mass 
destruction". Based on these assertions, Bush concluded that "[i]n one place – in one regime – 
we find all these dangers, in their most lethal and aggressive forms".888 
The argument that fear regarding Saddam Hussein's WMD program was the most 
critical driving force for regime change is belied by the evidence at hand. First, a number of 
government officials have admitted that WMD were not the main reason for the invasion. 
True, the widespread accusation that the Bush administration willfully lied about Iraqi WMD 
is hard to sustain. There are plausible reasons for the administration's belief that Saddam 
possessed such weapons. His prior use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, his 
uncooperative stance towards weapons inspections following the 1991 Gulf War, and his 
decision in 1998 to ban UN inspectors from Iraq, all gave the administration ample reason to 
believe that the Iraqi dictator was trying everything to conceal the real extent of his WMD 
program. As Leffler shows, "[e]ven the harsh critics of the war [...] acknowledge that they, 
too, believed that Saddam possessed WMD (of some sort) or would develop them as soon as 
he successfully evaded sanctions and inspections".889 Whether this genuine belief in Saddam 
Hussein's WMD program was the main reason for regime change, however, is far from 
certain. Evidence suggests that rather than being the administration's main preoccupation, 
WMD were a convenient argument to justify regime change and garner domestic public and 
international support. Paul Wolfowitz, Bush's Deputy Secretary of Defense, for example 
conceded in a post-invasion interview that "for reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. 
government bureaucracy [the administration] settled on the one issue that everyone could 
agree on which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason".890 Douglas Feith, Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy, similarly hints at the notion that the WMD threat was a 
means to publicly justify regime change, discounting the importance of corresponding 
intelligence details for the administration's decision for regime change: "the rationale for the 
war [2003 invasion of Iraq] didn't hinge on the details of [the WMD] intelligence even 
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though the details of the intelligence at times became elements of the public presentation [for 
regime change]".891 Richard Haass, the State Department's Director of Policy Planning, 
agrees by arguing that the "arguments put forward for going to war - noncompliance with 
U.N. resolutions, possession of weapons of mass destruction - turned out to be essentially 
window-dressing, trotted out to build domestic and international support".892 
An alternative version of the security-threat argument claims that not Iraqi WMD per 
se, but rather Saddam Hussein's willingness to hand such weapons to terrorist organizations 
like Al Qaeda was the main source of threat to US security. This concern was regularly 
invoked when Bush administration officials presented the case against Iraq to the public. In 
the words of the US President, "the source of our urgent concern about Saddam Hussein's 
links to international terrorist groups" was the notion that, for a chemical or biological attack, 
"all that might be required are a small container and one terrorist or Iraqi intelligence 
operative to deliver it". More specifically, Bush asserted that the US knew not only that "Iraq 
and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy – the United States of America", 
but also that they had "high-level contacts that go back a decade", giving Saddam Hussein the 
strategic option to "decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a 
terrorist group or individual terrorists".893 In his 2003 State of the Union Address, Bush 
similarly claimed that the Iraqi regime had ties to terrorists: 
Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by 
people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, 
including members of Al Qaida. Secretly and without fingerprints, he could 
provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists or help them develop their 
own.894  
Although it is difficult to probe whether the purported link between Iraq's regime and terrorist 
groups was a genuine belief within the Bush administration, evidence suggests that it was not 
based on available intelligence, giving credence to the suspicion that the "administration 
manufactured the issue to exploit the national anguish over 9/11 [...] by associating Iraq with 
the perpetrators of that terrorist horror".895 Compared to the issue of Saddam Hussein's WMD 
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program, the US intelligence community was far less convinced of any collaboration between 
Iraq and terrorists. "If there were evidence of Iraq giving funds or safe haven to al Qaeda 
before the invasion", Richard Clarke, the administration's chief counterterrorism specialist, 
argues, "the Administration would have produced it".896 When Secretary of State Colin 
Powell prepared his speech to the UN security council in February 2003, he discarded a 
number of items linking Iraq to Al Qaeda, as such "assertions weren't backed by what the 
intelligence community believed and stood behind".897 Indeed, evidence regarding the 
terrorist links of the Iraqi regime was so sparse that some of the most fervent supporters of 
regime change within the administration resorted to additional intelligence gathering, 
circumventing the intelligence community and trying to find proof for their unshaken belief 
in the Iraq-Al Qaeda connection.898 
The second prevalent explanation for regime change in Iraq is an argument about the 
role of economic interests in the decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Especially the 
notion that Iraq's oil resources were a central factor in the Bush administration's rationale for 
regime change is a much-invoked variant of this argument. William Blum, for example, 
argues that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein enabled "American oil companies to move into 
Iraq to enjoy a laissez-faire feast".899 Another author similarly argues that the "U.S. invasion 
of Iraq was not meant to stop Iraq from using weapons of mass destruction [...], nor was it to 
create democracy", but rather to "extend U.S. control over Iraqi oil supplies [...]" considered 
to be "the real spoils of war" and the "primary concerns governing the U.S. intervention from 
the start".900 Further explicating the logic behind the alleged desire to control Iraqi oil, Noam 
Chomsky argues that "[i]f you control Iraq, you are in a very strong position to determine the 
price and production levels [of oil], and to throw your weight around throughout the 
world".901  
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Oil and infrastructure companies were certainly beneficiaries of the post-war 
occupation of Iraq. Corporations such as Halliburton, but also construction companies like 
Bechtel, won remarkable government contracts worth billions of dollars to reconstruct the 
Iraqi infrastructure and economy.902 It is also true that some Bush administration officials like 
the President himself and his Vice President had "once been in the oil business", heading 
some of the companies that won government contracts in Iraq.903 Despite these facts, 
however, it is hard to sustain that oil-related considerations governed the administration's 
decision to invade Iraq. A significant bulk of primary documents like the records of the 
administration's energy task force remain classified, but preliminary evidence suggests that 
the administration was not driven by a desire to control Iraqi oil. The oil and energy working 
group of the State Department's 'Future of Iraq Project', "one of the most comprehensive U.S. 
government planning efforts for raising [Iraq] out of the ashes of combat",904 assured that 
"Iraq's enormous reserves of oil and gas are the endowment, patrimony, and birthright of the 
Iraqi people" and that the "focus of oil policy [...] should be to derive the maximum 
obtainable benefits from Iraq's enormous hydrocarbon reserves and deliver these benefits to 
their owners, the Iraqi people".905 The project might have found little resonance with other 
government agencies, and "much of the project's work was shelved", having little impact on 
the implementation of post-war reconstruction in Iraq,906 but its basic idea regarding the 
usefulness of Iraqi oil for Iraq' development was widely shared: while largely ignoring the 
State Department's project, Donald Rumsfeld and his Department of Defense planned on 
facilitating "Iraqi efforts to secure their own country, using their oil exports to finance 
whatever was needed".907 Another indication for the lack of US interest in controlling Iraqi 
oil was the fact that, much to the surprise of Noam Chomsky, one the most vocal proponents 
of the oil-argument,908 the country's oil exports plummeted after the invasion, for years not 
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regaining "even the reduced production levels that prevailed in the 1990s, when Iraq was 
under tough U.N. sanctions".909 
The third alternative explanation prevalent in the literature treats the influence of the 
neoconservative movement, defined as an "especially hawkish political ideology",910 on the 
government's decision-making process as the central factor responsible for the Bush 
administration's endorsement regime change in Iraq. Most commonly, this explanation 
assigns causal weight to neoconservatives who  
seized the occasion of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, to steer the 
nation into a war that would never have been fought had not this group of 
ideologues managed somehow to gain control of national policy.911  
John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt identify key administration officials who belonged to 
the neoconservative movement, "the principal driving force behind the Bush administration's 
decision to invade Iraq in 2003":912  
this group included prominent officials in the Bush administration such as Paul 
Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith, the number two and three civilians in the 
Pentagon; Richard Perle, Kenneth Adelman, and James Woolsey, members of 
the influential Defense Policy Board; Scooter Libby, the vice president's chief 
of staff; John Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international 
security, and his special assistant, David Wurmser; and Elliott Abrams, who is 
in charge of Middle East policy at the National Security Council. It also 
included a handful of well-known journalists like Robert Kagan, Charles 
Krauthammer, William Kristol, and William Safire.913 
According to the argument, without the influence of these individuals on the US President, 
regime change in Iraq would hardly been possible.914 
Indeed, neoconservative members of the Bush administration were staunch supporters 
of regime change in Iraq. Individuals such as Paul Wolfowitz or Scooter Libby propagated 
Saddam Hussein's overthrow enthusiastically, even before 9/11, evidenced by both public and 
private remarks about the utility of support for Iraqi opposition groups and the use of force to 
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unseat the Iraqi dictator.915 Yet, explanations centering on neoconservatives both inside and 
outside the administration vastly overestimate the influence of these individuals on the 
decision-making process, particularly Bush's post-9/11 endorsement of military aggression 
against Saddam Hussein. Interestingly, Mearsheimer and Walt concede that, prior to 9/11, 
neoconservatives "had been unable to persuade either Clinton or Bush to support an 
invasion",916 and by resorting to the central role 9/11 played in creating a new context and 
influencing Bush's outlook and perception of Saddam Hussein, inadvertently point to other 
factors unrelated to the existence and influence of neoconservatives that had an important 
bearing on Bush's decision to invade Iraq. As Frank Harvey shows through his counterfactual 
analysis, a US government headed by a different President and without neoconservative 
officials might have reached similar conclusions in the aftermath of 9/11.917 The existence of 
neoconservatives in the Bush administration was thus not necessary for the US government to 
turn to regime change in Iraq as the chosen policy. 
Conclusion 
US regime change in Iraq cannot be understood if we do not take the emotional state of 
administration officials, most notably of George W. Bush himself, into account. The Bush 
Doctrine's hegemonic vision, dividing the world into good and evil and promising to not only 
target terrorists, but also their alleged state sponsors and safe havens, combined with a 
radically negative perception of the sources of Iraqi obstruction led to high emotional 
frustration within the Bush administration. Saddam Hussein's continued intransigence after 
9/11 in terms of his resistance against the enforcement of no-fly zones and continued 
ambiguity regarding his WMD program were viewed by the administration as a clear sign of 
the Iraqi leader's hostility towards and irreducible hatred for the United States, prompting 
Bush to resort to regime change to get rid of the perceived menace. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is something deeply puzzling about regime change decisions. In the words of Stephen 
Kinzer, the story of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, for example, is a story "enveloped in a single 
one-word question: Why?".918 Enshrouded in ambiguity, regime change in Iraq has been 
explained with recourse to ad-hoc assertions about the influence of neoconservatives. But 
Iraq is no exception. If regime change is generally costly, highly consequential, yet mostly 
ineffective, as studies have argued, its use raises questions. In trying to provide answers, most 
of existing explanations suffer from what has been called the "streetlight effect".919 Taking 
certain patterns of state behavior for granted, particularly rationality based on cost-benefit 
calculations and the relevance of a quest for security, they have not been able to solve the 
enigma of regime change, as they have looked for answers under the proverbial streetlight, 
searching "for something in a way that's relatively convenient rather than in a way that's more 
likely to be fruitful".920 In contrast, this study, chartering unexplored territory, has abandoned 
the streetlight and instead ventured into the dark to provide a more compelling explanation 
for the practice of regime change. In doing so, I have argued that regime change is better 
understood as an affectively spurred response to policymakers' experience of emotional 
frustration, an emotional state evoked by a combination of hegemonic expectations and 
perceptions of a target state's obstruction as rooted in irredeemable hatred. 
The relationship between the experience of frustration and the inclination towards 
aggression has been subject to extensive study in the field of social psychology, but has not 
crossed disciplinary boundaries. The frustration-aggression hypothesis, postulating that 
engagement in aggressive behavior can be a consequence of frustration, is not only well-
known in the field, but has received approval despite many modifications, and is still 
assumed to be "a major, if not the major, source of aggression".921 Therefore, one would not 
exaggerate in claiming that the connection between frustration and aggression is anything but 
controversial at the level of individuals. When transposed to the level of international politics, 
however, the relationship seemingly loses its plausibility, running against the grain of much 
of international relations scholarship. After all, critics might note, especially at the level of 
the articulation and implementation of foreign policy, the emotional state of foreign 
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policymakers cannot be a consequential factor given that the highly institutionalized context 
of decision-making leaves little room for raw emotions to become influential movers of 
policy. Indeed, a substantial part of international relations theorizing is biased against not 
only the role of emotion in decision-making, asserting that at best "emotion is all 
consequence and rarely a cause",922 but also against explanations that do not "place great 
stress on the incentives and constraints posed by the environment, be it domestic or 
international".923 Judged from such a perspective, an argument about the role of emotional 
frustration in regime change decisions must look odd. 
Despite such understandable pessimism towards an explanation for regime change 
centering on the impact of emotion on decision-making, this study has argued that it would in 
fact be difficult to account for the practice of regime change without reference to the 
emotional frustration of policymakers. Stripped to its essence, the core claim presented in this 
study is that regime change, being an aggressive foreign policy option that can be affectively 
spurred by emotional arousal, becomes an attractive tool for emotionally frustrated 
policymakers. What evokes emotional frustration on the part of policymakers is a 
combination of hegemonic expectations towards a target state and the perception that 
obstructive behavior is rooted in deep hatred. Once emotionally frustrated, these elites resort 
to regime change a) to get rid of a perceivedly irredeemable menace, and b) to discharge their 
frustration through the use of force. Portrayed in this way, regime change need not be the 
product of a rational weighing of costs and benefits, nor a tool whose essential purpose is to 
confront national security threats, spread democracy, or advance economic interests, i.e. 
factors prominently cited in the literature. 
That the argument about the role of emotional frustration in regime change decisions 
helps us understand the pattern of US regime change is shown in the empirical part of this 
study. Through a series of four detailed historical case studies that reach back to the 
beginning of the twentieth century and encompass virtually the entire period of US regime 
change activity in the modern history of US foreign policy, I uncover the repeated ways in 
which the emotional frustration of leading US policymakers has framed and animated 
decisions to engage in regime change. As the first case study shows, the 1906 intervention in 
Cuba was Theodore Roosevelt's immediate response to the emotional frustration he 
experienced with the Cuban leadership around Cuban President Tomas Estrada Palma whose 
inability to quell a domestic uprising, the 1906 August revolt, was highly obstructive to 
                                                 
922
 Mercer, "Human Nature and the First Image: Emotion in International Politics," 290. 
923
 Robert Jervis, "Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know?," Security Studies 22, no. 2 (2013): 154. 
 187 
Roosevelt's hegemonic expectations of order and stability in Cuba. Regarding the revolt as 
illegitimately targeted at the United States, and accusing Palma of being obstructive so as to 
intentionally drag the United States into the Cuban power struggle, Roosevelt responded 
violently by intervening in Cuba against both the rebels and the incumbent Cuban 
government. A few years later, President William H. Taft experienced similar levels of 
emotional frustration: confronted with the obstructive foreign policy and domestic economic 
policies of Jose Santos Zelaya, the President of Nicaragua, Taft decided to first suspend 
diplomatic recognition and then side with armed Nicaraguan opponents of Zelaya's 
presidential successor, Jose Madriz. Based on expectations towards Zelaya that were more 
extensive than during Roosevelt's presidential term, and the perception that Zelaya's and even 
Madriz' behavior were an expression of deep-seated anti-Americanism, Taft saw no choice 
but to use force to eliminate what he called 'Zelayist elements' from Nicaragua's political 
authority structure.  
In the case of the 1965 Dominican intervention, President Johnson's decision to 
prevent Dominican constitutionalists from returning to their pre-coup political system was 
predicated upon his frustration with Juan Bosch, Dominican President before his ousting in 
September 1963. While Bosch proved to be an obstinate head of state regularly clashing with 
US expectations with regard to the Alliance for Progress and the persecution of Dominican 
Communists, it was his activities in exile that were perceived to be a sign of his hatred for 
everything American, provoking intense frustration in Johnson. Confronted with the 
possibility of Bosch's return to power, Johnson forcefully supported reactionary anti-Bosch 
elements within the Dominican military with the deployment of more than 20,000 US troops 
to the island, suppressing the Dominican constitutionalists' desire to return to their democratic 
1963 constitution. Finally, the 2003 invasion of Iraq was similarly predicated upon George 
W. Bush's change in expectations towards Iraq after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, combined 
with a radically negative perception of the sources of Iraqi obstruction. While Saddam 
Hussein's foreign policy conduct had been obstructive at least since the beginning of the 
1990s, only after 9/11 was it perceived to be an expression of his irreducible hatred for the 
United States. Intensely frustrated with the Iraqi dictator, Bush regarded regime change as a 
welcome tool to discharge his emotional arousal and to get rid of an unyielding menace. 
This argument about emotional frustration and regime change in US foreign policy 
has significant implications for several important debates in international relations 
scholarship: the debate regarding the relationship between public statements, official 
justifications, and rhetoric with actual state practices; the debate on US grand strategy; the 
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debate on the effectiveness of regime change; and finally debate on how policymakers assess 
state intentions. In what follows, I consider each of these debates in turn. 
Words, Deeds, and the Naiveté of Realism 
An important debate in international relations scholarship has revolved around whether 
official justifications for foreign policy actions bear any analytical and real-world 
significance. According to one line of argument, the justificatory choices of policymakers are 
important. Claiming that they provide a window onto the international normative context, 
justifications for state action are conceived of as attempts "to connect one's actions with 
standards of justice or [...] with standards of appropriate and acceptable behavior".924 For 
states, it is important to link foreign policy actions to established principles of state conduct, 
because justifications constitute "legitimacy claims", which are "essential to the cultivation 
and maintenance of an actor's or institution's legitimacy". Thus, "actors seeking to justify 
their identities, interests, practices, or institutional designs" do so because they hope to 
receive consent and approval.925 According to a second line of argument, however, the 
significance of justifications should not be overrated, because "public speech acts are 
notorious for their lack of credibility and validity as indicators for the actor's beliefs and 
intentions".926 Little can be inferred from what state leaders publicly say, as leaders 
oftentimes spread outright lies.927 Put differently, words are unreliable and talk cheap.928 
Especially realists point to a gap between rhetoric and actual foreign policy practice, arguing 
that, in the United States for example, "public discourse about foreign policy [...] is usually 
couched in the language of liberalism", while "[b]ehind closed doors [...], the elites who make 
national security policy speak mostly the language of power".929 Indeed, asserting that their 
theoretical framework allows them to cut through fleeting rhetoric and to identify interests as 
they really are, many realists regularly accuse other theoretical perspectives of giving too 
much credit to costless communication, and of taking public statements at face value. This is 
evidenced, for example, by Stephen Walt's critique of Samuel Huntington's argument about 
the role of civilizational fault lines in the occurrence of international conflict in the post-Cold 
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War world.930 Refuting Huntington's thesis, Walt claims that national security interests trump 
cultural affinities between states, asserting that inconsequential nature of public talk serves as 
a confirmation for the "enduring relevance of the realist, statist paradigm".931 Another 
example is John Mearsheimer's claim that liberal theories, and the American public for that 
matter, buy too much into the public rhetoric of US foreign policy elites, being naively 
persuaded that the United States acts "according to cherished principles, rather than cold and 
calculated power considerations".932 
This study contributes to the debate on the significance of public justifications for 
foreign policy actions. While its empirical findings support the basic notion that there is a 
discernible gap between rhetoric and practice, the study takes issue with the assertion that 
especially realist theories are well-equipped to identify the real forces that drive state 
behavior. Showing that instead of cutting through the rhetoric of foreign policy elites, realist 
approaches are prone to buying into official justifications that revolve around notions of 
national self-defense and thereby giving too much weight to security talk, the study shows 
that realism is guilty of the same basic mistake they accuse other theoretical explanations of 
committing. The analysis presented here demonstrates that especially in the cases of the 
Dominican Republic and Iraq, US administrations expended considerable efforts on the 
public presentation of their case for intervention.933 While other lines of justifications have 
certainly played a role, justifications for regime change have in all cases asserted that action 
is necessary because US security is on the line. Yet, as the empirical analysis of this study 
illustrates, security considerations played a central role at the level of justifications, but 
decisions to intervene were crucially animated by emotional frustration, opening up a gap 
between talk and action that those who take the language of security and national threats at 
face value, misread. To the extent that US administrations have tried to justify regime change 
with recourse to security, they have inadvertently revealed the powerful incentives to present 
decisions in the language of security and self-defense, pointing to the imperative of 
justification and the "shared values and expectations that other decision makers and other 
publics in other states hold".934 Assuming that such rhetoric reflects the actual forces driving 
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policy, however, would be a naive leap of faith that interferes with the realist promise to 
uncover the sources of foreign policy conduct in general and regime change decisions in 
particular. 
US Grand Strategy and the Consequence of Hegemonic Expectations 
International relations scholars have long debated which course US foreign policy should 
take. With consensus remaining elusive, the debate on US grand strategy, defined as a 
"nation-state's theory about how to produce security for itself",935 has divided theorists into 
two competing camps.936 The first camp favors a grand strategy of primacy, also called "deep 
engagement", arguing that the US should remain globally engaged and maintain its "security 
commitments to partners and allies in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East".937 Unless 
such expansive grand strategy is pursued, the United States would have to deal with "the 
emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment" in which undeterred states 
would aspire to regional hegemony and have incentives to "adopt solutions to their security 
problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas".938 As high as the costs of 
US security commitments might be, the grand strategy of "deep engagement" is said to yield 
greater security benefits and should therefore be preferred over alternative grand strategies. 
The premise that global security commitments are necessary for US security is challenged by 
a second camp of scholars.939 Arguing that the case for "deep engagement" is fundamentally 
flawed because "primacy is unlikely to produce [...] diminished third-party security 
competition", has "nonsecurity consequences", and has the "tendency to lead the United 
States into imprudent wars",940 these scholars favor the alternative grand strategy of restraint, 
also called retrenchment. In the words of three of its proponents, "the policy of restraint [...] 
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means specifically two things: a significant reduction in the number of active-duty forces and 
a significant reduction in America's overseas military presence".941 The US can afford 
adopting a smaller role in the world, so the argument goes, as "security competition is 
declining anyway" and even "if competition occurred, it would pose little threat to the United 
States".942 
As extensive as the debate on US grand strategy is, the empirical analysis of this study 
makes a novel contribution to it. Many advantages and disadvantages of specific grand 
strategic choices have been the subject of lengthy discussions, but it has been generally 
overlooked that hegemonic expectations might have unintended consequences that can 
incline foreign policymakers to the use of force where none would be considered, were non-
hegemonic expectations adopted. As my historical analysis of US regime change decisions 
show, each case study under examination involved US leaders having expectations towards a 
target state that, if conformed to, would have curtailed or wholly undermined the target state 
leaders' autonomous decision-making capabilities. As a consequence, these hegemonic 
expectations increased the potential for frustration by turning the target states' otherwise 
ordinary state conduct into obstruction, which if perceived in a certain way, i.e. as rooted in 
hatred, arouses emotions that, as the study has shown, can lead to an aggressive foreign 
policy behavior like regime change. Proponents of the grand strategy of primacy (or "deep 
engagement") assure that their preferred strategy does not bias a state's foreign policy towards 
increased military activism, claiming that it does not "imply the aggressive use of force to 
overturn the international status quo or force U.S. preferences on other societies". In their 
view, "[t]he use of military power is a choice" and "[h]aving a large global military presence 
enables this choice but does not necessitate it".943 If the empirical results of this study are 
valid, however, hegemonic expectations inherent in a grand strategy based on primacy and 
the concomitant maintenance of military bases worldwide, might inadvertently drag such a 
grand strategy into violent conflict, biasing the choice that "deep engagement" allegedly 
facilitates. Neither critics nor proponents of "deep engagement" have noted that expectations 
shape how foreign policymakers see a target state's behavior and whether such behavior 
constitutes obstruction in their eyes, potentially developing a dynamic that results in 
emotional arousal and foreign policy aggression. 
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The Effectiveness of Regime Change 
As shown in Chapter Two of this study, the bulk of previous scholarship on regime change, 
also called "foreign-imposed regime change" (FIRC), has dealt with the effectiveness of this 
foreign policy instrument, not its sources. Among the range of potential consequences 
examined are the effects of regime change on democratization, internal stability, civil war, 
regional peace, and interstate conflict. According to the general consensus, FIRC enhances 
the durability of interstate peace and lowers the likelihood of regional war,944 but is an 
ineffective tool in producing favorable results in the target state in terms of internal stability, 
civil war prevention, and democracy.945 Stephen Krasner and Jeremy Weinstein, after 
reviewing studies on the domestic consequences of regime change for the target state, come 
to the conclusion that "the recent studies of the impact of FIRCs on democratization suggest 
that imposition creates consolidated democracies only if very specific conditions are in 
place".946 
The effectiveness of regime change is not the main focus of this study. Yet, it 
contributes to the pertinent debate by showing that most of the potential consequences 
studied, particularly democracy promotion, are not always part of the reasons why the United 
States has engaged in regime change. Without inquiring into the role of regime change and 
the rationale of its use, the implicit assumption of most FIRC studies is that the desirable 
potential outcomes of FIRC reflect the regime changer's desires, as it would be rather 
unlikely to, for example, expect democratization through regime change if the regime 
changer has no interest in promoting democracy. Two scholars studying the effects of FIRC 
on democratization acknowledge that "[p]reconditions for democracy are important in 
creating fertile grounds for foreign-imposed regime change to bring about positive 
democratic change, but by themselves they cannot ensure democratization unless the external 
intervener takes the initiative and enacts democratic reforms".947 By showing that, indeed, the 
desire to make the domestic complexion of target states more democratic has not been among 
the main driving forces for regime change in US intervention decisions, this study not only 
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helps us understand why democratization has been such a rare outcome in target states 
suffering regime change, it also suggests that assessing the effectiveness of regime change 
makes only sense in light of the purpose of this policy instrument. Ironically then, one could 
argue that regime change is an highly effective instrument if its purpose, as this study 
suggests, is to get rid of an obstructive and perceivedly hateful foreign leader and to 
discharge emotional frustration, regardless of its lacking potential for democratization. 
Perceived Intentions 
Can state leaders confidently gauge other states' intentions and if so, what indicators do they 
rely on to do so? Such questions have been at the center of an important debate in 
international relations scholarship that is essentially about the scrutability of state intentions. 
Pessistimic views argue that international anarchy is so pervasive that states can never be 
"sure that other states do not have offensive intentions to go along with their offensive 
capabilities".948 This uncertainty prompts states to "make worst-case assumptions about their 
rivals' intentions" and therefore to focus on offensive capabilities of rivals.949 In the words of 
Sebastian Rosato, because of uncertainty, "estimates of intentions play only a marginal role 
and great powers focus on the balance of power, which is more easily measurable".950 Other 
views argue that it is not military capabilities states rely on to gauge intentions, but rather 
costly signals, which are defined as "an act which one type of actor in a game can take that 
other types would find too costly".951 Costly signals help policymakers differentiate states 
with benign intentions, i.e. states that seek security, from states that have aggressive 
intentions beyond security.952 Therefore, the pessimism of offensive realism about the ability 
of states to gauge one another's intentions is said to be unwarranted: pessimistic accounts 
"strongly overestimate the difficulty in assessing state motivations".953 Finally, a recent study 
argues that neither military capabilities nor costly signals are indicators states resort to in 
order to assess their adversaries' intentions. Instead, state leaders "often base their 
interpretations [of intentions] on their own theories, expectations, and needs, sometimes 
ignoring costly signals and paying more attention to information that, though less costly, is 
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more vivid".954 What Keren Yarhi-Milo calls the 'selective attention thesis' acknowledges 
"heuristic inference strategies" used by state leaders to get a grasp of their security 
environment and is therefore more flexible than competing explanations for how 
policymakers come to grips with other states' intentions. 
My analysis of how US leaders perceive obstructive actions of target states 
contributes to the debate about the perception of state intentions in two important ways: first, 
by offering empirical evidence for how state leaders scrutinize the behavior of other states,955 
this study lends credence to the view that one and the same behavior can be perceived 
differently and that state leaders can draw varying inferences with regard to the roots of said 
behavior.956 This implies that "decisionmakers do not always assume the worst about 
intentions, as offensive realists would say they should".957 More specifically, this study shows 
that the perception of another state's behavior is crucially influenced by the extent to which 
policymakers impute malignity and hatred to the target state's actions. In all four cases of US 
regime change analyzed here, the decision to intervene was predicated upon US presidents 
associating target state obstruction with deep-seated hatred for the United States. Dovetailing 
with what authors have called the 'egocentric bias', i.e. the "predilection of people to see 
themselves as the central point of reference for the actions of others",958 my findings call 
attention to how assumptions of hatred have a major impact on the perception of state 
intentions. Second, this study affirms the policy relevance of the study of perceptions of state 
intentions by showing how perceptions of obstruction can have serious emotional 
implications, even leading to decisions as fateful as regime change. If my account of US 
regime change decisions is correct, imputing hatred to a target state's behavior is likely to 
instigate an aggressive policy response. This carries with it an important policy implication, 
supporting views that call for a careful analysis of adversaries' sources of behavior that 
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acknowledges other states' agency rather than reducing their behavior to an allegedly direct 
response to one's own actions. 
A Final Note on the Powerful 
By inquiring into the role of emotional frustration in US regime change decisions, this study 
has unavoidably had to zoom in on the powerful, the ones who make decisions that affect the 
lives of countless people around the world, and, with phenomena as big as regime change, 
decisions that determine nothing less than the difference between life and death for those 
affected. Taking these real costs of policies such as regime change seriously, it is of 
paramount importance to understand how and why such fateful decisions are made and, just 
as importantly, who the people are who make these decisions. One implicit, yet important 
implication of this study is to show that decisionmakers are no superhuman creatures capable 
of finding rational solutions, however defined. Rather, as exceptionally powerful and perhaps 
mystical as they might be, they are better portrayed as ordinary human beings with the same 
cognitive and emotional capacities, flaws, and predispositions as us less powerful. 
Understood in this way, it should perhaps be less surprising that, for better or worse, even 
foreign policy elites happen to act upon their emotional impulses, regardless of the highly 
institutionalized and bureaucratized context in which decisions regarding foreign policy are 
made. Showing that the behavioral implications of emotion reach to the highest echelons of 
power should give us a more realistic picture of foreign policy decision-making, and help us 
understand and grasp decisions as costly and fateful as regime change. 
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